5 December 2023

Ref: OIA-2023/24-0176

Dear

Official Information Act request for correspondence with the former Prime Minister related to Christchurch Call

Thank you for your request made under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act), for correspondence related to the Christchurch Call with the former Prime Minister and Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call, Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern. We approached you seeking a refinement to your original request which captured a lot of administrative and logistical material. On 21 September 2023 you submitted a refined request to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) for:

> "*Correspondence between Rt. Hon. Jacinda Ardern and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (including the Prime Minister) between 17 April 2023 and 01 August 2023. I ask for information only related to The Christchurch Call. I only ask for information that includes recommendations, briefings, and presentations.*"

We transferred your request as it related to any relevant correspondence between the Prime Minister and former Prime Minister, Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern, to the Prime Minister.

On 19 October 2023, I wrote to you extending the time limit for response by 32 working days, to 5 December 2023. The additional time was needed as to respond to your request required a search through a large quantity of information, and consultations were needed before a decision was made. I am now in a position to respond.

Please find **attached** correspondence held by DPMC identified as relevant to your request. The documents released to you are set out in the table below. As marked within the documents, some information has been withheld under the following sections of the Act:

- section 6(a), to protect the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand
- section 6(b)(ii), to protect the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on a basis of confidence by any international organisation
- section 6(c), to protect the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial
- section 9(2)(a) of the Act, to protect the privacy of individuals.
- section 9(2)(ba)(i), to protect the supply of similar information in the future.
- section 9(2)(c), to protect the health or safety of members of the public
- section 9(2)(f)(iv), to maintain the confidentiality of advice tendered by or to Ministers and officials
- section 9(2)(g)(i), to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinion
- section 9(2)(g)(ii), to prevent improper pressure or harassment
- section 9(2)(j), to enable negotiations to be carried on without prejudice or disadvantage.

Where information has been published, section 18(d) of the Act has been applied on the basis that the information is already publicly available. The link to the website with the information has been provided in the table below.

Included as an attachment to the emails released to you is a table of engagement requests made to the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call. This document is regularly updated as logistics are worked through, decisions are made, and different versions of this 'tracker' document were attached at different times. As noted in the released documents, the information about the possible engagements themselves have been withheld under sections 9(2)(a), 9(2)(ba)(i), 9(2)(f)(iv) and 9(2)(g)(i) of the Act (as set out above).

Also marked is information that is not in scope of your request which has been redacted. This is information included in the correspondence which is administrative and logistical and not including 'recommendations', 'briefings' or, 'presentations'. Included as information we have assumed to be not in scope of your request are itineraries for the Special Envoy. In addition, where there are duplicate emails in email trails, these have been redacted as marked.

It is important to note that the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call does not receive any renumeration as the Special Envoy. While reference was made about the reimbursement of the Special Envoy for any actual and reasonable costs, no such claims have been made.

Table of correspondence released

Doc No	Date	Subject line from Email or Title	Approach
Doc 01	30/04/2023	Christchurch Call: first weekly update and engagements tracker	Release with redactions under: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) 18(d) – some information publicly available at: www.dpmc.govt.nz/publications/proactive-release-prime-ministers-special-envoy-christchurch-call Some information out of scope.
Doc 02	1/05/2023	Re: Christchurch Call: first weekly update and engagements tracker	Release with redactions under: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some information out of scope. Some duplicate information.
Doc 03	10/05/2023	Read out of CCU meeting with Reddit, 10 May 2023	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii)
Doc 04	10/05/2023	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 10 May 2023	Release with redactions under: 6(a) 6(b)(ii) 6(c) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv)

Doc No	Date	Subject line from Email or Title	Approach
			9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j) Some information out of scope.
Doc 05	11/05/2023	RE: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 10 May 2023	Release with redactions under: 6(b)(ii) 6(c) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some information out of scope. Some duplicate information.
Doc 06	17/05/2023	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 17 May 2023	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) 18(d) – some information publicly available at: www.dpmc.govt.nz/publications/proactive-release-prime-ministers-special-envoy-christchurch-call Some duplicate information.
Doc 07	24/05/2023	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 25 May 2023	Release with redactions under: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j) Some information out of scope.
Doc 08	26/05/2023	Christchurch Call: daily round-up – 26 May	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j) Some information out of scope.
Doc 09	26/05/2023	Fwd: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 25 May 2023	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some duplicate information.
Doc 10	31/05/2023	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 31 May 2023	Release with redactions under: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some information out of scope.
Doc 11	31/05/2023	Weekly round-up pt 2: Twitter	Release with redactions under:

Doc No	Date	Subject line from Email or Title	Approach
		bystander footage + CCAN issues briefing	9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii)
Doc 12	2/06/2023	Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 31 May 2023	Release with redactions under: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(g)(ii)
Doc 13	6/06/2023	RE: Visit to San Francisco 8 - 9 June: itinerary and briefing pack	Release with redactions under: 6(b)(ii) 6(c) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(c) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j) 18(d) Co-Chair statement is publicly available on the Christchurch Call website at: www.christchurchcall.com/assets/Documents/Christchurch-Call-Joint-Statement-2022-English-version.pdf Final Opinion piece in The Washington Post available at: www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/06/09/jacinda-ardern-ai-new-zealand-planning (Draft withheld under section 9(2)(g)(i)).
Doc 14	21/06/2023	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 21 June 2023	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some information out of scope.
Doc 15	21/06/2023	Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 21 June 2023	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some information out of scope. Some duplicate information.
Doc 16	27/06/2023	Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 21 June 2023	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some information out of scope.
Doc 17	3/07/2023	RE: Possible collaboration with [some of subject line withheld under s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)]	Email content withheld under: 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(j)

Doc No	Date	Subject line from Email or Title	Approach
Doc 18	12/07/2023	Christchurch Call catch up - Special Envoy / [*some of subject line withheld under s9(2)(g)(ii)*]	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some information out of scope.
Doc 19	12/07/2023	For consideration: 'Future of the Call' workstream	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j)
Doc 20	12/07/2023	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 12 July 2023	Release with redactions under: 6(b)(ii) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j) 18(d) – Article about meeting with Stanford University scholars some information publicly available at: fsi.stanford.edu/news/special-envoy-jacinda-ardern-assembles-stanford-scholars-discussion-technology-governance-and Some information out of scope.
Doc 21	17/07/2023	RE: Christchurch Call: Briefing paper - Altman call 18 July	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some information out of scope.
Doc 22	18/07/2023	Final briefing to support PM / SE meeting - 20 July	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j) Some information out of scope.
Doc 23	19/07/2023	Briefing note - US Second Gentleman - 21 July	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j)
Doc 24	19/07/2023	RE: Invitation for Prime Minister Ardern [UNCLASSIFIED]	Withheld in full under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii)
Doc 25	19/07/2023	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 19 July 2023	Release with redactions under: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii)
Doc 26	19/07/2023	Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 19 July 2023	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i)

Doc No	Date	Subject line from Email or Title	Approach
			9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) Some duplicate information.
Doc 27	21/07/2023	RE: Formal Message: US to Announce New AI Commitments On 21 July RESTRICTED	Release with redactions under: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j) Whitehouse Press Release: www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/07/21/remarks-by-president-biden-on-artificial-intelligence
Doc 28	26/07/2023	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 26 July 2023	Release with redactions under: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba)(i) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i) 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(j) Some information out of scope. Decisions on the post-Summit work programme are set out in the 2023 Leaders' Summit Joint Statement which is publicly available on the Christchurch Call website at: www.christchurchcall.com/assets/Documents/Christchurch-Call-Leaders-Summit-2023-Joint-Statement-ENG.pdf

Where section 9 applies, in making my decision I have considered the public interest considerations in section 9(1) of the Act. No public interest has been identified that would be sufficient to override the reasons for withholding that information.

You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to investigate and review my decision under section 28(3) of the Act.

This response will be published on DPMC's website during our regular publication cycle. Typically, information is released monthly, or as otherwise determined. Your personal information including name and contact details will be removed for publication.

Yours sincerely

Janine Smith
Deputy Chief Executive, Policy

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	Jacinda Ardern; s9(2)(a)
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	Christchurch Call: first weekly update and engagements tracker
Date:	Sunday, 30 April 2023 4:19:00 pm
Attachments:	image001.png
	Connecting key people in our new Call team UNCLASSIFIED.msg
	ChCh Call Team - Organogram 2023.pptx
	Special Envoy - requests for engagement - tracker.docx
	Letter of Appointment and ToR - Special Envoy.pdf

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora Special Envoy and s9(2)(a)

[Not in Scope]

Upcoming visit to Geneva

The CyberPeace Institute (CPI) has confirmed Chief Executive Stéphane Duguin's availability in principle to meet with you on either Sat 20 May and Sun 21 May while you're in Geneva.

s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

Proactive release of your Letter of Appointment and ToR

Subject to your agreement and the PM's agreement, we propose proactively releasing the Letter of Appointment and Terms of Reference for your role. PMO has agreed to this in principle

s9(2)(g)(i)

What do you think of proactively releasing the docs?

That's all from me. I'm looking forward to working with you both. Please don't hesitate to reach out on anything at all s9(2)(g)(ii) is in Ottawa this week at the Canada Centre Conference (though still online and s9(2)(a) so if you're unable to get hold of him for anything urgent, please let me know and the team and I will swing into action. My phone number is s9(2)(a)

Ngā mihi mahana ki a koe,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

s9(2)(g)(ii)
Senior Advisor
Christchurch Call Unit, Policy Advisory Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Mobile s9(2)(a)
Email s9(2)(g)(ii) dpmc.govt.nz

Christchurch Call Unit - New Zealand (DPMC/MFAT)

France (Co-Founder) Counterparts

- Henri Verdier, Ambassador for Digital Affairs
  s9(2)(a)
- Paul Schmite, Advisor to Ambassador for Digital Affairs
  s9(2)(a)

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s9(2)(g)(ii)
Prime Minister's Special Representative for Cyber & Digital
Christchurch Call Coordinator
s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz
s9(2)(a)

- International Leadership and support to PM
- Christchurch Call Spokesperson
- Senior Relationships with Govt, Industry and Civil Society

CHRISTCHURCH CALL |
TO ELIMINATE TERRORIST & VIOLENT EXTREMIST CONTENT ONLINE

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s9(2)(g)(ii) (MFAT)
Divisional Manager, International Security and Disarmament Division
New Zealand Counter Terrorism Ambassador
s9(2)(g)(ii) @mfat.govt.nz
s9(2)(a)

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s9(2)(g)(ii) Chief Advisor s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(g)(ii) Principal Advisor s9(2)(a)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz s9(2)(a) 0.65 FTE 0900 – 1430 Mon to Thursday	s9(2)(g)(ii) Principal Advisor s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz s9(2)(a) Internet NZ Secondee up to 0.6 FTE (not available Wed)	s9(2)(g)(ii) Senior Policy Advisor s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(g)(ii) Senior Policy Advisor s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(g)(ii) Special Advisor Axford Fellow s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.gov s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(g)(ii) Special Advisor Australian Department of Home Affairs Secondee s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz	s9(2)(g)(ii) Team Admin / EA s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz s9(2)(a) 0.80 FTE Mon to Fri	s9(2)(g)(ii) Programme Manager s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz s9(2)(a) 0.20 FTE Mon to Fri	s9(2)(g)(ii) Senior Communications Advisor s9(2)(g)(ii) @mfat.govt.nz s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(g)(ii) acting Unit Manager International Security Policy s9(2)(g)(ii) @mfat.govt.nz	s9(2)(g)(ii) Senior Policy Officer Christchurch Call s9(2)(g)(ii) @mfat.govt.nz	s9(2)(g)(ii) Policy Officer Christchurch Call s9(2)(g)(ii) @mfat.govt.nz s9(2)(a)
Lead Responsibilities - *Strategic Advice, direction & mentoring* - **Algorithms work plan** - Free Open & Secure Internet - Support to PM's international engagement	**Lead Responsibilities** - **Incident response work plan** - **Transparency work plan** - **GIFCT – working group engagement**	**Lead Responsibilities** - Strategic advice on community, internet governance, and technical questions	**Lead Responsibilities** - **Special Envoy support** - **Gender issues** - Company onboarding - *Advice on regulatory systems and evolving jurisprudence*	**Lead responsibilities** - **Community work plan**	**Lead responsibilities** - **Community work plan**	**Lead responsibilities** - **Incident response work plan** - **Transparency work plan**	**Lead Responsibilities** - Executive and team assistance - Travel coordination	**Lead responsibilities** - Oversight of work programme - Governance, planning, reporting, & monitoring - Finance, procurement, and HR	**Lead responsibilities** - Strategic Communications - Media - Liaison with digital and web teams	**Lead responsibilities** - Foreign Affairs Coordination and Engagement - Troubleshooting - MFAT DPMC business coordination	**Lead responsibilities** - Briefings - Engagement with Governments and Int'l Orgs - CCAN engagement - International fora including FOC	**Lead responsibilities** - **Future tech workplan** - Youth and children - MFA briefing
Support role - Support to PM's international engagement - [GIFCT/IAC] - Support to Coordinator on senior level relationships		**Support role** - Civil society & technical community relationships	**Support role** - Algorithmic issues - Free, Open, & Secure internet - Domestic policy and agency contributions to the Call Commitments		**Support role** - Advice on tech companies - US regulatory systems		**Support role** - Support to Programme Manager			**Support role** - Supporter Governments - Supporter International Partner Organisations	**Support role** - MFA briefings	**Support role** - CCAN - Partner Org and company onboarding - Incident Response

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MFAT Post network

- PAR, WSH: key to bilateral and industry relationships
- Supporter Governments outreach/engagement
- International events/initiatives/ Ministerial travel programming

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12. Appointee details

Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call	
Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern	s9(2)(a), s9(2)(g)(ii)

13. Supporting agency details

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Defence House 34 Bowen Street Pipitea **WELLINGTON 6011** s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Defence House 34 Bowen Street Pipitea **WELLINGTON 6011** s9(2)(g)(ii)

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

This document outlines the process for managing requests for external engagement with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and contains the tracker tool for managing these requests. This process and tool manage requests from external parties for meetings, event participation, and media engagement as well as the Christchurch Call Unit's (CCU's) proactive suggestions for engagement. This process and tool do not manage set international outreach trips, which will be managed as separate projects as they arise.

Maintaining a record of all requests for engagement, either new, ongoing, or closed, is an essential information management practice. This document contains three tables:

- o <u>New requests</u>, which will go to the Special Envoy for decision
- o <u>Active engagements</u>, which are accepted or delegated engagements to be actioned and tracked
- o <u>Closed requests</u>, which are declined requests or engagements that have been completed

Process for requests for engagement with the Special Envoy

1. Request received
   Received through the Special Envoy's direct contacts, the Call inbox, or CCU members

2. Request centralised
   Forward all requests to s9(2)(g)(ii) copying s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)

3. Request logged, assigned, and initially assessed
   s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Thursday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

7. Request decisions actioned
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements with s9(2)(a)
   Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

8. Request moved to 'Active engagement tracker' or 'Closed requests' tracker

Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

Notes for Special Envoy's use: The tracker uses a drop-down tool. In the column titled 'Special Envoy: decision', please identify whether you would like to accept, decline, delegate or discuss. The column titled 'Special Envoy: comment' leaves room for additional comments in relation to your decision. The requests are organised by the date of the meeting/event/media that has been requested; Word's 'sort' function can reorganise the table by another means, if you wish. The CCU will consider on an ongoing basis opportunities for proactive engagement, including developing a plan for targeted, strategic media engagement; we welcome your guidance on this, including how frequently you want to engage with media. The CCU can work with and support you on the media opportunities we have suggested or marked 'high' priority.

Instructions for CCU use: For each new request for the Special Envoy's engagement, complete a row in the below table called 'New requests'. This includes internal requests and suggestions from the Christchurch Call Unit (CCU) and MFAT. Use the drop-down tool where applicable and, in the free-form boxes, please enter information in a form consistent with other entries. Please do not delete any rows once the Special Envoy has reviewed the request; instead, move accepted or delegated requests to the 'Active engagements' table and move declined requests to the 'Closed requests' table. All 'Active engagements', once completed, will also move to the 'Closed requests' table.

Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests								
Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 9 pages withheld under same grounds]

From:	Jacinda Ardern
To:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(a) s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	Re: Christchurch Call: first weekly update and engagements tracker
Date:	Monday, 1 May 2023 2:19:00 pm
Attachments:	Special Envoy - requests for engagement - tracker.docx
	Jacinda Ardern Programme Geneva 20-22 May 2023.docx

Kia ora s9(2)(g)(ii)

Thanks for your email!

[Not in Scope]

The engagement tracker will be a very useful device in this regard.

On the tracker, please find attached my comments. Hopefully I have filled it in as intended!

Geneva

[Not in Scope]

Proactive release

Proactive release of the appointment docs etc makes perfect sense. Go for it.

Hopefully this answers everything I was due to follow up on!

Have a great week

Best

Jacinda

—————————————————

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern
Special Envoy to the Christchurch Call
www.christchurchcall.com
s9(2)(a)

Duplicate - the following 12 pages redacted as duplicate.

s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv) - following 5 pages withheld under same grounds.

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	Jacinda Ardern [DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	Read out of CCU meeting with Reddit, 10 May 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 10 May 2023 7:49:00 pm

[IN-CONFIDENCE]

Kia ora Special Envoy,

As flagged in today's "Wednesday weekly round-up" email to s9(2)(a)   here is a read out of the Unit's meeting earlier today with Reddit. We are providing this via your DPMC address as a security classification is required.

FILE NOTE: Meeting with Reddit, 10 May 2023

s9(2)(ba)(i)

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 10 May 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 10 May 2023 3:50:00 pm
Attachments:	1. SE visit to Wellington 12 May.docx
	3. Engagements tracker.docx
	2. CCU workplan tracker - May 2023.pdf
	FW Insights #51.msg

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

Here is the Special Envoy's first 'weekly Weds round-up'.

Friday visit to Wellington, 12 May

[Not in Scope]

- For the first session, mapping out work and outcomes for 2023, there is a pre-read document: slides 6 – 12 of the workplan tracker s9(2)(g)(ii) has previously sent to the Special Envoy. Attached again as *2. CCU workplan tracker – May 2023*.
- One change since we discussed last Friday: the pre-recording session at MFAT will cover the Anniversary speech only, and not RightsCon. As per Special Envoy s9(2)(g)(ii) messages, we're keen to discuss RightsCon engagement further on Friday. Following that, we will make arrangements as needed.

[Not in Scope]

s6(c)

Engagements tracker
- Attached as *3. Engagements tracker*.
- It's light this week with only three new requests, two of which are media requests. With regard to media requests, we note we have an agenda item on Friday to discussion media engagement planning, which will include discussing a focused approach to media engagements, and also follow-up on some specific requests from last week's tracker that were marked "discuss/more info needed".
- Friday aside, please note we are aware as per the Special Envoy's direction (email s9(2)(a) s9(2)(g)(ii) 8.05.23), usual process will be to provide follow-up feedback via a quick email for engagements marked 'discuss/more info needed'.

Call work programme
- s9(2)(g)(ii) has previously provided the Special Envoy with our team's internal workplan tracker for the rest of the year. This now includes the Special Envoy's work programme and will be revised on an ongoing basis between s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii) in consultation with the Special Envoy. As above, this will form part of Friday's discussions.

- The CCU plans to return to short, regular (monthly) briefings to the Prime Minister and Special Envoy, providing an update on the Call work programme. We propose this is the primary vehicle for Call work programme updates to the Special Envoy.
- Please find attached an informal document highlighting Call work programme progress.
- The CCU met with Reddit on 10 May. We will provide a file note of the meeting, which has a security classification, to the Special Envoy's DPMC email address later today.

Other BAU matters
- No correspondence this week.
- No consultation on information release this week.

For info – reading / watching
- [Optimizing for What? Algorithmic Amplification and Society | Knight First Amendment Institute (knightcolumbia.org)](knightcolumbia.org)
- [Google "We Have No Moat, And Neither Does OpenAI" (semianalysis.com)](semianalysis.com) (refer s9(2)(g)(ii) email to all 9.05.23)
- [White House rolls out plan to promote ethical AI - The Verge](https://www.theverge.com)
- Attached email *FW Insights #51*.

Heads up - coming weeks
- Next week: Meeting briefing for CyberPeace Institute, 21 May 2023, Geneva; will come your way in next Weds round-up unless you'd like it sooner (please advise).
- Future weeks:
  - Consultation on proactive release of Letter of Appt and ToR; we are now working on the proactive release (refer email Special Envoy/ s9(2)(g)(ii) 1.05.23).
  - RightsCon engagement briefing/speech; week of 29 May (note, as above, discussion on Friday with Call team).
  - Briefing for San Francisco visit (8/9 June); planning to provide to you on 1 or 2 June.

As always, please let me know how we can continually improve this process for you and the Special Envoy. Thanks, s9(2)(a)

Ngā mihi,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

Summary of attachments:
1. SE visit to Wellington 12 May
2. CCU workplan tracker – May 2023
3. Engagements tracker
4. FW Insights #51

Christchurch Call Unit workplan tracker

May 2023

VERSION TWO

IN CONFIDENCE

What are these slides

- A view of the main deliverables and milestones for the Christchurch Call Unit

- An aide to delivery, management and communications intended to cover all major priorities and at least 80 per cent of total team effort

- Updated with a check in on progress towards the end of each month

- Contact:

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Policy Advisory Group

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

s9(2)(a)

The asks for you this month

1. Workstream leads: confirm the wording of your priority and revise your quarterly milestones (slides 9 to 12)

2. Fill in the new monthly view for your workstreams for at least April May and June (slides 14 to 21) and send both to s9(2)(g)(ii)

**3.** Participate in the monthly checkin on progress (week of May 8 or talk to s9(2)(g)(ii) beforehand if you will be away)

Background

The tracker just covers Call Unit work

Call Community work

Governments' Call work

Call commitments

Companies' Call work

Call Unit work covered by this Tracker (not to scale)

There are four Call priorities plus a group for cross-cutting priority work

Building the Call Community

We seek to deepen engagement among the Call Community, increase the diversity of representation, and strengthen our infrastructure.

- Increase the number of online service provider supporters
- Increase engagement with existing supporters, including through the development of a community platform
- Continue regular dialogue on policy issues and sharing of best practice
- Support the Christchurch Call Advisory Network to build its advisory function and grow its expertise and diversity
- Continue to strengthen ties with the GIFCT and Tech Against Terrorism

Crisis and Incident Response

We continue to test and refine our approach to crisis response to better prevent the spread of terrorist and violent extremist content in real time.

- Bring diverse companies – both large and small - into crisis response.
- Address the role of alt-tech or unmoderated platforms in disseminating content.
- Extend participation in the Christchurch Call Crisis Response Protocol. Include active roles for civil society, researchers and communities.
- Continue strengthening the crisis response system, human rights protections and transparency.

Algorithms and Positive Interventions

We are focused on improving our understanding of user journeys and the role of algorithms in driving online radicalisation and developing positive interventions to keep users safe.

- Improve understanding of online user journeys and the role they may play in radicalisation, how online and offline factors interact, how content recommendation processes might be exploited, and ways to mitigate this.
- Work across the tech sector and government to understand data and information needs for effective research.
- Progress the Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes, in which New Zealand, the United States, Twitter, Microsoft and the charitable organisation OpenMined are developing and testing privacy technologies to help enable independent research on these important questions

Transparency

We are focused on building greater transparency from Government and Online Service Provider supporters, including by encouraging supporters to report on content flagging and removal.

- Develop and make readily accessible for the Call's tech company and government supporters advice on how to provide meaningful transparency for key stakeholders.
- Continue encouraging and supporting Call supporters to make demonstrable improvements in their transparency practices and reporting.

Cross-cutting work

We are progressing several projects that contribute to all or several of the priorities

- Launch a workstream on new technologies (including Generative AI)
- Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism and terrorism
- Contribute to tech governance initiatives on related issues
- s9(2)(f)(iv)

The eight Call Unit external workstreams fit within the five Call priorities

Building the Call Community

We seek to deepen engagement among the Call Community, increase the diversity of representation, and strengthen our infrastructure.

Crisis and Incident Response

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
Cross-cutting work

We are progressing several projects that contribute to all or several of the priorities

| Priority	Call Unit external workstreams
Building the Call Community	1. Develop Call into self-sustaining community (includes specific outreach to and consideration of issues for LGBTQIA+ and youth) (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))
Crisis and Incident Response	2. Strengthen incident response, including with alt-tech platforms (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) 3. Develop a shared approach to address unmoderated and alt tech services (Lead: s9(2)(g) (ii)
Algorithms and Positive Interventions	4. Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC (Lead: s9(2)(g) (ii)
Transparency	5. Enhance government and company transparency (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Cross-cutting work	6. Launch a workstream on new technologies (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) 7. Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) 8. Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives (Lead: s9(2)(g) (ii)

Tracker

External workstream (1 to 5)	By March 2023	June	September	December
1. Develop Call into self-sustaining community Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: 13, 15, 22		s9(2)(g)(i) Engagement plan for Posts Deliver on the Call's anniversary plan Christchurch visit	RightsCon report Christchurch visit report Implemented NZ Post engagement plan Complete testing phase of Community workstream	s9(2)(f)(iv)
2. Strengthen incident response, including with alt-tech platforms Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: 20		s9(2)(f)(iv)	s9(2)(f)(iv) [Small firms action TBC] GIFCT Incident Response working group delivers view of success measures (TBC)	
3. Develop a shared approach to address unmoderated and alt tech services and help small firms respond Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitment: 12,15,18,20		Convene expert group on Free, Open and Secure internet Agree a set of benchmarks for this work	Develop guidelines to help regulators and online service providers, including consideration of appropriate technical tools	
4. Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitments: 11, 14, 15	Proof of function for CCIAO with two online platform datasets in parallel	Convene Algorithmic Oversight Group Researchers complete CCIAO proof of concept	Agree in principle long term setup of CCIAO and new pilot projects Expand CCIAO to other partners	
5. Enhance government and company transparency Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitments: 2, 6, 7, 10, 22	Government: Community work designed and scheduled. Read literature.	Company: ACT Portal delivered Government: Community sessions completed. Final draft of Community advice out for feedback/input.	Government: Community guidance and best practice examples published GIFCT Transparency Working Group delivers toolkit	

External workstream (6 to 8)	By March 2023	June	September	December
6. Launch a new technologies workstream, including to consider the application of the Call in new online environments Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitment: 5, 6, 20		Convene working group Discuss intersectional approaches at RightsCon Drafting issue report	Report on key issues, risks, opportunities and next steps for Call Community	s9(2)(f)(iv)
7. Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitments: 16, 23, 24, 25	Agree goals for gender work Global Partnership evidence base paper from UK	Community gender research agendas aligned, some research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#1 and RightsCon sessions Global Partnership intervention programmes catalogue	Community gender research agendas aligned, ongoing research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#2 and #3 with policy brief delivered Engagement with CCIAO	
8. Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitments: 25		s6(b)(ii)	Detailed advice for PM and Special Envoy on parallel approaches to disinformation and related issues.	

Internal outputs	By March 2023	June	September	December
Ensure visibility of Call-relevant domestic projects across agencies Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitment: [xx]		Regular checkin with DIA and other Internet Governance officials		s9(2)(f)(iv)
Future of the Call Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitment: None		Develop and distribute a view of the options for internal discussion and agreement	Discuss with France as a prelude to wider community conversations (TBC)	

Christchurch Call Unit work programme tracker

Supporting workstreams	By March 2023	June	September	December
Milestones and events	Briefing for incoming PM Announce Envoy role	Budget (May) GIFCT summit (June) RightsCon (June)	TrustCon (July) UNGA (Sep)	s9(2)(f)(iv)
Planning and reporting		Progress update to Cabinet (Jun) Steering Group (Jun)	Steering Group (Oct)	
Special Envoy		Deliver Anniversary webinar speech (pre-record) Deliver RightsCon opening speech (pre-record) SF: tech company and NGO outreach (Jun 8 and 9) First set of media engagements (TBC)	Deliver TrustCon speech (pre-record) Harvard fellowships formally begin UNGA events s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)	
Unit travel		Ottawa: Countering Radicalisation (early May) SF: Tech ambassadors (mid May) Costa Rica: RightsCon (early June) SF: meetings incl GIFCT summit (mid-June) Singapore: GIFCT, TAT, Meta workshops (mid-May)	Stanford: Trust & Safety Research Conference (Late Sep)	

Monthly views

1. Develop Call into self-sustaining community (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s9(2)(g)(i) Engagement plan for Posts Deliver on the Call's anniversary plan Christchurch visit	RightsCon report Christchurch visit report Implemented NZ Post engagement plan Complete testing phase of Community workstream	CCAN has had a number of advisory sessions with call supporters
	April: Complete the government community workstream concept note CCU workstream updates now standing part of CCAN monthly update Develop concept note on youth and contact the main relevant stakeholders	**July:**	**October:**
	May: Held Te Rourou session and call with Costa Rica; briefed PM for Coronation engagements Deliver Call Anniversary Plan (16 May) Engagement with stakeholders with interest and expertise in the youth workstream	**August:**	**November:**
	June: Engagement with Posts in NL, IR, Kenya, Ghana, Japan and SK Test ideas with a pilot group of young people	**September:**	**December:**

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2. Strengthen incident response, including with alt-tech platforms (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s9(2)(f)(iv)	s9(2)(f)(iv) Agree plan for work on small firms	s9(2)(f)(iv)
	April: Small firms project proposal. Facilitate CCAN discussion on Nashville/bystander footage Notify Community of Louisville CIP activation; media points for PM GIFCT IRWG: Identification of quantitative metrics.	July: s9(2)(f)(iv)	October:
	May: Compile target list and questions for CRP consultation, schedule meetings. Commission work on small firms Initial FOSI meeting GIFCT IRWG: Participate in GIFCT Louisville debrief. Human rights metrics.	August: s9(2)(f)(iv)	November:
	June: Conclude initial consultation with key stakeholders on changes to CRP. GIFCT IRWG: Bystander footage deep dive.	September:	December:

3. Develop a shared approach to address unmoderated and alt tech services (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	Convene expert group on Free, Open and Secure internet Agree a set of benchmarks for this work	Develop guidelines to help regulators and online service providers, including consideration of appropriate technical tools and means.	s9(2)(f)(iv)
	April:	July: Further community outreach and expert input Workshop meeting in the margins of TrustCon (TBC)	October: Implementation of leaders' decisions
	May: Convene expert group Agree approach and hold wider community consultation	August: Finalisation of guidelines for online service providers and regulators. Recommendations to leaders on next steps	November:
	June: Start consultation on guidelines	September: UNGA mandate for next stage of this work	December:

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4. Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Proof of function for CCIAO with two online platform datasets in parallel	Convene Algorithmic Oversight Group Researchers complete CCIAO proof of concept	Agree in principle long term setup of CCIAO and new pilot projects Expand CCIAO to other partners	CCIAO structure up and running Agree a way forward for work on how to assess interventions
	April: Completed phase 1 and setting up of data nodes at DailyMotion, LinkedIn and Twitter	July: Outreach with Call Community	October: Launch of next phase – researcher access tool and project funding
	May: s6(a), s9(2)(j) Start of phase 2 testing on real data Final New Zealand payment to OpenMined	August: Finalisation of announcements for UNGA meeting and decisions on funding and institutional design for next phase of project	November:
	June: Engagement with researcher community on roll out of the PET tool Formal onboarding of France and DailyMotion (TBC)	September: Announcement of outcomes on CCIAO	December:

5. Enhance government and company transparency (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Government: Community work designed and scheduled. Read literature.	Company: ACT Portal delivered Government: Community sessions completed; final draft of Community advice out for feedback/input.	Government: Community guidance and best practice examples published GIFCT Transparency Working Group (TWG) delivers toolkit	
	April: First Community Session on Government Transparency (13 April) First draft of Community advice circulated for feedback/input GIFCT TWG: Overview of toolkit proposal	July: Finalise and publish Community guidance and best practice examples.	October:
	May: Second Community Session (17 May). Iterate draft advice for feedback/input Identify with ACT areas for collaboration on government transparency	August:	November:
	June: Third (and final?) Community Session. Iterate draft advice for feedback/input Support launch of ACT portal at RightsCon GIFCT TWG: Feedback on toolkit	September:	December:

6. Launch a new technologies workstream, including to consider the application of the Call in new online environments (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	Convene working group Discuss intersectional approaches at RightsCon Drafting issue report	Report on key issues, risks, opportunities and next steps for Call Community	s9(2)(f)(iv)
	April: WG Meeting #1	July:	October:
	May: WG Meeting #2	August:	November:
	June: Draft issue report RightsCon Session	September:	December:

7. Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)

| March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Agree goals for gender work Global Partnership evidence base paper from UK	Community gender research agendas aligned, some research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#1 and RightsCon sessions Global Partnership intervention programmes catalogue	Community gender research agendas aligned, ongoing research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#2 and #3 with policy brief delivered Engagement with CCIAO	Ongoing research delivered Develop recs for gender action s6(a)
	April:	July: ISD WG#2 on OSP TVEC/gender policies Community gender group meeting with research members (GNET, ISD) presenting research agendas (TBC)	October:
	May: ISD WG#1 on OSP TVEC/gender policies Community design and consultation of RightsCon session	August: ISD WG#2 on OSP TVEC/gender policies GNET's gender/TVEC list review complete, 25 August	November:
	June: RightsCon session on advice to OSPs on TVEC/gender, 6 June (TBC) Summary paper of RightsCon session findings and Community consultation (30 June) Research paper 'Online Misogyny in NZ' delivered by Classifications Office (mid to late June)	September: ISD WG/RightsCon session policy brief due, 30 September	December:

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8. Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives (Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) [REDACTED]

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s6(b)(ii) [REDACTED]	Detailed advice for PM and Special Envoy on parallel approaches to disinformation and related issues	
	April:	July:	October:
	May:	August: Advice to PM and Special Envoy on approaches to Disinformation and related issues	November:
	June: s6(b)(ii) [REDACTED]	September: Decisions regarding ongoing engagement	December:

Christchurch Call Unit comms plan scratchpad

Channel	By March 2023	June	September	December
Website		Special Envoy – news story (April) Call Anniversary – news story, speech notes (May)		
Social media		Special Envoy – PR tweet (April) Call anniversary content (May)		
Communications to Posts		FM on Special Envoy (April) Staff forum for MFAT Posts, plus intranet news story and video (April)		
Call community (Monthly newsletter)		Call Anniversary Webinar (15 May) SF: tech company and NGO outreach (Jun 8 and 9)	s9(2)(f)(iv)	
CCAN (Zoom, last Friday of the month)				
Press		SE: First set of media engagements (TBC) s9(2)(g)(ii) NATO DEEP podcast (recorded April, aired May)		
Events and major partner engagements	Announce Envoy role	Budget (May) GIFCT summit (June) RightsCon (June)	TrustCon (July) UNGA (Sep)	IGF (Oct) Paris Peace Forum (Nov)

Whats next

Items to discuss in monthly review (week of May 8)

- What has changed since last month (fifth priority plus lines for Special Envoy and travel and comms schematic added, workstream list updated)
- Periodic reminder of the weighty responsibilities of the workstream lead role

Workstream leads

- Talk through progress and your main upcoming milestones for the rest of the year
- Talk to your milestones for April, May and June

- Communications planning two-step
- Next steps:
  - Timing for next month's review
  - First publication to the Call Community
  - Steering Group 12 June
  - What we are saying we will get done this year

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

This document outlines the process for managing requests for external engagement with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and contains the tracker tool for managing these requests. This process and tool manage requests from external parties for meetings, event participation, and media engagement as well as the Christchurch Call Unit's (CCU's) proactive suggestions for engagement. This process and tool do not manage set international outreach trips, which will be managed as separate projects as they arise.

Maintaining a record of all requests for engagement, either new, ongoing, or closed, is an essential information management practice. This document contains three tables:

- o New requests, which will go to the Special Envoy for decision
- o Active engagements, which are accepted or delegated engagements to be actioned and tracked
- o Closed requests, which are declined requests or engagements that have been completed

Process for requests for engagement with the Special Envoy

1. Request received
   Received through the Special Envoy's direct contacts, the Call inbox, or CCU members

2. Request centralised
   Forward all requests to s9(2)(g)(ii) copying s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)

3. Request logged, assigned, and initially assessed
   s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Thursday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

7. Request decisions actioned
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements with s9(2)(a)
   Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

8. Request moved to 'Active engagement tracker' or 'Closed requests' tracker

Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

Notes for Special Envoy's use: The tracker uses a drop-down tool. In the column titled 'Special Envoy: decision', please identify whether you would like to accept, decline, delegate or discuss. The column titled 'Special Envoy: comment' leaves room for additional comments in relation to your decision. The requests are organised by the date of the meeting/event/media that has been requested; Word's 'sort' function can reorganise the table by another means, if you wish. The CCU will consider on an ongoing basis opportunities for proactive engagement, including developing a plan for targeted, strategic media engagement; we welcome your guidance on this, including how frequently you want to engage with media. The CCU can work with and support you on the media opportunities we have suggested or marked 'high' priority.

Instructions for CCU use: For each new request for the Special Envoy's engagement, complete a row in the below table called 'New requests'. This includes internal requests and suggestions from the Christchurch Call Unit (CCU) and MFAT. Use the drop-down tool where applicable and, in the free-form boxes, please enter information in a form consistent with other entries. Please do not delete any rows once the Special Envoy has reviewed the request; instead, move accepted or delegated requests to the 'Active engagements' table and move declined requests to the 'Closed requests' table. All 'Active engagements', once completed, will also move to the 'Closed requests' table.

Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests								
Propose d date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 9 pages withheld under same grounds]

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]: s9(2)(g)(ii) s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) (ISED); s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]: s9(2)(g)(ii) (CMD); s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) - Special Envoy
Subject:	FW: Insights #51
Date:	Wednesday, 10 May 2023 10:12:58 am
Attachments:	image001.png

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Some interesting material in thi s9(2)(g)(i)

s9(2)(g)(ii)

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Prime Minister's Special Representative on Cyber and Digital
Christchurch Call and Cyber Coordinator

Policy Advisory Group/National Security Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Phone: s9(2)(a)
Email: s9(2)(a)
Web: www.christchurchcall.com

From: s9(2)(g)(ii) <s9(2)(a)
Sent: Tuesday, 9 May 2023 6:11 am
To: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] <s9(2)(a)
Subject: Fwd: Insights #51

Sent from Outlook for iOS

From: ISD <info@isdglobal.org>
Sent: Tuesday, May 2, 2023 5:59:51 AM
To: s9(2)(a)
Subject: Insights #51

View this email in your browser

We need transparency, not censorship, to address hate speech and other harms on social media

Following Elon Musk's interview with the BBC, and the ensuing debate around censorship and free speech, ISD's CEO, **Sasha Havlicek**, addresses the mischaracterisation of the problems we face online. In the article she calls for improved transparency in relation to the social media platforms' algorithmic systems that ultimately distort the playing field for free speech.

Slipping through the net: Exploring online support for proscribed groups in Northern Ireland
There is evidence that platforms have attempted to block users from promoting proscribed terrorist groups over the years. However, ISD has identified how a small set of online communities in Northern Ireland are rallying support for these groups while growing unnoticed across Facebook, Instagram and TikTok.

More here

It is (still) shockingly easy to find terrorist content on TikTok
An ISD investigation conducted over the course of only a few hours found that content related to the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack remains easily accessible on TikTok. ISD explores the platform's failure to commit to enforcing its own policies.

More here

Anti-vaccine conspiracies have historically been anti-establishment and very often antisemitic. In the COVID-19 vaccine rollout, we saw how those theories were adapted and tied into greater conspiracies like the 'Great Reset', 'New World Order' and QAnon. We explain the history and different narratives that have been used not only during COVID-19, but also increasingly being used in the age of social media.

Read more about it in our latest Explainer.

More here

ISD NEWS

ISD CEO **Sasha Havlicek** joined geopolitical experts as a panellist at the **Economic Outlook** event in London late last month for a discussion on the various challenges Europe, the Middle East and Africa are facing at the start of the second year of war in Ukraine.

"The trajectory of this war will essentially determine for generations to come the balance of power between authoritarianism and liberal democracy. The stakes could not be higher," Sasha said.

The event was hosted by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and the UChicago Institute of Politics.

More here

ISD IN THE MEDIA

ISD and CASM Technology research on the rise in antisemitic content on Twitter since Elon Musk's takeover featured in an article for **Newsweek**. This followed a series of high-profile Jewish organisations that slammed the platform for not responding in a proactive manner.

Discord, an encrypted messaging app, has been linked to various hate-fuelled mass shootings and rallies, as well as the recent US military leak. But why? **USA Today** explores the issue in this article, drawing on **ISD research on gamers and the far right on the app**.

Latin American heads of state are going viral on TikTok. One president now adds English subtitles to his content, guaranteeing a wider audience reach. ISD's Resident Senior Fellow **Jiore Craig** talks to **TIME** about the "disconnect" we are seeing among global leaders regarding TikTok.

A conspiracist in the Netherlands was sentenced to prison for his role in a campaign against a Dutch town, falsely accusing them of covering up a satanic paedophile ring. ISD Senior Analyst **Ciarán O'Connor** talks to **WIRED** on the positive impact of accountability in cases like these.

VACANCIES

Interested in challenging extremism, hate and disinformation in all its forms?

ISD UK is seeking to hire a **Senior Business Development Manager**. ISD-US is now accepting applications for a **Finance Coordinator** and a **Philanthropic Gifts Manager**. The Strong Cities Network is also accepting applications for a **Projects Coordinator** role.

If you would like to know more about upcoming opportunities or submit a speculative application, please visit our careers portal below.

New ISD vacancies

Help ISD safeguard democracy

We have been committed to the fight against hate, extremism, polarisation and disinformation for over 15 years and it's all thanks to support from people like you. As an independent, non-profit organisation, our work is reliant on grants and donations to stay on the forefront of analysing and responding to threats to democracy in all their forms.

By donating to ISD, your contribution will ensure we can continue to analyse, advise, and act to create stronger, more cohesive societies. Join us by donating at the link below.

Donate now

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Facebook

Website

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]
Subject:	RE: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 10 May 2023
Date:	Thursday, 11 May 2023 1:27:00 pm
Attachments:	SE visit to Wellington 12 May.docx
	Engagements tracker.docx
	Post summit work programme.pdf
	CCU workplan tracker - May 2023.pdf

Hi s9(2)(a)

Thank you for the feedback on the programme. This has been revised accordingly – please find attached.

s6(c)

Docs for tomorrow

You may have seen s9(2)(g)(ii) sent through to the Special Envoy an additional document for discussions tomorrow. In the interests of having everything in one coordinated place, I have attached the following documents that will be useful for the Special Envoy tomorrow:

- CCU workplan tracker – May 2023
- Post summit work programme
- Engagements tracker

Please note, we will have hard copies of all the attached documents available for the Special Envoy here too.

[Not in Scope]

s9(2)(g)(ii)

From: s9(2)(a)
Sent: Wednesday, 10 May 2023 4:16 pm
To: s9(2)(g)(ii)   [DPMC] <s9(2)(g)(ii)   dpmc.govt.nz>
Subject: Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 10 May 2023

Hi

[Not in Scope]

Thanks

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

EA to the Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern

Special Envoy to the Christchurch Call
www.christchurchcall.com

s9(2)(a)

P O Box 90947, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142

Duplicate

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

This document outlines the process for managing requests for external engagement with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and contains the tracker tool for managing these requests. This process and tool manage requests from external parties for meetings, event participation, and media engagement as well as the Christchurch Call Unit's (CCU's) proactive suggestions for engagement. This process and tool do not manage set international outreach trips, which will be managed as separate projects as they arise.

Maintaining a record of all requests for engagement, either new, ongoing, or closed, is an essential information management practice. This document contains three tables:

- o New requests, which will go to the Special Envoy for decision
- o Active engagements, which are accepted or delegated engagements to be actioned and tracked
- o Closed requests, which are declined requests or engagements that have been completed

Process for requests for engagement with the Special Envoy

1. Request received
Received through the Special Envoy's direct contacts, the Call inbox, or CCU members

2. Request centralised
Forward all requests to s9(2)(g)(ii) copying s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)

3. Request logged, assigned, and initially assessed
s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Thursday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

7. Request decisions actioned
s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements with s9(2)(a)
Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

8. Request moved to 'Active engagement tracker' or 'Closed requests' tracker

Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

Notes for Special Envoy's use: The tracker uses a drop-down tool. In the column titled 'Special Envoy: decision', please identify whether you would like to accept, decline, delegate or discuss. The column titled 'Special Envoy: comment' leaves room for additional comments in relation to your decision. The requests are organised by the date of the meeting/event/media that has been requested; Word's 'sort' function can reorganise the table by another means, if you wish. The CCU will consider on an ongoing basis opportunities for proactive engagement, including developing a plan for targeted, strategic media engagement; we welcome your guidance on this, including how frequently you want to engage with media. The CCU can work with and support you on the media opportunities we have suggested or marked 'high' priority.

Instructions for CCU use: For each new request for the Special Envoy's engagement, complete a row in the below table called 'New requests'. This includes internal requests and suggestions from the Christchurch Call Unit (CCU) and MFAT. Use the drop-down tool where applicable and, in the free-form boxes, please enter information in a form consistent with other entries. Please do not delete any rows once the Special Envoy has reviewed the request; instead, move accepted or delegated requests to the 'Active engagements' table and move declined requests to the 'Closed requests' table. All 'Active engagements', once completed, will also move to the 'Closed requests' table.

Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

| New requests								
Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 11 pages withheld under same grounds]

Post-Summit Work Programme outputs

The Call Unit has both global and domestic responsibilities…

1. The Leaders of the organisations that contribute to the Christchurch Call are responsible for direction setting, prioritisation of effort, and allocating resources as needed to the work programme. The Christchurch Call Unit helps the New Zealand Prime Minister and French President to convene fellow Call Leaders. The Unit works with counterpart officials to coordinate the agenda, collates expert input, compiles progress updates, and supports Leaders to make decisions about how the Call confronts its current challenges and where it should go next.

Global	• Support to NZ PM and French President as Leaders and co-founders • Stewardship, with France, of the International efforts to fulfil Call commitments • Organisation of Leaders' Summits • Convening the wider Community • Working to ensure the success of the initiative

Domestic	• Advice to the PM on the Call and related digital issues • Oversight of New Zealand's contribution to fulfilling the Call commitments

2. The Call Unit also helps to advise the Prime Minister on progress made against New Zealand's individual Call Commitments. This is covered separately under item 5.

3. The Call Unit work programme is directed by the DPMC Business Plan for 2022/23. The Business Plan sets four strategic objectives, each with a set of deliverables, to meet the external priority of advancing the delivery of commitments under the Christchurch Call. These four objectives, which have been integrated along with the deliverables into Call Unit work programme outlined below, are:
   a. Ensure cross-agency visibility and delivery of New Zealand's commitments under the Call
   b. The Call is a self-sustaining community
   c. Deliver a Christchurch Call Leaders' Summit in September 2022 that advances existing workstreams and sets the groundwork for the future
   d. The central issues, priorities and goals of the Call receive attention across the Community but also in related and complementary forums (domestically and internationally).

Global efforts are organised under a set of multi-year Work Plans…

4. The Global Work Plans include a set of actions that were first endorsed by Leaders at the 2022 Summit, as laid out below.

Work plan	Action	Status
Community	• Build a self-sustaining community with a shared sense of purpose, aligned expectations, responsibility, & ownership. • Strengthen the Civil Society Advisory Network, help them to diversify their expertise, diversity, and make better use of their advisory function. s6(b)(ii), s9(2)(g)(i)	2022 Summit process and community dialogue and input significantly bolstered these efforts, but work is needed to broaden civil society membership and refocus engagement priorities
	• Grow Industry support for the Call incl. gaming, and those with a young and/or regionally diverse user base.	4 new industry supporters added since 2021 Summit
	• Structured conversations on delivery of Call Commitments.	Need to better engage offshore network and supporter Governments
	• New Community platform to facilitate interaction	Initial scoping underway, to progress in 2023.

Work plan	Action	Status
Algorithms & Positive interventions	• Gain a better understanding of online "user journeys" and the role of platforms in radicalisation • Identify more effective design tweaks and intervention points to make the online environment safer • Empower a new generation of community-led online interventions	s9(2)(f)(iv) new algorithmic outcomes initiative offers a way forward
	• Establish more transparency and redress mechanisms for algorithms that remove TVEC	Community dialogue advanced. Significant improvements made by platforms
	• Develop a suite of shared technical tools to eliminate TVEC	GIFCT tendering for new classifiers & broadening functionality of hash sharing. s9(2)(f)(iv)

Work plan	Action	Status
Incident Response	• Review and update the shared Crisis Protocol	**Completed**
	• Map overlaps and gaps in the current set of protocols and frameworks	**Completed**
	• Establish human rights and due process protections	Good progress through existing structures
	• Support and engage with GIFCT to improve their incident response framework	
	• Continue to build, test, and refine tools for collective response	
	• Respond to incidents and ensure proper debrief.	
	• Build a global community of practice on incident response	

Work plan	Action	Status
Transparency	• Establish more interactive multi stakeholder policy dialogue on topical policy issues, improve input on policy and increase trust & understanding	Community dialogues held on multiple key topics with follow up engagement & trust building across the community. Need for more govt and tech engagement i
	• Raise awareness about the Call	Comms plan developed and rolled out. Regular

		presentations and outreach on Call at global events. New website delivered.
	• Gather existing resources and make them accessible to governments and companies looking to improve their transparency and reporting practices. • Identify trust gaps and transparency needs of different stakeholders • Enhance information sharing and establish communities of practise for government and tech transparency • Find ways to scale up support for new/small/different companies to do transparency & reporting	Support to Action Coalition on Meaningful Transparency to deliver online transparency portal. Work in GIFCT Transparency Working Group is looking at "meaningful transparency" and different information needs. Work in Call Community in 2022/23 on government transparency, with Tech Against Terrorism and CCAN members involved in Santa Clara.

Priorities agreed at 2022 Summit include existing and new lines of work…

5. At the 2022 Leaders' Summit, new priorities were endorsed. The additional lines of effort following the 2022 Leaders' Statement are highlighted in **red**

Community	• Build a self-sustaining community with a shared sense of purpose, aligned expectations, responsibility, & ownership. • Strengthen the Civil Society Advisory Network, help them to diversify their expertise, diversity, and make better use of their advisory function. **+ specific outreach to, and consideration of issues for LGBTQIA+ and youth** s9(2)(g)(i) • Grow Industry support for the Call incl. **gaming,** and those with a **young** and/or regionally diverse user base. **+ outreach to small platforms**	
	• Structured conversations on delivery of Call Commitments.	
	• Deliver a community platform **(repeat priority for Leaders)**	

Algorithms & Positive interventions	• Gain a better understanding of online "user journeys" and the role of platforms in radicalisation • Identify more effective design tweaks and intervention points to make the online environment safer • Empower a new generation of community-led online interventions **+ develop shared approaches, push towards research pilots and studies, and build the collective evidence base**	
	• Establish more transparency and redress mechanisms for algorithms that remove TVEC **+ prioritise new tools including third party standards, quality metrics, and promote user choice**	
	• Develop a new suite of shared technical tools to eliminate TVEC	

Incident Response	• Review and update the shared Crisis Protocol **(+ continued effort with particular focus on purpose, activation criteria, extending participation across Call Community, including CCAN)**	
	• Establish human rights and due process protections **(+ continued effort in Call Community, GIFCT Incident Response Working Group)**	
	• Support and engage with GIFCT to improve their incident response framework	
	• Continue to build, test, and refine tools for collective response (+ continued effort)	

	+ Ensure shared industry tools remain at the leading edge of technology and are effective in responding to adversarial tactics and shifts. **+ specific work on small and alt-tech platforms**	
	• Respond to incidents and deliver debriefs.	
	• Build a global community of practice on incident response	

Transparency	• Establish more interactive multi stakeholder policy dialogue on topical policy issues, improve input on policy and increase trust & understanding	
	• Raise awareness about the Call – what it does and and how it operates	
	• Gather existing resources and make them accessible to governments and companies lookin	
	• Identify trust gaps and transparency needs of different stakeholders	
	• Enhance information sharing and establish communities of practise for government and tech company transparency	
	• Find ways to scale up support for new/small/different companies to do transparency & reporting	

New work priorities	**• Shared approach to address unmoderated and alt tech services**	
	• Deepen evidence base on linkages between online misogyny and gender-based hatred and extremism as vectors for violent extremism and terrorism online	
	• Launch a workstream on new technologies (including on ways Call commitments can be effected in new online environments)	
	• Contributing to parallel initiatives on related issues and ensuring that the Call work complements and contributes to broader tech governance effort	

Christchurch Call Unit workplan tracker

May 2023

VERSION TWO

IN CONFIDENCE

What are these slides

- A view of the main deliverables and milestones for the Christchurch Call Unit
- An aide to delivery, management and communications intended to cover all major priorities and at least 80 per cent of total team effort
- Updated with a check in on progress towards the end of each month

- Contact:

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Policy Advisory Group

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

s9(2)(a)

The asks for you this month

1. Workstream leads: confirm the wording of your priority and revise your quarterly milestones (slides 9 to 12)

2. Fill in the new monthly view for your workstreams for at least April May and June (slides 14 to 21) and send both to s9(2)(g)(ii)

3. Participate in the monthly checkin on progress (week of May 8 or talk to s9(2)(g)(ii) beforehand if you will be away)

Background

The tracker just covers Call Unit work

Call Community work

Governments' Call work

Call commitments

Companies' Call work

Call Unit work covered by this Tracker (not to scale)

There are four Call priorities plus a group for cross-cutting priority work

Building the Call Community

We seek to deepen engagement among the Call Community, increase the diversity of representation, and strengthen our infrastructure.

- Increase the number of online service provider supporters
- Increase engagement with existing supporters, including through the development of a community platform
- Continue regular dialogue on policy issues and sharing of best practice
- Support the Christchurch Call Advisory Network to build its advisory function and grow its expertise and diversity
- Continue to strengthen ties with the GIFCT and Tech Against Terrorism

Algorithms and Positive Interventions

We are focused on improving our understanding of user journeys and the role of algorithms in driving online radicalisation and developing positive interventions to keep users safe.

- Improve understanding of online user journeys and the role they may play in radicalisation, how online and offline factors interact, how content recommendation processes might be exploited, and ways to mitigate this.
- Work across the tech sector and government to understand data and information needs for effective research.
- Progress the Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes, in which New Zealand, the United States, Twitter, Microsoft and the charitable organisation OpenMined are developing and testing privacy technologies to help enable independent research on these important questions

Crisis and Incident Response

We continue to test and refine our approach to crisis response to better prevent the spread of terrorist and violent extremist content in real time.

- Bring diverse companies – both large and small - into crisis response.
- Address the role of alt-tech or unmoderated platforms in disseminating content.
- Extend participation in the Christchurch Call Crisis Response Protocol. Include active roles for civil society, researchers and communities.
- Continue strengthening the crisis response system, human rights protections and transparency.

Transparency

We are focused on building greater transparency from Government and Online Service Provider supporters, including by encouraging supporters to report on content flagging and removal.

- Develop and make readily accessible for the Call's tech company and government supporters advice on how to provide meaningful transparency for key stakeholders.
- Continue encouraging and supporting Call supporters to make demonstrable improvements in their transparency practices and reporting.

Cross-cutting work

We are progressing several projects that contribute to all or several of the priorities

- Launch a workstream on new technologies (including Generative AI)
- Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism and terrorism
- Contribute to tech governance initiatives on related issues
- [words about Free Open Secure Internet]

The eight Call Unit external workstreams fit within the five Call priorities

Building the Call Community

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Crisis and Incident Response

We continue to test and refine our approach to crisis response to better prevent the spread of terrorist and violent extremist content in real time.

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Transparency

We are focused on building greater transparency from Government and Online Service Provider supporters, including by encouraging supporters to report on content flagging and removal.

Cross-cutting work

We are progressing several projects that contribute to all or several of the priorities

Priority	Call Unit external workstreams
Building the Call Community	1. Develop Call into self-sustaining community (includes specific outreach to and consideration of issues for LGBTQIA+ and youth) (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))
Crisis and Incident Response	2. Strengthen incident response, including with alt-tech platforms (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)) 3. Develop a shared approach to address unmoderated and alt tech services (Lead: s9(2)(g) (ii)
Algorithms and Positive Interventions	4. Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC (Lead: s9(2)(g) (ii)
Transparency	5. Enhance government and company transparency (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Cross-cutting work	6. Launch a workstream on new technologies (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)) 7. Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)) 8. Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives (Lead: s9(2)(g) (ii)

Tracker

External workstream (1 to 5)	By March 2023	June	September	December
1. Develop Call into self-sustaining community Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: 13, 15, 22		s9(2)(g)(i) Engagement plan for Posts Deliver on the Call's anniversary plan Christchurch visit	RightsCon report Christchurch visit report Implemented NZ Post engagement plan Complete testing phase of Community workstream	s9(2)(f)(iv)
2. Strengthen incident response, including with alt-tech platforms Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: 20		s9(2)(f)(iv)	s9(2)(f)(iv) [Small firms action TBC] GIFCT Incident Response working group delivers view of success measures (TBC)	
3. Develop a shared approach to address unmoderated and alt tech services and help small firms respond Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitment: 12,15,18,20		Convene expert group on Free, Open and Secure internet Agree a set of benchmarks for this work	Develop guidelines to help regulators and online service providers, including consideration of appropriate technical tools	
4. Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitments: 11, 14, 15	Proof of function for CCIAO with two online platform datasets in parallel	Convene Algorithmic Oversight Group Researchers complete CCIAO proof of concept	Agree in principle long term setup of CCIAO and new pilot projects Expand CCIAO to other partners	
5. Enhance government and company transparency Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitments: 2, 6, 7, 10, 22	Government: Community work designed and scheduled. Read literature.	Company: ACT Portal delivered Government: Community sessions completed. Final draft of Community advice out for feedback/input.	Government: Community guidance and best practice examples published GIFCT Transparency Working Group delivers toolkit	

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External workstream (6 to 8)	By March 2023	June	September	December
6. Launch a new technologies workstream, including to consider the application of the Call in new online environments Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitment: 5, 6, 20		Convene working group Discuss intersectional approaches at RightsCon Drafting issue report	Report on key issues, risks, opportunities and next steps for Call Community	s9(2)(f)(iv)
7. Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitments: 16, 23, 24, 25	Agree goals for gender work Global Partnership evidence base paper from UK	Community gender research agendas aligned, some research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#1 and RightsCon sessions Global Partnership intervention programmes catalogue	Community gender research agendas aligned, ongoing research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#2 and #3 with policy brief delivered Engagement with CCIAO	
8. Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitments: 25		s6(b)(ii)	Detailed advice for PM and Special Envoy on parallel approaches to disinformation and related issues.	

Internal outputs	By March 2023	June	September	December
Ensure visibility of Call-relevant domestic projects across agencies Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitment: [xx]		Regular checkin with DIA and other Internet Governance officials		s9(2)(f)(iv)
Future of the Call Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitment: None		Develop and distribute a view of the options for internal discussion and agreement	Discuss with France as a prelude to wider community conversations (TBC)	

Christchurch Call Unit work programme tracker

Supporting workstreams	By March 2023	June	September	December
Milestones and events	Briefing for incoming PM Announce Envoy role	Budget (May) GIFCT summit (June) RightsCon (June)	TrustCon (July) UNGA (Sep)	IGF (Oct) Paris Peace Forum (Nov)
Planning and reporting		Progress update to Cabinet (Jun) Steering Group (Jun)	Steering Group (Oct)	s9(2)(f)(iv)
Special Envoy		Deliver Anniversary webinar speech (pre-record) Deliver RightsCon opening speech (pre-record) SF: tech company and NGO outreach (Jun 8 and 9) First set of media engagements (TBC)	Deliver TrustCon speech (pre-record) Harvard fellowships formally begin UNGA events s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)	
Unit travel		Ottawa: Countering Radicalisation (early May) SF: Tech ambassadors (mid May) Costa Rica: RightsCon (early June) SF: meetings incl GIFCT summit (mid-June) Singapore: GIFCT, TAT, Meta workshops (mid-May)	Stanford: Trust & Safety Research Conference (Late Sep)	

Monthly views

1. Develop Call into self-sustaining community (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s9(2)(g)(i) Engagement plan for Posts Deliver on the Call's anniversary plan Christchurch visit	RightsCon report Christchurch visit report Implemented NZ Post engagement plan Complete testing phase of Community workstream	CCAN has had a number of advisory sessions with call supporters
	April: Complete the government community workstream concept note CCU workstream updates now standing part of CCAN monthly update Develop concept note on youth and contact the main relevant stakeholders	July:	October:
	May: Held Te Rourou session and call with Costa Rica; briefed PM for Coronation engagements Deliver Call Anniversary Plan (16 May) Engagement with stakeholders with interest and expertise in the youth workstream	August:	November:
	June: Engagement with Posts in NL, IR, Kenya, Ghana, Japan and SK Test ideas with a pilot group of young people	September:	December:

2. Strengthen incident response, including with alt-tech platforms (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s9(2)(f)(iv)	s9(2)(f)(iv) Agree plan for work on small firms	s9(2)(f)(iv)
	April: Small firms project proposal. Facilitate CCAN discussion on Nashville/bystander footage Notify Community of Louisville CIP activation; media points for PM GIFCT IRWG: Identification of quantitative metrics.	**July:** s9(2)(f)(iv)	**October:**
	May: Compile target list and questions for CRP consultation, schedule meetings. Commission work on small firms Initial FOSI meeting GIFCT IRWG: Participate in GIFCT Louisville debrief. Human rights metrics.	**August:** s9(2)(f)(iv)	**November:**
	June: Conclude initial consultation with key stakeholders on changes to CRP. GIFCT IRWG: Bystander footage deep dive.	**September:**	**December:**

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3. Develop a shared approach to address unmoderated and alt tech services (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	Convene expert group on Free, Open and Secure internet Agree a set of benchmarks for this work	Develop guidelines to help regulators and online service providers, including consideration of appropriate technical tools and means.	s9(2)(f)(iv)
	April:	July: Further community outreach and expert input Workshop meeting in the margins of TrustCon (TBC)	October: Implementation of leaders' decisions
	May: Convene expert group Agree approach and hold wider community consultation	August: Finalisation of guidelines for online service providers and regulators. Recommendations to leaders on next steps	November:
	June: Start consultation on guidelines	September: UNGA mandate for next stage of this work	December:

4. Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Proof of function for CCIAO with two online platform datasets in parallel	Convene Algorithmic Oversight Group Researchers complete CCIAO proof of concept	Agree in principle long term setup of CCIAO and new pilot projects Expand CCIAO to other partners	CCIAO structure up and running Agree a way forward for work on how to assess interventions
	April: Completed phase 1 and setting up of data nodes at DailyMotion, LinkedIn and Twitter	**July:** Outreach with Call Community	**October:** Launch of next phase – researcher access tool and project funding
	May: s6(a), s9(2)(j) Start of phase 2 testing on real data Final New Zealand payment to OpenMined	**August:** Finalisation of announcements for UNGA meeting and decisions on funding and institutional design for next phase of project	**November:**
	June: Engagement with researcher community on roll out of the PET tool Formal onboarding of France and DailyMotion (TBC)	**September:** Announcement of outcomes on CCIAO	**December:**

5. Enhance government and company transparency (Lead:

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Government: Community work designed and scheduled. Read literature.	Company: ACT Portal delivered Government: Community sessions completed; final draft of Community advice out for feedback/input.	Government: Community guidance and best practice examples published GIFCT Transparency Working Group (TWG) delivers toolkit	
	April: First Community Session on Government Transparency (13 April) First draft of Community advice circulated for feedback/input GIFCT TWG: Overview of toolkit proposal	July: Finalise and publish Community guidance and best practice examples.	October:
	May: Second Community Session (17 May). Iterate draft advice for feedback/input Identify with ACT areas for collaboration on government transparency	August:	November:
	June: Third (and final?) Community Session. Iterate draft advice for feedback/input Support launch of ACT portal at RightsCon GIFCT TWG: Feedback on toolkit	September:	December:

6. Launch a new technologies workstream, including to consider the application of the Call in new online environments (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	Convene working group Discuss intersectional approaches at RightsCon Drafting issue report	Report on key issues, risks, opportunities and next steps for Call Community	s9(2)(f)(iv)
	April: WG Meeting #1	July:	October:
	May: WG Meeting #2	August:	November:
	June: Draft issue report RightsCon Session	September:	December:

7. Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Agree goals for gender work Global Partnership evidence base paper from UK	Community gender research agendas aligned, some research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#1 and RightsCon sessions Global Partnership intervention programmes catalogue	Community gender research agendas aligned, ongoing research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#2 and #3 with policy brief delivered Engagement with CCIAO	Ongoing research delivered Develop recs for gender action s6(a)
	April:	July: ISD WG#2 on OSP TVEC/gender policies Community gender group meeting with research members (GNET, ISD) presenting research agendas (TBC)	October:
	May: ISD WG#1 on OSP TVEC/gender policies Community design and consultation of RightsCon session	August: ISD WG#2 on OSP TVEC/gender policies GNET's gender/TVEC list review complete, 25 August	November:
	June: RightsCon session on advice to OSPs on TVEC/gender, 6 June (TBC) Summary paper of RightsCon session findings and Community consultation (30 June) Research paper 'Online Misogyny in NZ' delivered by Classifications Office (mid to late June)	September: ISD WG/RightsCon session policy brief due, 30 September	December:

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8. Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives (Lead s9(2)(g)(ii)

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s6(b)(ii)	Detailed advice for PM and Special Envoy on parallel approaches to disinformation and related issues	
	April:	July:	October:
	May:	August: Advice to PM and Special Envoy on approaches to Disinformation and related issues	November:
	June: s6(b)(ii)	September: Decisions regarding ongoing engagement	December:

Christchurch Call Unit comms plan scratchpad

Channel	By March 2023	June	September	December
Website		Special Envoy – news story (April) Call Anniversary – news story, speech notes (May)		
Social media		Special Envoy – PR tweet (April) Call anniversary content (May)		
Communications to Posts		FM on Special Envoy (April) Staff forum for MFAT Posts, plus intranet news story and video (April)		
Call community (Monthly newsletter)		Call Anniversary Webinar (15 May) SF: tech company and NGO outreach (Jun 8 and 9)	s9(2)(f)(iv)	
CCAN (Zoom, last Friday of the month)				
Press		SE: First set of media engagements (TBC) s9(2)(g)(ii) NATO DEEP podcast (recorded April, aired May)		
Events and major partner engagements	Announce Envoy role	Budget (May) GIFCT summit (June) RightsCon (June)	TrustCon (July) UNGA (Sep)	IGF (Oct) Paris Peace Forum (Nov)

Whats next

Items to discuss in monthly review (week of May 8)

s9(2)(g)(ii)

- What has changed since last month (fifth priority plus lines for Special Envoy and travel and comms schematic added, workstream list updated)
- Periodic reminder of the weighty responsibilities of the workstream lead role

Workstream leads

- Talk through progress and your main upcoming milestones for the rest of the year
- Talk to your milestones for April, May and June

s9(2)(g)(ii)

- Communications planning two-step
- Next steps:
  - Timing for next month's review
  - First publication to the Call Community
  - Steering Group 12 June
  - What we are saying we will get done this year

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	@DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]
Subject:	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 17 May 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 17 May 2023 3:56:00 pm
Attachments:	1. Meeting brief - CyberPeace Institute 21 May.pdf
	2. Engagements tracker.docx
	3. Letter of Appointment – proactive release consult.pdf
	4. Terms of Reference – proactive release consult.pdf
	5. Cabinet paper – supporting SE role – proactive release consult.pdf
	6. TaT"s TCAP presentation.pdf
	7. Global Digital Cooperation Architecture.docx

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

Here is the Special Envoy's weekly round-up.

Meeting brief: CyberPeace Institute, 21 May, Geneva
- Attached as *1. Meeting brief – CyberPeace Institute 21 May*

Engagements tracker
- Attached as *2. Engagements tracker*.
- Following our Friday discussion regarding engagement strategy and objectives, we note s9(2)(f)(iv) We propose to continue to include all requests in the tracker so the Special Envoy has a view of what is coming in, and so that we explore alternatives to SE engagement should this be desired.
- Note, we received your request s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv) we will consider and advise via next week's engagements tracker.

For review: Proactive release consultation
- As flagged on 30 April, we propose to proactively release the PM's Letter of Appointment to the Special Envoy and the Terms of Reference. Please find attached these documents marked up with proposed redactions: *3. Letter of Appointment – proactive release consult* and *4. Terms of Reference – proactive release consult*.
- At the same time, we also propose to proactively release a Cabinet paper in which the PM sought Cabinet's approval to release EPF funding to support the Special Envoy's role. Please find this attached and marked up with proposed redactions: *5. Cabinet paper – supporting SE role – proactive release consult*.
- Please let us know if the Special Envoy has any feedback on what we proposed to proactively release (and redactions as marked up).
- We are working to a timeframe of 26 May for release, so we would be grateful for consideration of this content by 23 May.

For info: reading
- As discussed at our team day on Friday, Tech Against Terrorism's presentation on the **Terrorist Content Analytics Platform (TCAP)**. Attached as *6. TaT's TCAP presentation*.
- Informal note on **'Global Digital Cooperation Architecture'** relevant UN reports 2019/2020 and UN next steps; refer to 12 May team discussion. Attached as *7. Global Digital Cooperation Architecture*.

- The Call Unit (s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)) recently attended the **Canada Center Conference**, hosted by the Canadian Government. The Call Unit's objectives of the visit were met. Namely:
    - A virtual presentation by the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and a plenary presentation by s9(2)(g)(ii) to raise the profile of the Call.
    - Engagement with contacts on building a research community to support the Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes. This includes contacts who have datasets, algorithms, and practitioners interesting in the second phase of the CCIAO.
    - A panel on the experiences of communities impacted by terrorism and their role in responding to terrorist content online; s9(2)(ba)(i)
    - Significant interest from organisations seeking to join the Call in the partner category, s9(2)(ba)(i)

      The Secretariat will look to swiftly bring on board these organisations as partners.

Correspondence
- CCU received letter to Special Envoy from s9(2)(ba)(i) , including instruction for CCU to take forward. This is included in the engagements tracker for information to close the loop on the CCU picking this up/no further Special Envoy action required.

FYI: Engagements next week
- A briefing session with OpenMined later in the week (Thurs or Fri); currently liaising with s9(2)(a) on suitable times.

FYI: Coming to you in future
- Next week:
    - Consultation on OIA release of briefings pertaining to the establishment of the Special Envoy and Rt Hon Ardern's appointment. Please note this is distinct from the attached documents for proactive release; the CCU has received an OIA request regarding the Special Envoy's appointment, which captures the documents to be proactively released as well as a set of briefings to the Prime Minister.
    - Asia Tech X Singapore pre-record notes.
    - RightsCon notes for a pre-record (pre-record slot yet to be scheduled, but likely week of 29 May; awaiting details from RightsCon organisers).
    - A package of outcomes from 12 May planning day with CCU, including some follow-up actions for the Call Unit and the Special Envoy.
    - Draft programme for San Franciso visit.
- Week 29 May:
    - Briefing for San Francisco visit (8/9 June); planning to provide on 1 or 2 June.

Ngā mihi,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

Summary of attachments:
1. Meeting brief – CyberPeace Institute 21 May
2. Engagements tracker
3. Letter of Appointment – proactive release consult
4. Terms of Reference – proactive release consult

5. Cabinet paper – supporting SE role – proactive release consult
6. TaT's TCAP presentation
7. Global Digital Cooperation Architecture

MEETING BRIEF

CHRISTCHURCH CALL: MEETING WITH CYBERPEACE INSTITUTE, 21 MAY 2023

To	Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call	Prepared by	s9(2)(g)(ii)
From	s9(2)(g)(ii)	Date	16/05/2023

Overview

- You are meeting with Stéphane Duguin, Chief Executive of the CyberPeace Institute (CPI), on 21 May from 11.35am - 12.20pm. Stéphane will brief you on the CPI's investigations into cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. The CPI – a member of the Christchurch Call Advisory Network (CCAN) since 2021 – is interested in applying its investigative capabilities to analysing and countering the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and new technologies in online harm (including cyber-attacks, disinformation, and illegal and harmful content).

- This note outlines the CPI's engagement with the Christchurch Call (the Call). In addition, the CPI has provided a short briefing paper outlining its main projects and functions, examples of key products and services, and areas of interest relating to the Call (see Attachment A).

Background

The CPI operates at the nexus of cyberattacks and disinformation…

1. The CyberPeace Institute is a non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in 2019 with seed funding from the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Mastercard, Microsoft and the Ford Foundation. Stéphane was appointed as the establishment Chief Executive of the CPI in 2019, following a decade at EUROPOL leading efforts countering cybercrime and online terrorism, including coordinating the EU's crisis response to the Christchurch attacks. The CPI investigates and maps cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns – both separate occurrences and events that combine these methods. The CPI provides a range of support services to humanitarian and healthcare NGOs in relation to threat (and occurrence) of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

2. s9(2)(ba)(i)

   Stephane advocated for a breaking down of siloes between cyber and digital spheres given the evidence of online attacks traversing traditional cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns.

…but also has a strong interest in AI and new tech

3. The CPI recently joined the Call's new tech workstream. The CPI is interested in analysing how AI and new technologies might further compound online threats that already span cyberspace and content-based harms, including disinformation and harmful content. The

CPI's investigative and analytical capabilities will be important for the Call's work on new tech; and the CPI, with its expertise in analysing disinformation campaigns, could be a natural subject matter expert for the information integrity stream of a future multistakeholder, digital issues governance structure.

s9(2)(ba)(i)

Attachment A: CyberPeace Institute's briefing paper

21/05 meeting discussion points : the nexus between cyberattacks and disinformation

The CyberPeace Institute is an investigation organization protecting the most vulnerable in cyberspace. We document and investigate legal or illegal cyber activities which are causing human harm. Independent and neutral, headquartered in Geneva, we analyze all forms of cyber threats, deliver free cybersecurity assistance and perform advocacy on the basis of evidence.

The Institute **investigates the nexus between cyberattacks and disinformation** from 4 angles:
- We investigate how disinformation campaigns create opportunities for cyberattacks (i.e Infodemics led to a rise of cyberattacks during COVID-19),
- We investigate cyberattacks that take place as part of disinformation campaigns (i.e the hack and leak operation against the European Medicines Agency),
- We identify criminal groups and state actors who are using the same tools, techniques, processes, talents and infrastructure to deploy both cyberattacks and disinformation campaign (i.e CONTI, VULCAN, disinformation campaign happening alongside cyberattacks since the invasion of Ukraine, Daesh using its IT capabilities for both propaganda and cyberattacks)
- We share actionable knowledge and tools, to empower community voices, and assist vulnerable people to stay away from harmful content and cyberattacks.

Our investigative work is complemented with policy analysis and recommendations. The disinformation, cybercrime fighting and cybersecurity regulatory and policy landscape is fragmented, and this creates loopholes for criminal groups and state actors. For example, we see a worrying disconnect between UN processes (i.e. OEWG, AHC) and EU regulations (i.e. Terrorist Content Online Regulations, Digital Service Act, Cyber Resilience Act).

Potential avenues for cooperation

The Institute has strong expertise in investigating the fusion between cybercrime modus operandi (i.e. cyberattacks) and information operations (i.e. online propaganda, disinformation, etc). Our staff is composed of online propaganda experts, cybercrime investigators, cybersecurity engineers and digital policy analysts. We also operate our own big data analysis infrastructure, which allows us to perform our evidence-based analysis independently.

We are actively seeking cooperation in this space, and would be happy to assess how to cooperate with the Christchurch Call community. Avenues for cooperation could be, but are not limited to, the following workstreams:
- Investigate and document the scale of the phenomenon, the actors involved and the human impact of the nexus of disinformation and cyberattacks.
- Better analyze how algorithms and AI are creating new cognitive vulnerabilities, and human harm. Increasing this understanding will allow us to design ad hoc tools for countering malicious harm, and positive intervention.
- Support crisis response, especially when large scale cyberattacks accelerates the spread of online harmful content.
- Increase transparency among all stakeholders, so that the production, proliferation and dissemination of online harmful content is by publicly documented.
- Track how the regulatory efforts are having an impact on users safety.

ANNEX : The CyberPeace Institute - highlights

The CyberPeace Institute is a non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in 2019 with seed funding from the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Mastercard, Microsoft and the Ford Foundation.

The CyberPeace Institute is led by Stéphane Duguin. Prior to this position, Stephane led the EU IRU in EUROPOL, where **he coordinated the EU crisis response during the Christchurch Mosque shootings**. During his career, Stephane has investigated multiple instances of the use of disruptive technologies, such as AI, in the context of counter terrorism, cybercrime, cyberoperations, hybrid threats, and the online use of disinformation techniques.

Strong of 30+ employees, the Institute is composed of professionals from different backgrounds with a wide range of expertise from inside and outside the international cyber ecosystem (cybercrime, cybersecurity, disinformation, humanitarian, digital policy). The Institute is supported by various corporations, civil society actors and academia.

Key products, to illustrate our capability:

- Series of workshops and keynotes on online harmful content, notably in cooperation with the World Health Organisation and the European Commission
- Joint call with EU Disinfo Lab during the negotiation of the Digital Service Act
- The Humanitarian Cybersecurity Center, where we support NGOs for free, including in investigating how disinformation is impacting their operations
- Partnership with USAID, NetHope and Okta to launch a Humanitarian ISAC, which will identify cyber risks and suggest remediations, provide training and advice to nonprofit staff notably on disinformation
- The Cyber attacks in time of conflicts platform, where we trace all forms of online threats since the invasion of Ukraine. The platform documents more than 1537 cyberattacks linked to the conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, affecting 23 different sectors and 46 other countries.
- The Playing with live, cyberattacks on healthcare report, where we first analyzed the nexus between information operations and cyberattacks
- The Cyber Incident Tracer (CIT) #HEALTH, tracing 2 years of disruptive cyberattacks on healthcare. Our data shows since June 2020, 501 attacks in 48 countries led to a cumulative 5 years of disruption of healthcare.

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

This document outlines the process for managing requests for external engagement with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and contains the tracker tool for managing these requests. This process and tool manage requests from external parties for meetings, event participation, and media engagement as well as the Christchurch Call Unit's (CCU's) proactive suggestions for engagement. This process and tool do not manage set international outreach trips, which will be managed as separate projects as they arise.

Maintaining a record of all requests for engagement, either new, ongoing, or closed, is an essential information management practice. This document contains three tables:

- o New requests, which will go to the Special Envoy for decision
- o Active engagements, which are accepted or delegated engagements to be actioned and tracked
- o Closed requests, which are declined requests or engagements that have been completed

Process for requests for engagement with the Special Envoy

1. Request received
    Received through the Special Envoy's direct contacts, the Call inbox, or CCU members

2. Request centralised
    Forward all requests to s9(2)(g)(ii) copying s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)

3. Request logged, assigned, and initially assessed
    s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
    s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Thursday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

7. Request decisions actioned
    s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements with s9(2)(a)
    Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

8. Request moved to 'Active engagement tracker' or 'Closed requests' tracker

Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

Notes for Special Envoy's use: The tracker uses a drop-down tool. In the column titled 'Special Envoy: decision', please identify whether you would like to accept, decline, delegate or discuss. The column titled 'Special Envoy: comment' leaves room for additional comments in relation to your decision. The requests are organised by the date of the meeting/event/media that has been requested; Word's 'sort' function can reorganise the table by another means, if you wish. The CCU will consider on an ongoing basis opportunities for proactive engagement, including developing a plan for targeted, strategic media engagement; we welcome your guidance on this, including how frequently you want to engage with media. The CCU can work with and support you on the media opportunities we have suggested or marked 'high' priority.

Instructions for CCU use: For each new request for the Special Envoy's engagement, complete a row in the below table called 'New requests'. This includes internal requests and suggestions from the Christchurch Call Unit (CCU) and MFAT. Use the drop-down tool where applicable and, in the free-form boxes, please enter information in a form consistent with other entries. Please do not delete any rows once the Special Envoy has reviewed the request; instead, move accepted or delegated requests to the 'Active engagements' table and move declined requests to the 'Closed requests' table. All 'Active engagements', once completed, will also move to the 'Closed requests' table.

Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests								
Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 12 pages withheld under same grounds]

Terrorist Content Analytics Platform

Launch Event

Adam Hadley, Founder & Executive Director, s9(2)(a)
Anne Craanen, Research Manager, s9(2)(a)
Arthur Bradley, OSINT Manager, s9(2)(a)

Government of Canada

www.terrorismanalytics.org

@TCAPAlerts

tech
against
terrorism

Tech Against Terrorism is a public-private partnership focused on knowledge sharing and providing support to tech platforms

We focus on understanding terrorist activity, engaging with platforms, and building capacity through knowledge sharing and tech support

1 — Outreach and building trust with platforms

- Identify at-risk platforms
- Organise workshops
- Develop relationships
- GIFCT — Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism — Mentorship

2 — Supporting platforms by building capacity to tackle terrorist use

- knowledge sharing platform
- Regulatory Analysis
- Case studies
- Reports and primers

3 — Building tools and technical approaches to support platforms

- Terrorist Content Analytics Platform — **Analyse | Alert | Archive**
- Content hashing
- TCAP API

Online Harms Foundation

Tech Against Terrorism has a whole-sector approach to tackling terrorist use of the internet

Terrorist Content Analytics Platform

- **Alerting** terrorist content at scale

- **Legal** grounding for inclusion of terrorist entities and material

- Operational support for tech platforms in identifying terrorist content

- **Crisis response** mechanism for attacker-produced content

Tech Against Terrorism Europe

- Support for small tech platforms based in the **EU** or offering services in the EU

- Based on the EU TCO regulation

- Policy and operational support for **200 platforms**

Tackling Terrorist Operated Websites

- **Blind-spot** in current strategies to tackle terrorist use of the internet

- Monitoring of the migration of terrorists to self-moderated **websites** and servers

- Increased mentorship for infrastructure providers

Adversarial shift: Terrorist actors are continuously adapting their online behaviour in response to improving content moderation efforts

Lower concentration of terrorist actors, higher sophistication of COMO avoidance

ADVERSIARIAL SHIFT

Higher concentration of terrorist material, lower sophistication of COMO avoidance

Terrorist Content
Analytics Platform

The Solution

The TCAP Process

Manual processes

Automated processes

OSINT Specialists

Automated Scrapers

1	2	3	4	5	6
URL HTML PDF	Verification	**Terrorist Content** Analytics Platform	Hashing and Archiving	Automated Alerts	Online ● Offline ● Status Checking
	Data Classification				

Terrorist Content
Analytics Platform

TCAP Demo

Terrorist Content
Analytics Platform

TCAP Policies

TCAP Tiered Alerts System

Threat to life

Crisis

Designation

Illegal

Recommended

Tier 1: Threat To Life

Tier 2: Crisis (historical)

	UN	EU	US State	US Treasury	UK	Canada	Australia	New Zealand
2011 Norway Attack Perpetrator								
Manifesto								🟢
2019 Christchurch Attack Perpetrator								🔵
Livestream								🟢
Manifesto								🟢
2019 Halle Attack Perpetrator								
Livestream								🟢
Manifesto								🟢
2022 Buffalo Attack Perpetrator								
Livestream								🟢
Manifesto								🟢
2022 Bratislava Attack Perpetrator								
Manifesto								🟢

🔵 Designated terrorist entity

🟠 Designated under a synonym or umbrella group or by affiliation

🟢 Content banned by the New Zealand Classification Office

Tier 3: Designation – Violent Islamist

	UN	EU	US State	US Treasury	UK	Canada	Australia	New Zealand
Al Qaeda	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	●	● (syn)	●			●	●	●
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent	●	● (syn)	●			●	●	
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	●	● (syn)	●		● (syn)	●	●	●
Al Shabaab	●	● (syn)	●	●	●	●	●	●
Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind		●	●			●		
Hurras al-Din		● (syn)					●	
Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam was-Muslimin	●	● (syn)	●		●	●	●	●
Islamic State	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Islamic State Algeria Province		● (syn)						
Islamic State Central Africa Province		● (syn)	● (syn)	● (syn)		● (syn)		
Islamic State East Asia Province		● (syn)				●	●	
Islamic State Greater Sahara Province	●	● (syn)	●	●		●		●
Islamic State India Province		● (syn)						
Islamic State Khorasan Province	●	● (syn)	●	●		●	●	●
Islamic State Libya Province	●	● (syn)	●	●		●		●
Islamic State Pakistan Province		● (syn)						
Islamic State Sinai Province		● (syn)	●	●				
Islamic State Somalia Province		● (syn)		●			●	
Islamic State Tunisia Province		● (syn)				●		
Islamic State West Africa Province	●	● (syn)	●	●		●	●	●
Jemmah Islamiyah	●		●	●	●		●	●
Taliban				●		●		
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan	●		●	●	●	●		●

Legend:
● Designated terrorist entity
● (syn) Designated under a synonym or umbrella group or by affiliation
● Content banned by the New Zealand Classification Office

Tier 3: Designation – Far-Right

	UN	EU	US State	US Treasury	UK	Canada	Australia	New Zealand
Atomwaffen Division					●	●		
National Socialist Order					●	●	●	
Blood and Honour						●		
Combat 18						●		
Feuerkrieg Division					●			
National Action					●			
National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action					●			
Scottish Dawn					●			
System Resistance Network					●			
Proud Boys						●		●
Russian Imperial Movement			●	●			●	
Sonnenkrieg Division					●		●	
The Base					●	●	●	●
James Mason						●		

● Designated terrorist entity   ● Designated under a synonym or umbrella group or by affiliation   ● Content banned by the New Zealand Classification Office

Ethical considerations in developing the TCAP

Rule of law

Transparency

Privacy and Security

Tech Platform Autonomy

TCAP Phase II: Classifying, archiving, and transparent hashing of terrorist content

Supporting smaller platforms by providing content taxonomy and metadata to allow more granular content moderation decisions

Archive of verified terrorist content	Hash look up & hash-sharing	Real time alerting	TCAP API
↓	↓	↓	↓
Evidence based research Evidence of war crimes	One to many approach Transparent hashing	Counter terrorist content at source	Automated sharing of terrorist urls

Government of Canada

TCAP Statistics

Chart: Number of URLs by month (January 2021 – January 2023), showing Submissions (dark blue) and Alerts (orange).

	URLs Identified & Verified	43,983
	Alerts Shared	25,496
	Tech Platforms Alerted	102
	Percentage Offline	84%

Content Classification and Verification Policy

Buffalo attack: online spread of the attacker's livestream within one week

Social Media

Video Sharing

File Sharing

Independent Website

Messaging

Forums / Messageboards

Online Harms Foundation

Online Spread of the Attacker's Manifesto – within one week

Social Media

Archiving

File Sharing

Video Sharing

Independent Website

Messaging

Forum

Online Harms Foundation

Case study: We are also alerting terrorist content from multiple other terrorist incidents

TCAP Contribution to Research: TCAP Insights

Percentage of TCAP submissions, per tech platform type, by ideology

Terrorist Content
Analytics Platform

terrorismanalytics.org
@TCAPAlerts

Government of Canada

tech against terrorism

Online Harms Foundation

For information: 'Global Digital Cooperation Architecture' relevant UN reports 2019/2020 and UN next steps

s9(2)(g)(i)

The UN convened a [High level panel on Digital Cooperation](#) which submitted a report in 2019 entitled ['the age of digital interdependence'](#) which outlines their view of key digital issues and made recommendations on these including on Digital Cooperation Architecture approaches, with three 'multistakeholder' approaches discussed and worth reading about. At IGF 2019 in Berlin the rough consensus was support for the IGF plus, one of these three models, and Germany committed funding to support UN work on this and the creation of a UN Tech Envoy role to deliver it.

In June 2020 the UN Sec Gen issued [a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation](#) which included the IGF Plus model as the primary architecture for Digital Cooperation around emerging issues. Of interest AI also features in this report, with a specific AI focused multistakeholder body proposed. Implementation of this Roadmap was tasked to the office of a Tech Envoy, which was originally appointed in January 2021 and then removed 5 days after due to a sexual harassment inquiry. The second and current Tech Envoy, Amandeep Singh Gill, a career diplomat who had been part of the secretariat for the High Level Panel, was appointed and took office in June 2022.

The [UN Tech Envoy](#) now holds the path forward on these UN Digital Cooperation processes. The Tech Envoy is leading the Global Digital Compact (GDC) process, which came from the UN Secretary General's 2021 report entitled Our Common Agenda. The GDC process underway is linked to the Technology Track of the Summit for the Future, originally to be held UNGA 2023 now UNGA 2024.

s9(2)(g)(i)

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	@DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject:	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 25 May 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 24 May 2023 3:54:00 pm
Attachments:	1. Engagements tracker.docx
	2. Meeting note - OpenMined 26 May.docx
	3. OIA - proposed release for consultation - Special Envoy appointment.pdf
	FW AI Is Transforming Business What about Government.msg
	FW Axios PM Biden"s AI plan.msg
	4. Call Zoom background Option A.jpg
	5. Call Zoom background Option B.jpg
	6. Call Zoom background Option C.jpg

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

Another week, another weekly round-up from the Call Unit.

Engagements tracker
- Attached as *1. Engagements tracker*.

Meeting note: Briefing session with OpenMined team, 26 May
- Please find attached a short note ahead of Friday's briefing session with OpenMined; attached as *2. Meeting note – OpenMined 26 May*

In relation to the op-ed…
- Some latest pieces in the discourse:
    - TechCrunch post: https://techcrunch.com/2023/05/22/openai-leaders-propose-international-regulatory-body-for-ai/?utm_source=briefing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tech_am&utm_content=052323
    - Sam Altman's blogpost: Governance of superintelligence (openai.com)
    - Sam Altman's written testimony at Senate hearing: Sam Written Testimony Draft - Senate Hearing 5_16_23 051523 0330-DLAP Revisions 051523 0530 (002) (DLA Revised) 15 May.docx (washingtonpost.com)

For review by 31 May: OIA release consultation
- As flagged in last week's round up, we have received an OIA request seeking information on the establishment of the Special Envoy role and Rt Hon Ardern's appointment. We are consulting the Special Envoy on the proposed release of briefings within scope of this request. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) In addition to the briefings and emails, we will also direct the requestor to the proactively released Cabinet paper, Letter of Appointment, and Terms of Reference, which we consulted the Special Envoy on last week.
- Please find the bundle of briefings attached in one document called *3. OIA – proposed release for consultation – Special Envoy appointment*.
- Please let us know if the Special Envoy has any feedback on what we propose to release to the requestor (and redactions as marked up).
- PMO is due to receive the OIA on 9 June, so we would be grateful for consideration of this content by 31 May.

[Not in Scope]

Actions following 12 May team day
- We are working on a package of outcomes from 12 May planning day with CCU and plan to provide you with these over the coming week.

For info: reading
- s9(2)(g)(ii) has forwarded the following attached emails to the Special Envoy for her perusal: *"AI is Transforming Business – What about Government?"* and *"FW: Axios PM: Biden's AI plan"*

Engagements next week…
- We are liaising with French colleagues on a meeting for the Special Envoy with **President Macron** this week or next.
- Pre-record five minute speech for Asia Tech X Singapore (working with s9(2)(a) to schedule this during the first half of the week).
- Pre-record for RightsCon (working with s9(2)(a) to schedule this during the first half of the week).

Coming to you in future…
- Later this week:
    - Asia Tech X Singapore pre-record notes.
    - RightsCon notes for a pre-record.
    - Draft programme for San Franciso visit.
- Next week:
    - Briefing for San Francisco visit (8/9 June); planning to provide on 1 or 2 June.

Misc
- Attached are some Call Zoom backgrounds. "Option A" was used for the Special Envoy's Anniversary call pre-record, but other options included if the Special Envoy prefers the look of those.

Ngā mihi,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

Summary of attachments:
1. Engagements tracker
2. Meeting note – OpenMined 26 May
3. OIA – proposed release for consultation – Special Envoy appointment
4. Call Zoom background Option A
5. Call Zoom background Option B
6. Call Zoom background Option C

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

This document outlines the process for managing requests for external engagement with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and contains the tracker tool for managing these requests. This process and tool manage requests from external parties for meetings, event participation, and media engagement as well as the Christchurch Call Unit's (CCU's) proactive suggestions for engagement. This process and tool do not manage set international outreach trips, which will be managed as separate projects as they arise.

Maintaining a record of all requests for engagement, either new, ongoing, or closed, is an essential information management practice. This document contains three tables:

- o New requests, which will go to the Special Envoy for decision
- o Active engagements, which are accepted or delegated engagements to be actioned and tracked
- o Closed requests, which are declined requests or engagements that have been completed

Process for requests for engagement with the Special Envoy

1. Request received
   Received through the Special Envoy's direct contacts, the Call inbox, or CCU members

2. Request centralised
   Forward all requests to s9(2)(g)(ii) copying s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)

3. Request logged, assigned, and initially assessed
   s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Thursday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

7. Request decisions actioned
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements with s9(2)(a)
   Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

8. Request moved to 'Active engagement tracker' or 'Closed requests' tracker

Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

Notes for Special Envoy's use: The tracker uses a drop-down tool. In the column titled 'Special Envoy: decision', please identify whether you would like to accept, decline, delegate or discuss. The column titled 'Special Envoy: comment' leaves room for additional comments in relation to your decision. The requests are organised by the date of the meeting/event/media that has been requested; Word's 'sort' function can reorganise the table by another means, if you wish. The CCU will consider on an ongoing basis opportunities for proactive engagement, including developing a plan for targeted, strategic media engagement; we welcome your guidance on this, including how frequently you want to engage with media. The CCU can work with and support you on the media opportunities we have suggested or marked 'high' priority.

Instructions for CCU use: For each new request for the Special Envoy's engagement, complete a row in the below table called 'New requests'. This includes internal requests and suggestions from the Christchurch Call Unit (CCU) and MFAT. Use the drop-down tool where applicable and, in the free-form boxes, please enter information in a form consistent with other entries. Please do not delete any rows once the Special Envoy has reviewed the request; instead, move accepted or delegated requests to the 'Active engagements' table and move declined requests to the 'Closed requests' table. All 'Active engagements', once completed, will also move to the 'Closed requests' table.

Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests

Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 14 pages withheld under same grounds]

Meeting note: Briefing with OpenMined, 26 May 2023

- You will receive a briefing on Friday morning 7am with Andrew Trask, Leader of OpenMined, and Ronnie Falcon, Head of Product for OpenMined.

- OpenMined has been building a software infrastructure to enable the study of algorithmic outcomes. The technology allows third parties to perform experiments on secured datasets while assuring the data owner that data security is not breached or compromised, and applies differential privacy through an automated system, removing the need for manual programming, and legal scrutiny of experiments. This could enable analysis, research, and audit of the interactions between algorithmic processes and user data, leading to the potential for improved oversight and understanding of user journeys on social media.

- This work is now at the core of the first project under the Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes (CCIAO), supported by funding from New Zealand, Microsoft, Twitter, and the USA s6(a), s9(2)(ba)(i) As per our recent briefing, OpenMined has completed the key steps outlined in New Zealand's letter of contribution and the last of our funds will be remitted next week.

- OpenMined has now set up secure 'nodes' at Twitter, DailyMotion, and LinkedIn to access datasets. The Call Unit has continued to advocate for other firms to participate and we are seeing some signs of increasing interest. The participation of other firms, including potentially one of Meta or Google, could be valuable to the project. A detailed 'pitch' document is being developed to support continued advocacy.

- OpenMined is a notable player in privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) that can support new research tools. There are others working on ambitious PETs projects, including a Singaporean project working with the financial sector and the Global Partnership on AI, and a Japanese project linked to their 'data free flow with trust' work, designed to help facilitate cross-border services trade. PETs have a number of potential applications; something Andrew and Ronnie will be interested to discuss with you.

- OpenMined will brief you on the background to their organisation and the project, the distinctive features of OpenMined's Privacy Enhancing Technologies, the next steps in the project, and their vision for the future. OpenMined will likely be interested in understanding ways to obtain further funding – particularly multi-year project funding to help them build a larger and more capable infrastructure to scale the project. They are also interested in ways of identifying and funding trusted researchers to make use of the tool once it is up and running.

- The Unit has suggested a three-part agenda: Background, Project Update; and Future Directions. This will allow plenty of time for discussion and exchanges between you and Andrew and Ronnie.

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**CHRISTCHURCH
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The Christchurch Call and Prime Ministerial priorities for 2023

To: Prime Minister (Rt Hon Chris Hipkins)					
Date	20/02/2023	**Report number**	DPMC-4704556	**Priority**	Normal

Overview

- The Christchurch Call is one of New Zealand's quiet success stories, where through careful and principled work, New Zealand has managed to shape global norms and establish a leading role in international work on governance of the technology sector.

- [Not in Scope]

- This report outlines options for your role, include retaining full and detailed oversight of the work programme and leading global engagement, or engaging Rt Hon Ardern to assist, advise, and/or act on aspects of the Call work on your behalf (for example as a Special Envoy on the Christchurch Call or similar).

Recommendations

I recommend that you:

1. **Note** that New Zealand's Prime Minister, alongside France's President has responsibility for leading the global work programme under the Christchurch Call and delivering on Call Leaders' commitments.

2. **Note** that Rt Hon Ardern has forged a strong Community that can sustain the Call work and has cemented New Zealand's standing as a leading actor in shaping global norms on technology and human rights. She has expressed interest in continuing to contribute to this work.

3. **Indicate** your preferred approach to the Call work in 2023:

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EITHER

3.1   As Prime Minister, retain and deliver the full set of functions for the Christchurch Call, including leading engagement with your global counterparts and leaders in the technology sector and civil society, making decisions about the direction of the work programme, and ensuring Ministers and departments are working to fulfil New Zealand's commitments.

YES / NO

OR

3.2   Appoint Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern into a supporting role.

a.   *Retain most functions:* You maintain detailed oversight of the work programme, and Rt Hon Ardern acts as your Special Advisor, providing strategic advice and support as needed.

YES / NO

b.   *50/50 split:* You focus on some key relationships and Call outcomes, while Rt Hon Ardern acts on your behalf in other matters. This could include deploying her as your 'Special Envoy' for international outreach.

YES / NO

c.   *Delegate most functions:* Rt Hon Ardern takes on most outreach and shaping. You will sign off key decisions and, as required, make representations to other Leaders or participate in Summit-level engagements.

YES / NO

4.   **Note** that if you choose any of the options under 3.2 above, officials will work with Rt Hon Ardern to prepare detailed advice on her appointment and funding. We will also work on communications with President Macron and others in the Christchurch Call Community. You would retain the ability to revisit these arrangements as the work develops.

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

6.   **Agree** to share a message with your counterpart Leaders and the Christchurch Call Community, based on the draft at Attachment A.

YES / NO

7.   **Note** that officials are available to discuss in more detail the work programme for 2023 and your vision for the Call Unit, should you wish.

THE CHRISTCHURCH CALL AND PRIME MINISTERIAL PRIORITIES FOR 2023

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s9(2)(g)(ii)	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins **Prime Minister**
20 / 02 / 2023	/ / 2023

Contact for telephone discussion if required:

Name	Position	Telephone
s9(2)(g)(ii)		s9(2)(a)

Minister's office comments:

- ☐ Noted
- ☐ Seen
- ☐ Approved
- ☐ Needs change
- ☐ Withdrawn
- ☐ Not seen by Minister
- ☐ Overtaken by events
- ☐ Referred to

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The Christchurch Call is an innovative & successful initiative that responds to the March 15 attacks at a global level

1. The terrorist attack on 15 March 2019 was an atrocity designed for the internet. The murder of 51 members of New Zealand's Muslim community was livestreamed and amplified to a global audience. The online virality of the Christchurch attack livestream was unprecedented. It overwhelmed the safety systems social media firms had in place, with millions of copies of the video appearing online. This meant the impact of the attack reverberated far beyond New Zealand, affecting people around the globe.

2. The abuse of the internet to spread white nationalist propaganda was taken up by a community of extremists that places the perpetrator alongside other terrorists it reveres as so-called 'saintly' figures, such as Anders Breivik (Utøya, 2011). These groups and individuals saw Christchurch as a template, and this has played out in subsequent atrocities, including those in El Paso (2019), Buffalo (2022), and Bratislava (2022).

3. The Christchurch Call text was developed over the course of eight weeks following the Christchurch attack, fulfilling the vision of Rt Hon Ardern to build a partnership for long term change. The Call contains 25 detailed commitments[1] for Governments and tech firms, which must be carried out in a transparent, multistakeholder manner, while promoting international human rights law (including freedom of expression) and a free, open, and secure internet as a global force for good. France, as the 2019 G7 Chair, stepped up and played an essential role in developing the Call and hosting its launch on 15 May 2019 in Paris. France continues to co-lead the Call alongside New Zealand.

4. The city of Christchurch and the Christchurch Muslim community have an important stake in this work, seeing it as a considered, forward-looking response to online harm and an acknowledgement the events of 15 March 2019 will be remembered and acted upon globally.

The Christchurch Call has made considerable progress...

5. Among the significant achievements of the Christchurch Call:

   a. A significant reduction in the virality of livestreamed terrorist attacks that have sought to emulate the Christchurch attack (e.g. El Paso, Buffalo), resulting from improved policies, better systems, and greater coordination;

   b. Tech firms have adopted a comprehensive approach to all forms of terrorism and violent extremism online, where earlier there was a focus on UN-listed organisations - predominantly Islamic extremist groups – that struggled to deal with the rise of new types of violent extremism;

   c. The implementation of new policies, interventions, and technical tools to better identify and remove terrorist and violent extremist content;

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[1] Christchurch Call text | Christchurch Call

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d.   Standing up the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism as a new nongovernmental organisation (funded by the tech sector) with dedicated staff and resources to develop and share capability, supporting firms large and small;

e.   Agreed protocols for incident response that enable tech firms to coordinate with each other and governments and civil society to respond to viral content following an attack;

f.   Growing a global Christchurch Call Community that includes most of the world's liberal democracies, most major global tech firms, and a diverse network of civil society and international partner organisations that support our efforts;

g.   Progress by supporter Governments in regulating online services and implementing programmes for prevention, including support for community-led 'positive interventions';

h.   Consensus across the main global stakeholders around the preferred approach to these issues, and the means of addressing them together; the Call is becoming a model for multi-stakeholder work on digital challenges.

6.   In a crowded landscape of international processes seeking to define norms and rules for technology, the Christchurch Call has two unique factors that contribute to its success. It is led by Heads of State and Government and the top executives of technology firms, working with leaders from civil society. This means organisational resources can be mobilised quickly to solve problems. In addition, the Call is genuinely multistakeholder in its governance and implementation (i.e., inclusive of the technical community, civil society, impacted communities, academia, and experts), which means it has legitimacy in the internet governance community and 'buy in' to solutions from international stakeholders.

...and there is more work underway

7.   On 20 September 2022, during the United Nations' General Assembly Leaders' Week in New York, Rt Hon Ardern and President Macron convened Call Leaders and endorsed priorities for work in the coming year. These are laid out in the Summit's Joint Communique[2] and include:

a.   Continuing to strengthen the incident response system, including developing new systems and tools to counter adversarial tactics, and bringing into the Call a diverse range of tech companies, both large and small;

b.   Developing principles for dealing effectively with uncooperative and alt-tech services that play a role in radicalisation to violence and in exacerbating crisis situations. This will require careful work to deliver in a manner that protects and respects human rights and maintains a free, open, and secure internet;

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[2] Christchurch-Call-Joint-Statement-2022-English-version.pdf (christchurchcall.com)

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c. Investigating the terrorist and violent extremist content issues that may arise as innovative technologies are introduced, including more widespread use of artificial intelligence-driven 'immersive' and augmented reality environments;

d. Delivering a platform for the Call Community to collaborate more effectively and efficiently, especially as we grow, and add additional tech company supporters and more representation from groups representing youth, women, and LGBTQIA+.

e. Supporting a US-led effort (through the Global Partnership for Action on Online Gender-Based Violence and Harassment) to gather a comprehensive evidence base on gender-based hatred and violent extremism.

f. Assessing how human/AI interactions affect the proliferation of terrorist content and radicalisation of at-risk individuals and improving the tools available to help address this issue.

8. A key output for 2023 is the **Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes**. At the September Summit, New Zealand, the United States, Microsoft, and Twitter announced[3] a joint initiative to fund, develop, and test new privacy-enhancing technologies that reduce the cost, complexity, and legal and procedural barriers that prevent online platforms sharing sensitive data with independent researchers. This will help the Call Community understand and address the impact algorithmic systems have on users. If successful, the Initiative would be a significant step in responsible governance of artificial intelligence, with applications beyond the Call. This announcement has generated significant international interest; we are working on ways to accommodate this interest in the project design.

The Call has been led from the top by Heads of State/Government and Senior Executives…

9. In 2021, Rt Hon Ardern focused on ensuring the Call Community was "self-sustaining" and had a diverse and motivated group of supporters who would encourage each other to push ahead with the agreed work priorities. New Zealand remains the centre of gravity for Call work and is well positioned to draw on strong support from other governments, industry, and civil society leaders as we head into 2023.

10. Alongside President Macron, Rt Hon Ardern helped steward a group of key Leaders whose engagement with the Call is a major factor in its success to date and future viability.
s6(a)

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[3] Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes | Christchurch Call

THE CHRISTCHURCH CALL AND PRIME MINISTERIAL PRIORITIES FOR 2023

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11. s6(a)

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12. s6(a)

13. As Prime Minister, you are also supported by your Special Representative[4] on Cyber and Digital, s9(2)(g)(ii) He represents your interests in international meetings, maintains engagement with the senior leadership of the global technology sector, works with a network of Digital and Cyber Ambassadors, and provides advice on New Zealand policy in this rapidly evolving field.

14. You are also supported by the Christchurch Call Unit - a joint venture of DPMC's Policy Advisory Group (PAG) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) led by s9(2)(a). The Unit coordinates the Call Community, convenes working level and technical contacts, negotiates outcomes, and supports you in your international engagement on the Call and related digital issues.

15. [Not in Scope]

Planning your 2023 Call engagement

16. The Community has shown considerable interest in the Leadership change in New Zealand and is eager to understand any implications for New Zealand's work on the Call.

17. As the Call is a Leaders' initiative, it cannot readily be delegated to a Ministerial colleague s6(a)

However, given the considerable track record, mana, and expertise of your predecessor, it would be feasible to deploy her on your behalf. Options include: appointing

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CONTENT ONLINE

Rt Hon Ardern as, for instance, a 'Special Envoy[5]' for the Christchurch Call or, potentially, as an 'Honorary Chair' or 'Honorary President' of the Call s6(a) In that role she could support and augment your engagement with Leaders, with either full or partial delegation. Such a role would also accelerate the pace and quality of communications and international engagement and, therefore, delivery of results under the Call.

18. s6(a)

19. s6(a)

20. RightsCon, a major civil society-led multistakeholder summit in June on human rights in the digital age, will be a centrepiece of the Call's 2023 outreach strategy. Last year Rt Hon Ardern was the first Head of Government to participate in RightsCon, which delivered significant profile and support for the Call. This year, US Vice President Kamala Harris and UN Tech Envoy Amandeep Singh are expected to join senior industry, government, and civil society figures at the meeting. Rt Hon Ardern had been invited to participate in this year's event; the organisers have indicated the invitation is intended to be transferable to you as Prime Minister if you wish. Your appearance (virtually/pre-recorded) at RightsCon 2023 would affirm New Zealand's commitment to working with stakeholders to shape a positive and open future for digital technologies.

21. The Call operates within a diverse ecosystem of initiatives on digital technologies, human rights, and democracy. s6(a) The Unit works with partners through Denmark's Tech for Democracy partnership; the US-led Declaration for the Future of the Internet; and President Biden's Summit for Democracy. This is another strand of engagement where opportunities exist to further Call-related objectives; these can be pursued either virtually or, drawing upon Rt Hon Ardern or senior officials, in person.

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[5]'Special Envoy' is an ad hoc position, generally filled by a senior politician appointed by a Head of State or Government to act for them on a particular topic.

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CONTENT ONLINE

22. As an initial action in your Call co-Leader role, we recommend you send an introductory letter to Call Leaders. **Attachment A** contains a proposed message for your approval. We suggest this message also go via email to the broader Call Community. If you wish to appoint Rt Hon Ardern to a Call role, you may want to hold off sending this letter until the appointment has been made so that it can be included.

Domestic work on digital issues and Call Commitments

23. The Unit provides leadership across the New Zealand Government on delivery of the Call Commitments, where significant efforts are underway. These sit alongside work to deliver recommendations stemming from the Royal Commission of Inquiry and reflect the growing challenge of developing policy and governing effectively in the digital age. There is a limited pool of digital policy expertise across Government – and incorporating multistakeholder inputs and approaches in this work requires care and expertise.

24. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

[Not in Scope]

25. In 2019, the Call was supported through temporary resourcing from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and staff in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. This was important in helping develop the Call and setting up its institutional machinery. In 2020 MFAT and DPMC staff continued this work, delivered remotely during the initial stages of the pandemic. While MFAT continued to resource the Call, it was unable to provide the dedicated technical expertise necessary to develop the work as the Call evolved. .

26. In April 2021, Rt Hon Ardern established the Call Unit within DPMC's Policy Advisory Group (PAG). DPMC funded this for two years, drawing on underspend in the Cyber Security Strategy Fund. This funding provided core staff (currently 5.5 FTEs, comprised of fixed term and seconded staff) to build our network and deliver Call outcomes. Through an agreed 'joint venture' arrangement, MFAT provided a further 2 FTE, support from its network of offshore posts, funding for the 2021 and 2022 Summits and an updated Call website, and communications and logistics support.

27. [Not in Scope]

THE CHRISTCHURCH CALL AND PRIME MINISTERIAL PRIORITIES FOR 2023

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

CHRISTCHURCH CALL
TO ELIMINATE TERRORIST
& VIOLENT EXTREMIST

[Not in Scope]

28. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Next Steps

29. Should you choose to appoint Rt Hon Ardern to work on the Call, there would be costs associated with contracting, and supporting a programme of international engagement and travel, that will not be able to be met from within baselines, even if the budget bid is successful.

30. Based on your preferred option, the Call Unit will prepare further advice. That could include working with Rt Hon Ardern to scope any role, advice on funding, and reporting arrangements. Funding options could include adjusting the existing 2023/24 Budget bid, or a draft Cabinet paper for consideration of expenditure from your Emerging Priorities Fund or the Between Budget Contingency. Please let us know if you have any immediate preference. This advice would also include communications material for your consideration, for any announcement on a role.

31. More broadly, should you wish, officials would be pleased to meet with you discuss your vision for the international digital work, the future focus of the Call Unit and the Special Representative, and your interest in international engagement on the Call and related initiatives.

Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A:	Suggested message to Call Leaders and the Call Community	UNCLASSIFIED

Attachment A withheld in full under s9(2)(g)(i)

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

CHRISTCHURCH CALL
TO ELIMINATE TERRORIST
& VIOLENT EXTREMIST

Attachment A:
Suggested message to Call Leaders and the Call Community

s9(2)(g)(i)

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

Appointment of Rt Hon Ardern to support Christchurch Call work

To: **Prime Minister** (Rt Hon Chris Hipkins)					
Date	14/03/2023	**Report number**	DPMC-4712222	**Priority**	Normal

Overview

- You have decided to appoint Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern to support your leadership of the Christchurch Call. Officials have accordingly scoped the role, done an initial assessment of funding and support requirements, and engaged with Rt Hon Ardern about options to take this forward.

- This report outlines options for the scope and functions of Rt Hon Ardern's role, including a plan of work, the appointment process, funding and supporting the role, engaging with President Macron and the Call Community, and arrangements and timing for announcing the role.

Recommendations

I recommend that you:

1. **Note** that you have indicated your preference to appoint Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern to support your leadership of the Christchurch Call, taking on many of your leadership functions on your behalf.

2. **Note** that officials have engaged with Rt Hon Ardern in the development of this advice and confirmed her interest in taking up a role.

3. **Agree** that the Call Unit will engage with Rt Hon Ardern on the level of activity the role would encompass, drawing on the options indicated in Attachment A.   **YES / NO**

APPOINTMENT OF RT HON ARDERN TO SUPPORT CHRISTCHURCH CALL WORK

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4.   **Indicate** your preferred approach to appointing Rt Hon Ardern:

     EITHER

     4.1   On the advice of the Chief Executive of DPMC, directly appoint Rt Hon Ardern as **your Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call**. (Recommended Option)   **YES / NO**

     OR

     4.2   On the advice of the Chief Executive of DPMC, directly appoint Rt Hon Ardern as **New Zealand's High Representative for the Christchurch Call**.   **YES / NO**

     AND/OR

     4.3   s9(2)(g)(i)   **YES / NO**

5.   **Agree** to take an oral item to Cabinet regarding the appointment of Rt Hon Ardern to your selected role(s).   **YES / NO**

6.   s6(a)   **YES / NO**

7.   **Note** the estimated cost of establishing and supporting Rt Hon Ardern's role will be in the range of 0.450m to 0.500m per annum, pro-rated over the term of the appointment, and that the Call Unit will work to refine this estimate based on discussions with Rt Hon Ardern on the level of activity for the role.

8.   **Note** that this figure is additional to the funding sought in the 2023/24 budget and is not provided for within DPMC baselines.

9.   **Indicate** your preferred approach to securing funding to support Rt Hon Ardern's role:

     EITHER

APPOINTMENT OF RT HON ARDERN TO SUPPORT CHRISTCHURCH CALL WORK

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9.1	Seek Cabinet approval for expenditure from your Emerging Priorities Fund (Recommended Option)	**YES / NO**
	OR	
9.2	Adjust DPMC's Christchurch Call bid for Budget 2023	**YES / NO**
	OR	
9.3	Work with DPMC to reprioritise spending within its baselines.	**YES / NO**

10. s9(2)(f)(iv) **YES / NO**

11. **Direct** the Unit to work with your Office and Rt Hon Ardern on appropriate arrangements and timing for an announcement. **YES / NO**

12. **Agree** that, concurrent with an announcement, you would share a message to Call Leaders and the Call Community (based on the proposed draft attached to DPMC-4704556). **YES / NO**

13. **Note** that officials are available to discuss in more detail the functions and scope of Rt Hon Ardern's new role, the options for appointing Rt Hon Ardern and funding the new role, and the announcement plan, should you wish.

14. **Agree** that the appointment be reviewed in November or December 2023 **YES / NO**

APPOINTMENT OF RT HON ARDERN TO SUPPORT CHRISTCHURCH CALL WORK

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

s9(2)(g)(ii)	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins **Prime Minister**
14 / 03 / 2023	/ / 2023

Contact for telephone discussion if required:

| Name	Position	Telephone
s9(2)(g)(ii)		s9(2)(a)

Minister's office comments:

☐ Noted

☐ Seen

☐ Approved

☐ Needs change

☐ Withdrawn

☐ Not seen by Minister

☐ Overtaken by events

☐ Referred to

APPOINTMENT OF RT HON ARDERN TO SUPPORT CHRISTCHURCH CALL WORK

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

Scoping an effective and ambitious role for Rt Hon Ardern

1. As Prime Minister of New Zealand, you are a co-Leader of the Christchurch Call – a project of national and global significance. You have decided (refer DPMC-4704556) to appoint Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern to support you in this role, and to allocate much of the leadership of the work to Rt Hon Ardern. As responsible Minister, you will retain oversight and decision-making authority as well as relationships with international counterparts. This memorandum provides advice on how Rt Hon Ardern can support you and act on your behalf to continue this work.

2. This is a significant opportunity for the Call. Rt Hon Ardern's expertise and international relationships, effectively deployed and supported, could unlock significant progress across the work programme, pave the way for you to engage periodically with Call counterparts, and deliver long term change in support of an internet for good. s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

3. Officials have confirmed with Rt Hon Ardern her interest in this role, initially for this calendar year. Officials have also discussed with Rt Hon Ardern a set of possible objectives, and functions and scope of her new role, which are outlined for you below.

Rt Hon Ardern's role can be scoped according to your preferences and available resources

4. You have indicated you would like to allocate most Call leadership functions to Rt Hon Ardern. Rt Hon Ardern has asked the Call Unit to outline a spectrum of options for her engagement and tempo of Call work in the coming months, ranging from 'minimum viable' through to a more ambitious approach, based on the Call work programme endorsed by Call Leaders last September. At the ambitious end of the spectrum, Rt Hon Ardern's role could involve a significant travel programme with an increased tempo of outreach designed to secure deliverables over the next six to eight months and consolidate and strengthen the foundations for the Call's work to be self-sustaining into the future. Alternatively, there are options for a more limited set of activities to support you. **Attachment A** details the possibilities for Rt Hon Ardern's role along a sliding scale of activity.

With a broad scope, Rt Hon Ardern could undertake many of your oversight and outreach functions

5. Co-leadership functions include decision-making (some of which is taken alongside President Macron), oversight (departmental and work programme), and outreach functions. You will formally retain all these functions, but the Unit proposes you allocate to Rt Hon Ardern aspects of your oversight and outreach functions. Rt Hon Ardern could be responsible for:

    *   Leader outreach, particularly tech leaders, whose resources and scheduling are generally planned out many months in advance;

APPOINTMENT OF RT HON ARDERN TO SUPPORT CHRISTCHURCH CALL WORK

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- Informal Leaders' Meetings: s6(a)
  there will be opportunities for Rt Hon Ardern to support you via smaller and more informal gatherings of Leaders s9(2)(f)(iv)

- External engagement and outreach at public events and international media;

- In conjunction with the Call Unit, providing you with essential, targeted advice about the work programme, and decisions you may be required to take, while helping to steward the Call Community's efforts where your input is not directly required;

- Landing key deliverables, particularly advancing the Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes, s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

6. These activities could remain flexible. As advised previously (refer DPMC-4704556), you would retain the ability to revisit these arrangements as the work develops.

The appointment should signal that Rt Hon Ardern acts on your behalf…

7. It will be important to find a suitable appointment process and title that reflects Rt Hon Ardern's mandate, such that she can carry out her work effectively. The title of Rt Hon Ardern's new role should reflect her status as a former Head of Government and the mandate you are giving her to act on your behalf. This will be important to grant her the access and credibility needed to effectively perform her role. Potential options for a title could include:

   a. Prime Minister's ***'Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call'***

      A Special Envoy is a senior political figure who takes on a set of duties on behalf of a Head of State or Government. This appointment makes clear that Rt Hon Ardern acts with your endorsement and on your behalf. Special Envoys are sometimes conferred the diplomatic rank of Ambassador (i.e. a mixture of options (a) and (c)), although this would have limited practical benefit given her status as a former Head of Government.

   b. New Zealand's ***'High Representative for the Christchurch Call'***

      High Representative roles are senior diplomatic or Cabinet roles. They are most often associated with international organisations (such as the UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the EU's High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy). High Representatives have a more general set of responsibilities on behalf of the organisation they represent. You could make such an appointment, s6(a)

   c. New Zealand's "***Ambassador for the Christchurch Call***'

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Thematic Ambassadors are generally appointed by a Minister of Foreign Affairs. Examples include e.g. New Zealand's Ambassador for Counter Terrorism, France's Digital Ambassador, or the Dutch Ambassador for HIV/AIDS Elimination. A thematic Ambassador would be assumed to have a more flexible set of responsibilities and report through the existing foreign policy system, rather than directly to you.

8. We recommend option (a) as the preferred title for Rt Hon Ardern. Of the available options, the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call is an appropriate title and role for a former Head of Government, and it retains a formal, direct connection between you and Rt Hon Ardern. The title of Special Envoy would require a straightforward appointment process, whereby you appoint Rt Hon Ardern on the advice of the Chief Executive of DPMC provided via a short submission. In providing initial advice on Rt Hon Ardern's appointment, the Cabinet Office recommends that you take Rt Hon Ardern's appointment to Cabinet via an oral item.

9. While option (b) 'New Zealand's High Representative for the Christchurch Call' would also provide Rt Hon Ardern with a senior title and a straightforward appointment process (as per option (a)), it does not connote as close a connection with you as 'Special Envoy' does, and it is more commonly understood in a UN context. The Unit does not recommend option (c) by itself as this would place Rt Hon Ardern within a departmental reporting structure that is less directly tied to you as responsible Minister. An ambassador role would require the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to progress a Cabinet appointment process.

10. s6(a)

s6(a)

11. s6(a)

APPOINTMENT OF RT HON ARDERN TO SUPPORT CHRISTCHURCH CALL WORK

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
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Funding and supporting Rt Hon Ardern's role

Additional funding will be required to support Rt Hon Ardern's special role

12. Rt Hon Ardern has declined to receive remuneration for undertaking this role, but there will be some cost associated, including a need for reimbursement of actual and reasonable expenses. The Unit estimates the additional cost of establishing and supporting Rt Hon Ardern's role will be in the range of 0.450m to 0.500m p/a, pro-rated over the period of the appointment. In addition to earlier informal advice on the range of costs for administrative staff support to Rt Hon Ardern, travel expenses (international and domestic), IT equipment, and security support (cyber and physical), this amount includes provision for some additional policy resource (1 FTE). Security support remains the largest variable in these costs. As we take forward discussion with Rt Hon Ardern on the degree of activity to be undertaken in the role, we will be able to more precisely quantify these costs.

13. s9(2)(f)(iv)

    Currently, the estimated cost of establishing and supporting Rt Hon Ardern's role is not included in this bid and provision is not available for it elsewhere within DPMC's baselines. Therefore, funding for Rt Hon Ardern's role will need to be identified. The Unit has identified three possible avenues for your consideration:

    a. *Seek Cabinet approval for expenditure from your Emerging Priorities Fund*
    This option would be efficient, involving a straightforward process that could secure funding with minimal delay, subject to Cabinet's agenda. This could provide certainty for the funding support available for the new role prior to appointing Rt Hon Ardern and enable expenditure in the current financial year, such that work could commence promptly.

    b. *Adjust DPMC's Christchurch Call bid for Budget 2023*
    Though viable, this option will involve some delay and a degree of uncertainty. This option also carries the risk of 'trade off' amongst other budget priorities.

    c. *Reprioritise DPMC's budget to support Rt Hon Ardern's role*
    DPMC could work with you to reprioritise DPMC's budget priorities to fund Rt Hon Ardern's role from within DPMC's baselines.

14. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

Rt Hon Ardern will require a 'home' organisation for administrative support, including administering allocated funding

15. While DPMC's Call Unit will be responsible for policy support, Rt Hon Ardern will require a 'home' agency with responsibility for administrative support (e.g. equipment, support staff, travel arrangements, expenses). A written agreement between Rt Hon Ardern and the 'home'

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13. s9(2)(f)(iv)
    Currently, the estimated cost of establishing and supporting Rt Hon Ardern's role is not included in this bid and provision is not available for it elsewhere within DPMC's baselines. Therefore, funding for Rt Hon Ardern's role will need to be identified. The Unit has identified three possible avenues for your consideration:

    a. *Seek Cabinet approval for expenditure from your Emerging Priorities Fund*
       This option would be efficient, involving a straightforward process that could secure funding with minimal delay, subject to Cabinet's agenda. This could provide certainty for the funding support available for the new role prior to appointing Rt Hon Ardern and enable expenditure in the current financial year, such that work could commence promptly.

    b. *Adjust DPMC's Christchurch Call bid for Budget 2023*
       Though viable, this option will involve some delay and a degree of uncertainty. This option also carries the risk of 'trade off' amongst other budget priorities.

    c. *Reprioritise DPMC's budget to support Rt Hon Ardern's role*
       DPMC could work with you to reprioritise DPMC's budget priorities to fund Rt Hon Ardern's role from within DPMC's baselines.

14. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

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APPOINTMENT OF RT HON ARDERN TO SUPPORT CHRISTCHURCH CALL WORK

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

agency would facilitate the provision of this administrative support. The Unit recommends that DPMC, and specifically the Call Unit, hold responsibility for administratively supporting Rt Hon Ardern.

16. s9(2)(g)(i)

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

Announcing Rt Hon Ardern's appointment

18. Rt Hon Ardern has indicated a preference for making any announcement after her valedictory speech, scheduled for 5 April, to ensure a degree of separation between her current and future roles. The Unit proposes you announce Rt Hon Ardern's appointment shortly after that speech, so she can begin her new role as soon as she completes her term as MP for Mt Albert. Based on this timing, it would be possible to make an announcement on 6 April or 11 April (noting the Easter weekend between these dates). Should 6 or 11 April not suit, the Unit is available to work with your office and Rt Hon Ardern to determine a suitable date and provide support for the announcement.

19. The Unit anticipates a positive reception to the announcement, with the possibility that it will be bolstered by public support from other Call Leaders. We suggest the Unit and Rt Hon Ardern informally reach out to some key Call Leaders to ensure they are aware of – and not taken by surprise by the announcement of Rt Hon Ardern's appointment. In addition, the Unit proposes you send a message to Call Leaders and the Call Community at the time of the announcement (refer DPMC-4704556 for a draft message, which the Unit will revise for your consideration closer to the announcement).

Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A:	Options for the functions and scope of Rt Hon Ardern's special role	RESTRICTED

APPOINTMENT OF RT HON ARDERN TO SUPPORT CHRISTCHURCH CALL WORK

Attachment A is withheld in full under s6(a) and s9(2)(g)(i)

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

CHRISTCHURCH
CALL
TO ELIMINATE TERRORIST
& VIOLENT EXTREMIST

Attachment A: Options for the functions and scope of Rt Hon Ardern's special role

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Formal establishment and appointment of the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

To: Prime Minister (Rt Hon Chris Hipkins)					
Date	21/03/2023	**Report number**	DPMC-4716832	**Priority**	Normal

Overview

1. In accordance with previous advice (refer DPMC-4704556 and DPMC-4712222), the Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet recommends that you establish the role of the New Zealand Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and appoint Rt Hon Ardern to this role.

2. The Special Envoy role would support you in your role as co-Leader of the Christchurch Call by undertaking allocated co-Leader oversight and outreach functions on your behalf.

3. Rt Hon Ardern's appointment could help to deliver a significant uplift in the Call work, deliver outcomes with a long-term positive impact for public safety on the internet, and enhance New Zealand's role as a leading voice on digital issues.

Recommendations

I recommend that you:

1. **Establish** the role of the New Zealand Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call. **YES / NO**

2. **Note** that in line with previous advice (refer DPMC-4712222), the Special Envoy would act on your behalf to manage outreach and relationships, and land key deliverables of the Call work programme, and you would retain your Ministerial responsibilities, notably decision-making, for the Call.

3. **Note** Rt Hon Ardern is uniquely placed to carry out this role given her past leadership of this initiative, her mana, expertise

APPOINTMENT OF YOUR SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE CHRISTCHURCH CALL

and international relationships. Placing Rt Hon Ardern in this role is a significant opportunity that could deliver major new outcomes for New Zealand and the Call Community.

4. **Appoint** Rt Hon Ardern as the New Zealand Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call, beginning on 17 April 2023.

    YES / NO

5. **Agree** to advise Cabinet on 27 March 2023 of the establishment of the Special Envoy role and the appointment of Rt Hon Ardern to the role.

    YES / NO

6. **Note** that DPMC and Rt Hon Ardern will conclude a contractual arrangement to facilitate the provision of support to Rt Hon Ardern in her Special Envoy role.

7. **Note** that the role and the appointment of Rt Hon Ardern will be reviewed in November or December 2023.

Rebecca Kitteridge **Chief Executive**	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins **Prime Minister**
/ 03 / 2023	/ 03 / 2023

Contact for telephone discussion if required:

Name	Position	Telephone
s9(2)(g)(ii)		s9(2)(a)

Minister's office comments:

☐ Noted

☐ Seen

APPOINTMENT OF YOUR SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE CHRISTCHURCH CALL

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

☐ Approved

☐ Needs change

☐ Withdrawn

☐ Not seen by Minister

☐ Overtaken by events

☐ Referred to

Background

4. You have previously agreed to appoint Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern into a role to support you as co-Leader of the Christchurch Call, which includes the allocation of most of your co-Leader functions (refer DPMC-4704556). With her mana, expertise, and international relationships, Rt Hon Ardern is uniquely placed to support you as co-Leader of an initiative that holds widespread multistakeholder support at the highest levels.

5. On further advice (refer DPMC-4712222), you have agreed to appoint Rt Hon Ardern to a role, titled the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call, that carries the mandate and mana to act on your behalf. The Special Envoy will hold specific functions that derive from your co-Leader role, namely: Leader outreach, external engagement, landing key deliverables of the Call work programme, and assisting the Call Unit in advice on key decisions you may need to take as Call co-Leader. The allocation of these functions will enable Rt Hon Ardern to deliver significant outcomes for the Call and ultimately consolidate, strengthen, and advance the Call as a leading online safety initiative.

6. In accordance with your preferred approach to appointing Rt Hon Ardern (DPMC-4712222), this paper conveys the Chief Executive of DPMC's formal recommendation that you directly appoint Rt Hon Ardern as your Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call.

7. DPMC and Rt Hon Ardern will conclude a contractual arrangement prior to your announcement of the establishment of the role on 4 April and Rt Hon Ardern's subsequent commencement of the role. This arrangement will facilitate the provision of administrative support Rt Hon Ardern will require for her role, with funding to be secured from your Emerging Priorities Fund, subject to Cabinet's approval.

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

Aide-Mémoire

DRAFT CABINET PAPER: THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE CHRISTCHRHUCH CALL

To:	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins, Prime Minister		
From:	s9(2)(g)(ii)	Date:	23/03/2023
Briefing Number:	DPMC-4719545	Security Level:	RESTRICTED

Purpose

1. This aide-mémoire covers the draft Cabinet paper on funding for your Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and further information on the contents of the paper for your information.

Background

2. You have previously agreed to seek funding from your Emerging Priorities Contingency to support the work of your Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call (refer DPMC-4712222). Attached is a draft Cabinet paper seeking Cabinet's agreement to commit up to $625,000 across 2022/2023 and 2023/24 from your Emerging Priorities Fund to support your Special Envoy.

3. This paper is scheduled to be considered at Cabinet on 3 April 2023. Subject to Cabinet's agreement, your announcement of the appointment of Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern as your Special Envoy is scheduled for 4 April 2023.

Several financial assumptions underpin the proposed costs

4. The proposed approximate cost of $625,000 rests on an assumption of $500,000 per annum, pro-rated. Therefore, the FY 23/24 figures are for a full financial year. However, the paper notes that the arrangements for your Special Envoy are to be reviewed in December 2023.

5. There remains uncertainty around the security requirements for the role, given the nature of the work, and, consequently, also some uncertainty about the likely cost of these requirements. The proposed budget has therefore allowed some headroom for these costs; it is likely the experience of the first few months of the role will give a reasonable indication of ongoing security requirements and their cost.

A Cabinet report back on the Call is scheduled for June 2023

6. The paper notes that you are scheduled to report back to Cabinet in June 2023 on progress in advancing the Christchurch Call programme. This report back could provide a timely opportunity to communicate the Call's progress more broadly. The Christchurch Call Unit will work on drafting a paper for your consideration, working with the Special Envoy.

Consultation with agencies has begun, to be concluded alongside Ministerial consultation…

7. Officials have informally consulted with the Treasury and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the drafting of this paper. If you are sufficiently comfortable with the paper to take it to Ministerial consultation, officials will undertake formal agency consultation in parallel with this process (24 – 28 March).

An oral item at the next Cabinet will foreshadow this paper

8. You have previously agreed to inform Cabinet of the establishment of the Special Envoy role via oral item. This is set down for Cabinet on 27 March. This oral item is an opportunity to seek Cabinet's support for the establishment of the Special Envoy role and Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern's appointment to the role, and to foreshadow the attached Cabinet paper for consideration at the following week's Cabinet meeting. Officials will provide you with talking points in support of the oral item and, shortly thereafter, the Cabinet paper itself.

s9(2)(g)(ii)	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins **Prime Minister**
23 / 03 / 2023	/ 03 / 2023

Attachments:	
Attachment A:	Draft Cabinet paper – the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

Contact for telephone discussion			
Name	*Position*	*Telephone*	*1st contact*
s9(2)(g)(ii)		s9(2)(a)	✓

Attachment A withheld in full under s9(2)(g)(i)

Attachment A: Draft Cabinet paper – the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

s9(2)(g)(i) [Final Cabinet Paper is publicly available on the DPMC website]

s9(2)(g)(i) [Final Cabinet Paper is publicly available on the DPMC website]

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

Aide-Mémoire

Cabinet oral item: Establishment and appointment of Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call – talking points

To:	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins, Prime Minister		
From:	s9(2)(g)(ii)	Date:	24/03/2023
Briefing Number:	DPMC-4719496	Security Level:	RESTRICTED

Purpose

1. This aide-mémoire provides you with talking points to support the oral item you are taking to Cabinet on 27 March 2023 regarding the establishment and appointment of your Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call.

s9(2)(g)(ii)	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins **Prime Minister**
/ 03 / 2023	/ 03 / 2023

Attachments:	
Attachment A:	Talking points for Cabinet oral item on your Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

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Aide Mémoire: Cabinet oral item: Special Envoy for the Call - talking points   **DPMC-4719496**

Contact for telephone discussion			
Name	*Position*	*Telephone*	*1st contact*
s9(2)(g)(ii)		s9(2)(a)	✓

Attachment A is withheld in full under s9(2)(g)(i)

Aide Mémoire: Cabinet oral item: Special Envoy for the Call - talking points   **DPMC-4719496**

DPMC: 4719496   Page 2 of 5

RESTRICTED

s9(2)(g)(i) [Final Cabinet
Paper is publicly
available on the DPMC

s9(2)(g)(i)

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

Aide-Mémoire

CABINET ITEM: PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE CHRISTCHURCH CALL

To:	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins, Prime Minister		
From:	s9(2)(g)(ii)	Date:	31/03/2023
Briefing Number:	DPMC-4727490	Security Level:	IN-CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. This aide-mémoire provides you with talking points to support the paper you are taking to Cabinet on 3 April 2023 regarding your Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call.

The Special Envoy role will require some additional support…

2. The paper sets out the case for additional resources to support the work of the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and the augmented capacity the role will deliver to the Call work programme.

3. The paper seeks Cabinet's agreement to provide support to facilitate Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern's work as your Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call. It further seeks agreement to apply up to $625,000 from your Emerging Priorities Contingency in support of this.

No major issues identified in Ministerial and Agency Consultation

4. Ministerial consultation has been completed, with no comments received.

5. Agency consultation led to minor amendments to the description of Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) support for the work of the Christchurch Call.

Next steps

6. If Cabinet agrees to the recommendations in the paper, you are scheduled to announce Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern's appointment on Tuesday 4 April.

7. The Christchurch Call Unit will provide you with a draft Letter of Appointment for Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern.

8. The Christchurch Call Unit will prepare a paper for you to report back to Cabinet in June 2023 on progress in advancing the Christchurch Call programme. This milestone has been included in the CPC Tracker.

s9(2)(g)(ii)	**Rt Hon Chris Hipkins** **Prime Minister**
31 / 03 / 2023	/ 04 / 2023

Attachments:	
Attachment A:	Talking points for the Cabinet paper: Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

Contact for telephone discussion			
Name	*Position*	*Telephone*	*1st contact*
s9(2)(g)(ii)		s9(2)(a)	✓

Attachment A withheld in full under s9(2)(g)(i)

Aide Mémoire: CABINET ITEM: PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE CHRISTCHURCH CALL	**DPMC-4727490**

s9(2)(g)(i)

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Prime Minister's Special Representative on Cyber and Digital
Christchurch Call and Cyber Coordinator

Policy Advisory Group/National Security Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Phone: s9(2)(a)
Email: s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz
Web: www.christchurchcall.com

From: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii) **On Behalf Of** Information & Research Services
Sent: Wednesday, 24 May 2023 9:27 am
To: @NCP National Cyber Policy s9(2)(k) s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: FW: AI Is Transforming Business — What about Government?

[UNCLASSIFIED]

From: CIGI Newsletter <newsletters@cigionline.org>
Sent: Tuesday, 23 May 2023 10:00 pm
To: Information & Research Services s9(2)(k)
Subject: AI Is Transforming Business — What about Government?

Influential research. Trusted analysis.

AI Is Transforming How Business Is Done: What about Government?

Even as artificial intelligence (AI) is forecast to exceed human capabilities across a range of industries, it's also predicted to augment human labour. Analysts list some 400 use cases representing $6 trillion in value across 19 industries in which AI will transform the nature of work. What about government?

Daniel Araya writes that although use of AI by government may have been trailing that of the private sector till now, that's changing. In more than 60 countries, governments are developing national AI strategies, most focused on public sector transformation. AI could mean significantly improving public service delivery and elevating the work of public service professionals. Or, it could mean remaking government altogether. Araya looks at some of the questions ahead.

☐ READ

With AI Evolving at Lightning Speed, It's Time to Take Stock

AI is rapidly becoming enmeshed in our society. It's more important than ever that we pause and take stock of where we stand with this technology. The AI Index at the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence does just that.

☐ READ

The AI Index tracks progress in AI through various lenses, including trends in research and development, technical performance, ethics, economics, policy, public opinion, and education. Nestor Maslej takes a look at

this year's report by the AI Index, and discusses the three dominant trends that emerged in AI in 2022.

Recommended

Halting AI Research
In a recent *Toronto Star* op-ed, Joël Blit says he shares "many of the concerns around the accelerating growth of AI, including its potential to spread falsehoods, undermine democracy, and create killer robots.… However, I disagree with the prescription to pause research on AI, as it is unrealistic given geopolitical realities." [Read it here.](#)

Argentina's "Reckless" Plan
"It can only invite speculators to bet on a new default." In a *Financial Times* story ahead of Argentina's announcement on May 14 of new emergency government measures aimed to rein in inflation and support the peso, Hector Torres commented on the package and its risks. Read ["Argentina plans emergency economic measures to avoid big devaluation"](#) (subscription required).

Are AI Language Models Too Dangerous to Deploy? Who Can Tell?

Although generative AI technology may bring a host of benefits, it's also fraught with barely glimpsed risks and dangers. Prominent experts' call to push pause in the development of models more advanced than GPT-4 has provoked vigorous debate, at the heart of which is an uncertainty about the precise risk these chatbots pose, and whether we should trust the assurances of OpenAI, Google and others that they're safe enough to deploy for now.

☐ READ

Almost everyone agrees it would be best for governments to catch up with the lightning pace of development and put guardrails in place. But, Robert Diab says, although regulations are on the way, they may not provide the guardrails people are hoping for.


Next Week: 6th Annual IP Data and Research Conference

May 31 – 8:00 a.m. EDT (UTC–04:00) – Gatineau: Virtual spots available: The Canadian Intellectual Property Office and CIGI will be co-hosting the 6th Annual IP Data and Research Conference on May 31. Speakers will be exploring the themes of firms and the economics of IP; diversity and inclusion in the IP and innovation ecosystem; IP use and awareness; emerging technologies; and IP challenges and solutions.

Don't miss it! Check out the day's agenda and register for this free event [here](#).

☐ RSVP

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From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(g)(ii) ^MFAT s9(2)(g)(ii) ; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; ^MFAT s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) (ISED); s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) (CMD); s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	FW: ?? Axios PM: Biden"s AI plan
Date:	Wednesday, 24 May 2023 9:42:01 am
Attachments:	image001.png

[UNCLASSIFIED]

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Prime Minister's Special Representative on Cyber and Digital
Christchurch Call and Cyber Coordinator

Policy Advisory Group/National Security Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Phone: s9(2)(a)
Email: s9(2)(g)(ii) @dpmc.govt.nz
Web: www.christchurchcall.com

From: s9(2)(a)
Sent: Wednesday, 24 May 2023 8:13 am
To: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Axios PM: Biden's AI plan

                    Open in app View in browser

PRESENTED BY JPMORGAN CHASE

Axios PM

By Mike Allen · May 23, 2023

Good Tuesday afternoon! Today's PM — edited by Erica Pandey — is 690 words, a 2½-min. read. *Thanks to Sheryl Miller for the copy edit.*

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis (R) is expected to announce his 2024 presidential campaign during a Twitter Spaces event with Elon Musk at 6 p.m. tomorrow. *Go deeper*.

1 big thing: Biden's AI plan

Illustration: Maura Losch/Axios

President Biden this afternoon announced a <u>string of plans</u> designed to promote the benefits of artificial intelligence while curtailing risks, *Axios' Ashley Gold reports.*

- **Why it matters:** The U.S. government is racing to control tools that are suddenly advancing and deploying more rapidly than expected.

The big picture: The intervention has been encouraged by <u>leading AI pioneers</u> — but it's already behind the pace of European regulators.

- The White House says an eventual National Artificial Intelligence Strategy will include administration projects and public input.

Among the topics for study:

- **National security** benefits and risks of AI.
- **Whether AI** can help combat climate change.
- **AI's impact** on equity and civil rights, and how existing laws can be updated to account for it.
- **Whether AI can** strengthen or hurt democracy.

Zoom in: A <u>report</u> released as part of the announcements, "Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Teaching and Learning," shows the administration thinks schools will be a key focus of AI regulation

- **Randi Weingarten,** president of the American Federation of Teachers, told Axios: "AI is a game-changer, but teachers need to be the coaches in the game."

Our thought bubble: AI in schools will pit many interests against each other, *Axios' Ryan Heath notes.*

- **Will it free teachers** to better support kids, or turbocharge bias and digital divides and ignite a new culture war?

A version of this story was published first on Axios Pro. Get news like this by subscribing. Use code POLICY100.

- *Share this story ... White House fact sheet.*

2. Real menus win

Illustration of a QR code with

Illustration: Shoshana Gordon/Axios

Restaurants all over the country replaced their paper menus with contactless, scannable QR codes during the pandemic — and the digital menus looked like they were here to stay.

- **But restaurants are** increasingly going back to their old menus, *The New York Times' Amelia Nierenberg writes (subscription).*

"The motivation for the about-face is simple, restaurateurs said: Diners

just hate QR-code menus," *The Times reports.*

- **"[R]estaurants are trying** to coax people to eat out, and the seduction of a dining room is part of the get — dusky candlelight and uninterrupted, eye-to-eye conversation. A QR code can kill the mood: phones up, blue lights on, conviviality off."

 By the numbers: Use of QR-code menus is down 27% compared to 2021, according to MustHaveMenus, which manages thousands of digital menus.

- **That's because** restaurants are replacing them with paper menus — or customers are just ignoring the codes and ordering directly with their servers.

 What to watch: QR codes are unlikely to disappear from the dining experience altogether.

- **They can be useful** at places like beer gardens where servers may be stretched thin and speedy ordering is a priority.

Many restaurants are using paper menus — but putting QR codes on checks in case customers want to pay quickly with their phones.

Upskilling to help shrink Anacostia's 25% unemployment rate

JPMorgan Chase is working with Urban Ed, an organization in D.C.'s Anacostia neighborhood, to help residents pursue well-paid, in-demand jobs.

Why it's important: The firm supports skills training programs to give more people access to promising careers and economic security.

Learn more.

3. Catch me up

Waymo's autonomously driven Jaguar I-PACE electric SUV and legacy Chrysler Pacifica minivan. Photo: Waymo

1. **Uber will roll out** Waymo self-driving cars in the Phoenix area. This is part of Uber's long-expected return to the autonomous

vehicle game, after its own AV research unit was sold in 2021. *Go deeper*.

2. ✈ **The rate of serious** runway incursions is trending down after a spate of alarming near-disasters in recent months, according to FAA data out today. *Go deeper*.

3. **Retailers are clamping down** on the rising cost of processing returns by shortening return windows, charging for mailed returns and offering discounts to customers who agree not to send items back, *The Wall Street Journal* reports (subscription).

[?] [?] [?] [?]

4. Axios on the street: Prom in D.C.

Young transgender people from all over the country came together to celebrate a Trans Youth Prom outside the U.S. Capitol yesterday.

- **Why it matters:** The celebration comes as more states propose and pass anti-trans legislation.

Axios visual journalist Aïda Amer captured the event in photos:

Photo: Aïda Amer/Axios

Above: Drag performer Stormie Daie takes the stage at the Trans Youth Prom.

Below: Young people march in a parade through downtown D.C. after the prom.

Photo: Aïda Amer/Axios

JPMorgan Chase commits $30 million to HBCUs

JPMorgan Chase has expanded its commitment to Historically Black Colleges and Universities like Paul Quinn College.

The goal: The firm aims to create pathways toward economic success and increase its own talent pipeline through career development programs.

Learn more.

Are you a fan of this email format?
Your essential communications — to staff, clients and other stakeholders — can have the same style. Axios HQ, a powerful platform, will help you do it.

CHRISTCHURCH CALL

TO ELIMINATE TERRORIST & VIOLENT EXTREMIST CONTENT ONLINE

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	s9(2) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	(g)(ii)church Call: daily round-up - 26 May
Date:	Friday, 26 May 2023 4:54:00 pm
Attachments:	image001.png
	1. Asia Tech X Singapore Summit - pre-record speech.docx
	Fwd Rt. Hon. Jacinda Ardern invitation on behalf of Maria Ressa RE UN Internet Governance Forum.msg
	3. OpenMined Presentation - 26 May 2023.pptx
	2. Draft San Francisco itinerary.docx

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

A few things today, which I've all gathered into one email for ease.

Please find <u>attached</u>:

1. Asia Tech X Singapore Summit pre-record speech notes
2. Draft San Francisco itinerary
3. OpenMined Presentation – 26 May 2023 (as per the Special Envoy's request this morning)

[Not in Scope]

Ngā mihi,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

Senior Advisor
Christchurch Call Unit, Policy Advisory Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Mobile s9(2)(a)
Email s9(2)(g)(ii) dpmc.govt.nz

Asia Tech X Singapore Summit: Pre-record speech

Tena koutou tena koutou, tena tatou katoa

Thank you for having me here today, remotely, at the opening of the 2023 Asia Tech X Singapore Summit.

It is a privilege to speak to you - leaders from business, technology, and government who are shaping thinking on some of the most crucial issues of our time.

Like many other global leaders, you will no doubt be grappling with the topic of artificial intelligence and the uncertainty surrounding its development and governance.

Artificial intelligence and other new technologies promise huge benefits for humanity. Benefits not just for economic productivity, but for our basic needs, through advancements in healthcare and education, for example.

You will hear today from innovative tech start-ups already unlocking some of these benefits – and we must consider how we empower these developments and support their uptake.

It is clear the same technologies bring risks, some of them very significant. When even the developers of these technologies caution against the perils of AI, if left unchecked, it is time to consider those warnings carefully.

With this significant uncertainty in mind, government leaders, industry, civil society, academics, and citizens are all looking for ways to govern and manage the deployment of the new generation of Artificial Intelligence tools.

That is proving harder than anticipated. Harder because the technologies are not well understood. Harder, because the knowledge we do have – of the tech, its impacts, and the tools to manage it – is held across different sectors. Harder, because our institutions are not well set up to manage this challenge, and are simultaneously being corroded by its effects. And harder, because AI-driven change moves very fast, and is accelerating.

As we all consider this, and as you take forward discussions today on this issue, I encourage you to look towards flexible, collaborative solutions and models, some examples of which already exist.

I have seen first-hand through the Christchurch Call how new forms of collaboration outside of traditional regulatory structures have helped drive collective problem-solving.

On the 15th of March 2019, a terrorist took the lives of 51 members of New Zealand's Muslim community. The perpetrator of this horrific attack livestreamed his actions for 17 minutes. Facebook alone blocked or removed 1.5 million copies of the video and there was one upload per second to YouTube in just the first 24 hours.

In response to this attack, New Zealand chose to stand against the exploitation of this technology, refusing to accept the idea that technological 'progress' meant inevitable negative trade-offs.

Partnering with France, other countries, the tech sector, and civil society, New Zealand created the Christchurch Call to Action to find solutions to a wicked problem. And to protect human rights and a free, open and secure internet as a force for good.

Four years later, the Christchurch Call community has 120 members spanning governments, online service providers, civil society, and other partners, all with the simple shared interest to eliminate

terrorist and violent extremist content online and uphold the principle of a free, open, and secure internet.

While this multistakeholder approach has not been easy, it is working. Collectively, we have bolstered the power to respond to attacks. We continue to work on tools, policies, and approaches that will enable us to prevent radicalisation to violence.

This collaboration, which empowers citizens while countering the exploitation of our current technologies, has already charted a model that may prove helpful in governing artificial intelligence.

For the moment, we have an opportunity to act ahead of seeing problems of new technology play out for real. That opportunity may be brief. We should use it to build the flexible, inclusive structures that enable us to solve problems in an environment of uncertainty.

With AI we have a chance to create guardrails, governance structures, and operating principles that act as the option of least regret, while our understanding of the technology develops.

The Asia Tech X Singapore Summit puts this collaborative model into action - as leaders from across sectors come together to learn about, consider, and discuss the promise, peril, and partnerships involved in AI.

I wish you the best for your discussions today. I look forward to hearing the outcome of your deliberations and seeing their contribution as we all work together for our digital future.

Nga mihi mahana ki a koutou.

From:	s9(2)(a)
To:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	Fwd: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 25 May 2023
Date:	Friday, 26 May 2023 12:31:09 pm
Attachments:	Engagements tracker.docx

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> **From:** Jacinda Ardern <s9(2)(a)
> **Date:** 26 May 2023 at 12:25:30 PM NZST
> **To:** s9(2)(a)
> **Subject: Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 25 May 2023**
>
>
> Responses below.
>
> Thanks s9(2)(a)
> _____
>
> Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern
> Special Envoy to the Christchurch Call
> www.christchurchcall.com
> s9(2)(a)

[Duplicate Email (see Document 08) with some additional comments]:

> Begin forwarded message:
>
> **From:** "s9(2)(g)(ii)   [DPMC]" <s9(2)(g)(ii)   dpmc.govt.nz>
> **Subject: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 25 May 2023**
> **Date:** 24 May 2023 at 3:54:16 PM NZST
> **To:** s9(2)(a)
> **Cc:** "@DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]"
> s9(2)(g)(ii)   , s9(2)(g)(ii)   (EUR)"
> s9(2)(g)(ii)   s9(2)(g)(ii)   (ISED)"
> s9(2)(g)(ii)   , s9(2)(g)(ii)   (ISED)"
> s9(2)(g)(ii)   , s9(2)(g)(ii)   (CMD)"
> s9(2)(g)(ii)
>
> [UNCLASSIFIED]
>
> Kia ora s9(2)(a)
>
> Another week, another weekly round-up from the Call Unit.
>
> **Engagements tracker**
> - Attached as *1. Engagements tracker*.
>
> -
>
> Feedback attached!
>
> -
>
> **Meeting note: Briefing session with OpenMined team, 26 May**
> - Please find attached a short note ahead of Friday's briefing session with
>   OpenMined; attached as *2. Meeting note – OpenMined 26 May*

Really enjoyed this chat. Thank you!

In relation to the op-ed…
- Some latest pieces in the discourse:
  - TechCrunch post: https://techcrunch.com/2023/05/22/openai-leaders-propose-international-regulatory-body-for-ai/?utm_source=briefing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tech_am&utm_content=052323
  - Sam Altman's blogpost: Governance of superintelligence (openai.com)
  - Sam Altman's written testimony at Senate hearing: Sam Written Testimony Draft - Senate Hearing 5_16_23 051523 0330-DLAP Revisions 051523 0530 (002) (DLA Revised) 15 May.docx (washingtonpost.com)

For review by 31 May: OIA release consultation
- As flagged in last week's round up, we have received an OIA request seeking information on the establishment of the Special Envoy role and Rt Hon Ardern's appointment. We are consulting the Special Envoy on the proposed release of briefings within scope of this request. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) In addition to the briefings and emails, we will also direct the requestor to the proactively released Cabinet paper, Letter of Appointment, and Terms of Reference, which we consulted the Special Envoy on last week.
- Please find the bundle of briefings attached in one document called *3. OIA – proposed release for consultation – Special Envoy appointment*.
- Please let us know if the Special Envoy has any feedback on what we propose to release to the requestor (and redactions as marked up).
- PMO is due to receive the OIA on 9 June, so we would be grateful for consideration of this content by 31 May.

No comment from me.

-

[Not in Scope]

Actions following 12 May team day
- We are working on a package of outcomes from 12 May planning day with CCU and plan to provide you with these over the coming week.

For info: reading
s9(2)(g)(ii) has forwarded the following attached emails to the Special Envoy for her perusal: *"AI is Transforming Business – What about Government?"* and *"FW: Axios PM: Biden's AI plan"*

Engagements next week…
- We are liaising with French colleagues on a meeting for the Special Envoy with **President Macron** this week or next.
- Pre-record five minute speech for Asia Tech X Singapore (working with s9(2)(a) to schedule this during the first half of the week).

Once we have the notes, we can just record in Auckland. We have our own kit to do that.

-
  - Pre-record for RightsCon (working with s9(2) (a) to schedule this during the first half of the week).

Understand this one is a little more complex though!

Coming to you in future…
- Later this week:
  - Asia Tech X Singapore pre-record notes.
  - RightsCon notes for a pre-record.
  - Draft programme for San Franciso visit.

It would be great to get a draft outline sooner rather than later. I'd be keen to see proposals in writing before they are locked down.

  -
- Next week:
  - Briefing for San Francisco visit (8/9 June); planning to provide on 1 or 2 June.

Misc
- Attached are some Call Zoom backgrounds. "Option A" was used for the Special Envoy's Anniversary call pre-record, but other options included if the Special Envoy prefers the look of those.

I'm easy! If you have a preference, let me know.

-

Ngā mihi,
s9(2)(g)
(ii)
Summary of attachments:
1. Engagements tracker
2. Meeting note – OpenMined 26 May
3. OIA – proposed release for consultation – Special Envoy appointment
4. Call Zoom background Option A
5. Call Zoom background Option B
6. Call Zoom background Option C

<1. Engagements tracker.docx>

<2. Meeting note - OpenMined 26 May.docx>

<3. OIA - proposed release for consultation - Special Envoy appointment.pdf>

<Mail Attachment.eml>

<Mail Attachment.eml>

<4. Call Zoom background Option A.jpg>

<5. Call Zoom background Option B.jpg>

<6. Call Zoom background Option C.jpg>

Duplicate: plus following 15 pages Duplicates

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii)　　　　　[DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	@DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)　　; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)　　; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)　　^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject:	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 31 May 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 31 May 2023 4:33:00 pm
Attachments:	1. Engagements tracker.docx
	2. RightsCon pre-record notes.docx
	3. RightsCon pre-record instructions.docx
	4. San Francisco 8 – 9 June itinerary.docx

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

This week's round-up from the Call Unit below.

Engagements tracker

- Attached as *1. Engagements tracker*.

EVENTS/MEETINGS

RightsCon pre-record: Thursday 1 June at 9am

- We provided notes for the RightsCon pre-record on Monday 29 June. Please find these reattached as *2. RightsCon pre-record notes*.
- We have also provided the details for logging into the virtual studio room (see attached again as *3. RightsCon pre-record instructions*). We advise testing this ahead of the pre-record. Only the Special Envoy and Brett will be in the "studio". We will join through a separate link that allows us to be there but not be recorded.

BRIEFINGS AND PAPERS

- A briefing on s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)　　　　　　　will be sent to the Special Envoy's DPMC address.
- s9(2)(g)(i)
- Briefing for SF trip coming on Friday 2 June.
- Not quite a briefing or paper, but as referenced during OpenMined briefing: a good survey/read on some of the historical internet control and ownership issues - Carl Miller's "The Death of the Gods: The New Global Power Grab": The Death of the Gods: The New Global Power Grab: Miller, Carl: 9781786090126: Amazon.com: Books.

INTERNATIONAL VISITS

- PM Hipkins will be travelling to Europe for the NATO Leaders' Meeting and will be in Brussels, Stockholm and Vilnius 7-14 July. s6(a)　　　　　　　　　　　　The main purpose of this would be to place a marker in calendars for a Leaders' meeting during UN High Level Week in September. Closer to the time we will also provide a short update on the work programme, with more detail around the Leaders Meeting and any other asks.

- Arrangements for the visit to San Francisco are coming together. Please find attached

latest programme; *6. San Francisco 8 – 9 June itinerary*.

- Dates for IGF in Kyoto. We advise you are on the ground in Kyoto at the event on 8 and 9 October. These dates cover off the high-level track and opening ceremony that will attract leaders, as well as your session with Maria Ressa. If you are available to remain on for the morning of 10 October, this would provide an opportunity to meet with civil society and other leaders, who are otherwise excluded from the high-level track that runs over 8 and 9 October s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Thanks,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

<u>Summary of attachments:</u>
1. Engagements tracker
2. RightsCon pre-record notes.
3. RightsCon pre-record instructions
4. San Francisco 8 – 9 June itinerary

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

This document outlines the process for managing requests for external engagement with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and contains the tracker tool for managing these requests. This process and tool manage requests from external parties for meetings, event participation, and media engagement as well as the Christchurch Call Unit's (CCU's) proactive suggestions for engagement. This process and tool do not manage set international outreach trips, which will be managed as separate projects as they arise.

Maintaining a record of all requests for engagement, either new, ongoing, or closed, is an essential information management practice. This document contains three tables:

- o New requests, which will go to the Special Envoy for decision
- o Active engagements, which are accepted or delegated engagements to be actioned and tracked
- o Closed requests, which are declined requests or engagements that have been completed

Process for requests for engagement with the Special Envoy

1. Request received
    Received through the Special Envoy's direct contacts, the Call inbox, or CCU members

2. Request centralised
    Forward all requests to s9(2)(g)(ii) copying s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)

3. Request logged, assigned, and initially assessed
    s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
    s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Thursday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

7. Request decisions actioned
    s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements with s9(2)(a)
    Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

8. Request moved to 'Active engagement tracker' or 'Closed requests' tracker

Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

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Instructions for CCU use: For each new request for the Special Envoy's engagement, complete a row in the below table called 'New requests'. This includes internal requests and suggestions from the Christchurch Call Unit (CCU) and MFAT. Use the drop-down tool where applicable and, in the free-form boxes, please enter information in a form consistent with other entries. Please do not delete any rows once the Special Envoy has reviewed the request; instead, move accepted or delegated requests to the 'Active engagements' table and move declined requests to the 'Closed requests' table. All 'Active engagements', once completed, will also move to the 'Closed requests' table.

Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests

Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 14 pages withheld under same grounds]

RightsCon – Special Envoy pre-record

You pre-recorded remarks for RightsCon will be played at the Opening Ceremony prior to a live, on-stage discussion about Artificial Intelligence (AI) with panellists Kent Walker (Google), Gideon Lichfield (Editor, *Wired*) and Urvashi Aneja (Director, Digital Futures Lab).

Structure:

- As per last year's engagement - conversation-style pre-recorded interview with Brett Solomon.
- 20-30 minutes in length
- Outline:
    - Standby screen
    - 10 second opening video
    - Introduction by Brett
    - Conversation between Brett and Special Envoy Ardern
    - Closing by Brett
    - Thank you slide
- The conversation will be recorded via a web-based recording service called RiversideFM. See attached paper for instructions to log in and use the service.

Framing:

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)

From: s9(2)(g)(ii)   [DPMC]
To: Jacinda Ardern [DPMC]
Cc: @DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ;
    ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Weekly round-up pt 2: Twitter bystander footage s9(2)(g)(i)
Date: Wednesday, 31 May 2023 4:37:00 pm
Attachments: Christchurch Call Weekly round-up - 31 May 2023.msg
    s9(2)(g)(i)
    s9(2)(g)(i)

[SEEMAIL][RESTRICTED]

Kia ora Special Envoy

Please find attached two papers as flagged in the 31 May weekly roundup and via WhatsApp:
1. Christchurch Call – Memo – Twitter Allen TX Bystander Footage
2. s9(2)(g)(i)

s9(2)(g)(ii)

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

Memorandum

CHRISTCHURCH CALL: TWITTER: ALLEN TX BYSTANDER FOOTAGE

To	Special Envoy	Prepared by	s9(2)(g)(ii)
From	s9(2)(g)(ii)	Date	31/05/2023

Purpose

1. This note briefs you on a recent discussion with Twitter about bystander footage from the Allen TX shooting and consistency with the Christchurch Call commitments, and sets out our proposed next steps. You may wish to discuss this matter further with the Call Unit, s9(2)(g)(i)

Key points

2. s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii) (Principal Advisor, Christchurch Call Unit) had a call with Twitter representatives s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i) on 24 May. We requested this to set out concerns about the prevalence of graphic bystander footage on the platform following a shooting at Allen Premium Outlets, TX, and following a car attack on migrant workers in Brownsville, TX. We sought an explanation from Twitter of how this occurred, for report back to you.

3. In framing the discussion s9(2)(g)(ii) said he appreciated the content had been shared by Twitter users for a range of reasons, and that dealing with bystander footage posed challenges. With information available about the perpetrator's neo-Nazi and violent misogynist ideological influences, this incident was of significant interest to the Call Community. The Christchurch Call requires supporters to assess content against their terms of service, prioritise actions to protect the rights of victims and vulnerable users, and stop it being used to promote terrorism or violent extremism.

4. s9(2)(g)(ii) noted the broader and long-running policy debate around perpetrator versus bystander footage. She confirmed that graphic or gory content is not allowed under the Twitter Rules. The platform recognises the newsworthy nature of these kinds of events and wants users to be able to share information. That can include videos and images of dead bodies. However, some videos from Allen and Brownsville crossed the line for graphicness and gore and were therefore subject to enforcement actions such as warning labels or takedown.

s9(2)(ba)(i)

s9(2)(ba)(i)

s9(2)(g)(ii) responded it was important that platforms' safety tools and systems stayed abreast of changes in the business model and user behaviours; there had been major advances in video detection since the Call was adopted. s9(2)(ba)(i)

Comment

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)

9. Aside from technical issues, bystander footage also raises policy and legal issues. It is captured from different vantage points (including CCTV) and shared for a range of purposes (eyewitness account, safety message, in condemnation and support of the attack, as part of journalistic reporting, and promoting misinformation and conspiracy theories). Actors in the international crisis response system take different approaches. GIFCT requires that terrorist or mass violent content be perpetrator- or accomplice-produced and excludes bystander footage. Other protocols also tend to focus on perpetrator- or accomplice-produced content but take a more case-by-case approach to bystander footage. For example, the UK protocol has bystander footage in scope, where it exceeds a threshold and breaches online providers' terms of service. The judgment often depends on inferring the purpose of the person in producing and sharing the content; where they are acting in support of the attacker and their cause, the content would be in scope.

10. Against this background, it is important to note the Allen bystander content was not declared objectionable or illegal in New Zealand, unlike perpetrator-produced videos and manifestos of attacks.

Background

11. The shooting at Allen Premium Outlets took place on Saturday, 6 May. It left nine dead, including three children and the perpetrator. At least seven others were injured. Bystander footage of child victims and of the perpetrator after he was shot, was widely shared on Twitter, without interstitials, and was easily discoverable on the platform for days afterward, although that is no longer the case.

12. The content appears to breach the Twitter Rules – at a minimum the Sensitive Media Policy, which covers graphic content (blood, serious physical harm). The Twitter Rules say that Twitter's aim with this kind of content is to limit exposure and prevent sharing, and that the platform differentiates its enforcement approach depending on the type of media that has been shared and where it has been shared.

13. On behalf of the Call, s9(2)(g)(ii) responded to a BBC request for comment on 9 May, along the lines in paragraph 2 above, but the comments were not published.

s9(2)(g)(i)

From:	s9(2)(a)
To:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 31 May 2023
Date:	Friday, 2 June 2023 8:36:48 am
Attachments:	1. Engagements tracker.docx

This time!

s9(2)(a)

EA to the Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern

Special Envoy to the Christchurch Call
www.christchurchcall.com

s9(2)(a)

P O Box 90947, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142

On 31/05/2023, at 4:33 PM, s9(2)(g)(ii)   [DPMC]
<s9(2)(g)(ii)   dpmc.govt.nz> wrote:

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

This week's round-up from the Call Unit below.

Engagements tracker
- Attached as *1. Engagements tracker*.

EVENTS/MEETINGS

RightsCon pre-record: Thursday 1 June at 9am
- We provided notes for the RightsCon pre-record on Monday 29 June. Please find these reattached as *2. RightsCon pre-record notes*.
- We have also provided the details for logging into the virtual studio room (see attached again as *3. RightsCon pre-record instructions*). We advise testing this ahead of the pre-record. Only the Special Envoy and Brett will be in the "studio". We will join through a separate link that allows us to be there but not be recorded.

BRIEFINGS AND PAPERS
- A briefing on Twitter's response to the bystander footage of the Allen, TX shooting will be sent to the Special Envoy's DPMC address.
- A short summary of CCAN issues and current membership will also be sent to the Special Envoy's DPMC address.

- Briefing for SF trip coming on Friday 2 June.
- Not quite a briefing or paper, but as referenced during OpenMined briefing: a good survey/read on some of the historical internet control and ownership issues - Carl Miller's "The Death of the Gods: The New Global Power Grab": [The Death of the Gods: The New Global Power Grab: Miller, Carl: 9781786090126: Amazon.com: Books](#).

INTERNATIONAL VISITS

- PM Hipkins will be travelling to Europe for the NATO Leaders' Meeting and will be in Brussels, Stockholm and Vilnius 7-14 July. The Call Unit is preparing points for inclusion in bilateral calls TBC with s6(a) The main purpose of this would be to place a marker in calendars for a Leaders' meeting during UN High Level Week in September. Closer to the time we will also provide a short update on the work programme, with more detail around the Leaders Meeting and any other asks.

- Arrangements for the visit to San Francisco are coming together. Please find attached latest programme; *6. San Francisco 8 – 9 June itinerary*.

- Dates for IGF in Kyoto. We advise you are on the ground in Kyoto at the event on 8 and 9 October. These dates cover off the high-level track and opening ceremony that will attract leaders, as well as your session with Maria Ressa. If you are available to remain on for the morning of 10 October, this would provide an opportunity to meet with civil society and other leaders, who are otherwise excluded from the high-level track that runs over 8 and 9 October s6(a) and this would be looked upon very favourably by civil society stakeholders.

Thanks,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

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s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

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s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 14 pages withheld under same grounds]

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To:	Jacinda Ardern [DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	RE: Visit to San Francisco 8 - 9 June: itinerary and briefing pack
Date:	Tuesday, 6 June 2023 3:44:00 pm
Attachments:	image001.png
	SE Visit to SF - June 2023 - itinerary + briefing (2).pdf

Kia ora Special Envoy,

There's an update to the attendees for the dinner with s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j) on Thursday. Unfortunately s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j) is no longer able to attend, but s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)

As such, we've updated your briefing to reflect this change. Please find this attached.

We took the opportunity of this update to include the latest version of your op-ed too.

s9(2)(g)(ii)

[Not in Scope]

OVERSEAS VISIT

BY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JACINDA ARDERN

SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE CHRISTCHURCH CALL

TO

SAN FRANCISCO

8 – 9 JUNE 2023

CONTENTS

ACCOMPANYING PERSONNEL

From the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

s9(2)(g)(ii)	s9(2)(a) s9(2)(g)(ii) dpmc.govt.nz	• Joining for Call-related engagements • Available throughout your visit to San Francisco; arriving at midday 8 June and departing on 17 June
s9(2)(g)(ii)	s9(2)(a) s9(2)(g)(ii) dpmc.govt.nz	

s6(c)

Christchurch Call Leaders' Summit 2023

- The 2022 Summit was a success in that it combined a comprehensive, inclusive process for multistakeholder input with opportunities to communicate individually and together about objectives and achievement. The format allowed for free-flowing conversation among Leaders representing all parts of the Community.

- In 2023 we will be looking to continue with that free-flowing format, with Special Envoy Ardern and President Macron convening Leaders from the Call Community.

- The feedback has been very positive. One key area of improvement would be around having a more manageable agenda, and therefore carefully considering the issues we put in front of Leaders for conversation, as distinct from those officials can pre-bake for noting as part of the Summit communications package.

- In our consultations thus far, Leaders have been focussed on the question of how new powerful Artificial Intelligence models will affect our work. There are great opportunities and risks, in which all sectors have an interest. This will no doubt be a focal point.

- We would also report back on progress across our work programme, including:
  - Next steps under the Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes, s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

  - Measures to assist small firms with eliminating TVEC and responding to crisis incidents
  - Improved evidence base on gender-based hatred and radicalisation to violence
  - Progress on the Community including a new platform, and additional online service providers, partner organisations and civil society advisory network members. This could also include e.g. work s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

  - Progress on government transparency, incident response, positive intervention, and advice on how the Call should respond to technological developments in the sector.

- The Call Summit remains a Leader-level event and will engage top-tier (C-level) executives from industry and civil society, and Heads of State and Government. We are looking to United Nations High Level Week in New York as the best opportunity to assemble a quorum of such Leaders.

The 'asks'
1. Mark the first part of UN Leaders' Week 19-21 September in your Leader's diary. We will confirm a venue and time ASAP

2. Seek input on priority issue Leaders will want to discuss

3. How do we best run an inclusive, effective community process that is respectful of people's time?

Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes (CCIAO)

- The Christchurch Call is not just about dealing with the presenting issue of terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC). It is also deals with the factors that contribute to people becoming radicalised and creating TVEC in the first place. This is a core part of the Call text and the commitments made by supporters.

- We understand radicalisation is a complex phenomenon; many of the factors contributing to it are not the responsibility of platforms. Repeated instances of extremists themselves telling us they were radicalised online and justifying their attacks within a canon of online conspiracy (e.g., Christchurch, Buffalo, Bratislava) require us to grapple with this issue.

- The Call commits supporters to investigate algorithms and other processes that may drive users towards TVEC, and to use this knowledge to put in place interventions or other changes. It also points towards multistakeholder processes and reporting mechanisms for working on this.

- New Zealand is partnering with the USA, Microsoft, Twitter, and the non-profit OpenMined to develop a tool that will facilitate the scaled study of algorithmic processes in a way that is safe, ethical, and secure.

- Since the launch late last year, work has progressed significantly, with proof of function tests being carried out on synthetic datasets. This tool has been rolled out to Twitter, DailyMotion (a French video sharing platform) and LinkedIn. Verification tests are now being carried out using actual platform data. The three companies in the trial have found the experience valuable and see the technology as having a wide range of possible applications.

- The software being developed by OpenMined is just part of this. What we will need to develop with the Call Community is a governance structure and ethical framework, and agreement from the social media firms to participate in ongoing data sharing using these software tools. All of this needs to come together into a system that responds to the Call Commitments.

For researchers (Priority: highly credible in TVEC fields & strong track record with industry) and civil society folk including CCAN…

- We are currently testing software. The next step is building a system to utilise it that delivers on Call Commitments and enjoys ongoing support from participating platforms and the Community.

- That system will help us to answer questions such as:
  - *"What are the distinct features of a user journey for someone that engages with TVEC?"*
  - *"What is the before/after impact of positive interventions, or changes to ranking systems or other platform features designed to reduce toxicity or risk of harm?"*
  - *"What do user journeys for 'at risk' user types look like between and across platforms?"*
  - *"How effective and fair are the automated systems that identify and remove TVEC?*

- We have committed to looking specifically at gender-based (including anti-LGBTQIA+) violence/hatred as a feature of the radicalisation journey.

- Refining those into a practical and implementable set of questions will be an important task for the research community.

> **The 'asks':**
> 1. What is your advice regarding people, research centres we should work with? or

2. What other questions should we consider as part of this work?

For Social Media Platforms and other data holders:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

Supporting smaller firms

- The objective of this work is to enhance support mechanisms for smaller platforms. Call Leaders have asked for 24/7 crisis response capability. This capability could be delivered by various Call partners, including e.g. GIFCT and TaT.

- The Christchurch Call is not just about eliminating terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC) on large platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. The Call also contains a commitment to support smaller platforms, such as Discord, Streamable and others, as they respond to a shift towards them in the online extremist environment.

- Smaller platforms are being increasingly exploited by terrorists and violent extremists and require support to uplift their technical, operational and policy capabilities. Most support efforts to date have been facilitated by Tech Against Terrorism (TAT).

- TAT currently supports smaller platforms through their Terrorist Content Analytics Platforms (TCAP). s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(c)

- Christchurch Call Leaders agreed in September 2022 on the need to bring diverse tech companies, large and small, into crisis response. s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(c)

Background:

1. The Call text includes a commitment by governments and online service providers to "Support smaller platforms as they build capacity to remove terrorist and violent extremist content, including through sharing technical solutions and relevant databases of hashes or other relevant material, such as the GIFCT shared database."

2. Recent academic research and observational trends indicate that in response to increased moderation on mainstream platforms, terrorists and violent extremists are increasingly using smaller platforms to store and share TVEC. These smaller platforms may lack the awareness,

capacity and/or willingness to counter this exploitation. The problem is acutely evident in crisis situations.

3. TAT's TCAP provides identification and alerting of TVEC to over 100 participating smaller platforms,

s9(2)(c), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

13

Berkman Klein Center Fellowship: s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)

- The 2022 Christchurch Call Leaders' Communiqué prioritised action to study algorithmic outcomes, and positive interventions, and to work with France and other interested Community members to consider related issues including disinformation, harassment, abuse, and hatred online, and issues affecting youth – to understand how we might apply what we've learned working on the Christchurch Call where there is interest in new work programmes separate to the Call.

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)

- The 2022 Christchurch Call Leaders' Communiqué prioritised action to study algorithmic outcomes, and positive interventions, and to work with France and other interested Community members to consider related issues including disinformation, harassment, abuse, and hatred online, and issues affecting youth – to understand how we might apply what we've learned working on the Christchurch Call where there is interest in new work programmes separate to the Call.

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)

Call work programme tracker (updated May 2023)

External workstream (1 to 5)	By March 2023	June	September	December
1. Develop Call into self-sustaining community Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: 13, 15, 22		s9(2)(g)(i) Engagement plan for Posts Deliver on the Call's anniversary plan Christchurch visit	RightsCon report Christchurch visit report Implemented NZ Post engagement plan Complete testing phase of Community workstream	s9(2)(f)(iv)
2. Strengthen incident response, including with alt-tech platformsLead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: 20		s9(2)(f)(iv)	s9(2)(f)(iv) GIFCT Incident Response working group delivers view of success measures (TBC)	s9(2)(f)(iv)
3. Develop a shared approach to address unmoderated and alt tech services and help small firms respond Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitment: 12,15,18,20		s9(2)(f)(iv)		
4. Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitments: 11, 14, 15	s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)			

5. Enhance government and company transparency Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitments: 2, 6, 7, 10, 22	Government: Community work designed and scheduled. Read literature.	Company: ACT Portal delivered Government: Community sessions completed. Final draft of Community advice out for feedback/input.	Government: Community guidance and best practice examples published GIFCT Transparency Working Group delivers toolkit	
6. Launch a new technologies workstream, including to consider the application of the Call in new online environments Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitment: 5, 6, 20: 5, 6, 20		Convene working group Discuss intersectional approaches at RightsCon Drafting issue report	Report on key issues, risks, opportunities and next steps for Call Community	s9(2)(f)(iv)
7. Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitments: 16, 23, 24, 25	Agree goals for gender work Global Partnership evidence base paper from UK	Community gender research agendas aligned, some research delivered What's happening on platforms? ISD WG#1 and RightsCon sessions Global Partnership intervention programmes catalogue	Community gender research agendas aligned, ongoing research delivered What's happening on platforms? ISD WG#2 and #3 with policy brief delivered Engagement with CCIAO	
8. Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitments: 25		s6(b)(ii)	Detailed advice for PM and Special Envoy on parallel approaches to disinformation and related issues.	

Internal outputs	By March 2023	June	September	December
Ensure visibility of Call-relevant domestic projects across agencies Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitment: [xx]		Regular checkin with DIA and other Internet Governance officials		s9(2)(f)(iv)
s9(2)(f)(iv) Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitment: None		s9(2)(f)(iv)		

Supporting workstreams	By March 2023	June	September	December
Milestones and events	Briefing for incoming PM Announce Envoy role	Budget (May) GIFCT summit (June) RightsCon (June)	TrustCon (July) UNGA (Sep)	IGF (Oct) Paris Peace Forum (Nov)
Planning and reporting		Progress update to Cabinet (Jun) Steering Group (Jun)	Steering Group (Oct)	s9(2)(f)(iv)
Special Envoy		Deliver Anniversary webinar speech (pre-record) Deliver RightsCon opening speech (pre-record) SF: tech company and NGO outreach (Jun 8 and 9)	Deliver TrustCon speech (pre-record) Harvard fellowships formally begin Leaders' Summit (and UNGA events) s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)	IGF attendance (session with Maria Ressa) (8/9 Oct)

| Unit travel | | Ottawa: Countering Radicalisation (early May)

SF: Tech ambassadors (mid May)

Costa Rica: RightsCon (early June)

SF: meetings incl GIFCT summit (mid-June)

Singapore: GIFCT, TAT, Meta workshops (mid-May) | Stanford: Trust & Safety Research Conference (Late Sep) | |

AI governance: links to background reading

EU-US Trade and Technology Council roadmap
- [TTC Joint Roadmap for Trustworthy AI and Risk Management | Shaping Europe's digital future (europa.eu)](europa.eu)
- [Joint_TTC_Roadmap_1Dec2022_Final_5N6ll1SAobE63YQovEUimxcjiA_92123.pdf](#)
- [Mathias also on Mastodon @mathver@eupolicy.social on Twitter: "Great statement by the EU and the US on the importance of access to data for researchers coming out of the Trade and Technology Council #ttc4. https://t.co/dqFSdiutOS (1/5) https://t.co/Y7vqtCmPPf" / Twitter](#)

EU Digital Services Act
- [Unlocking the Potential of Public Data In The Digital Services Act (substack.com)](substack.com)

EU AI Act

- [Expert explainer: The EU AI Act proposal | Ada Lovelace Institute](#)
- [Expert-explainer-The-EU-AI-Act-11-April-2022.pdf (adalovelaceinstitute.org)](adalovelaceinstitute.org)

United States Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

- [AI Risk Management Framework | NIST](#)

G7 Action Plan
- [G7 Digital and Tech Track Annex 5 G7 Action Plan for promoting global interoperability between tools for trustworthy AI (g7digital-tech-2023.go.jp)](g7digital-tech-2023.go.jp)

The open statement…

- [Statement on AI Risk | CAIS (safe.ai)](safe.ai)

Twitter's algorithm release

- [Bird's Eye View: The Limits of Twitter's Algorithm Release - Center for Democracy and Technology (cdt.org)](cdt.org)

Microsoft's blueprint for AI governance

- https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2023/05/25/how-do-we-best-govern-ai/
- https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW14Gtw

BACKGROUND BRIEFNG: MEETINGS

1. Meeting: s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)
2. Dinner: s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)
3. Meeting: Brad Smith and Carol Ann Browne, Microsoft
4. Lunch and roundtable: Stanford University
5. Meeting: s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)
6. Meeting: Jack Clark, Anthropic (TBC)

Dinner: s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)

Thursday 8 June, 7pm
Location: Camper, Menlo Park
Accompanied by s9(2)(a)   s9(2)(g)(ii)   s9(2)(g)(ii)

Objectives

- Partner the Christchurch Call with philanthropic foundations to embed and advance the Call, drawing on the Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes and, as needed, on the Call's link to generative AI issues

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)

Lunch and roundtable: Stanford University

Friday 9 June, 12pm
Location: Stanford University
Accompanied by s9(2)(a)　　　s9(2)(g)(ii)　　s9(2)(g)(ii)　　　s9(2)(a)

Objectives

- Engaging the University that, alongside Harvard, Berkeley, Princeton, and MIT, is most likely to prove useful for driving progress on the Call.

- Strengthen linkages with key human rights, digital and cyber policy, governance, legal, and international relations experts.

Proposed discussion topics

- Multistakeholder models for addressing tech challenges, including:
    - Terrorist and violent extremist content online
    - Generative AI
    - Algorithmic explainability

s9(2)(g)(i)

- Tech sector outlook, including current sector context, dynamics, and geopolitical environment

Biographies

Professor Nathaniel Persily Professor, Stanford Law School	
	• Also a Stanford professor in both Political Science and Communication • Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies • Co-director of the Cyber Policy Center, Program on Democracy and the Internet and Social Science One • Focuses on the intersection of the internet and elections
Professor Jeff Hancock Founding Director, Stanford Social Media Lab	
	• Professor of Communication • Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies • Leading expert in social media behaviour including the impacts of AI technology
Marie Renske "Marietje" Schaake (Mar-iet-he) International Policy Director, Stanford Cyber Policy Center	
	• Dutch politician and former Member of the European Parliament (2009-2019) • International Policy Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence • Member of the Advisory Board of the CyberPeace Institute and Board Member for AccessNow

evelyn douek (Do-ehk) Assistant Professor, Stanford Law School

	• Focuses on private and public regulation of online speech • Douek is an Australian, having completed her early academic career in Sydney • Hosts Stanford's *Moderated Content* podcast

Riana Pfefferkorn (Feh-fer-corn) Research Scholar, Stanford Internet Observatory

	• Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity at Stanford Center for Internet and Society • Focuses on US and other governments' policies and practices on forced decryption and security design of online platforms

Alex Stamos Director, Stanford Internet Observatory

	• Research Scholar at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies • Previously Chief Information Security Officer at Yahoo and then Chief Security Officer at Facebook • Focuses on cybersecurity and safeguarding elections

Eileen Donahoe Executive Director, Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator

	• Focuses on policy for ethical AI and human rights, disinformation and governance of digital platforms • Previously US Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council during the Obama Administration, then Director of Global Affairs at Human Rights Watch • Serves on the boards of numerous institutions, including the Freedom Online Coalition Advisory Network

Daphne Keller Director of Program on Platform Regulation, Stanford Cyber Policy Center

	• Lecturer at Stanford Law School • Previous Associate General Counsel at Google, then Director of Intermediary Liability at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society • Focuses on content moderation practices; Expert advisor to courts and governments around the world

Dr. Michael A. McFaul Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

	• Professor in International Studies • International Affairs Analyst for NBC News and columnist for The Washington Post • served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014) • Focuses on Russian politics and history, author of multiple books on the topic

Dr Amy Zegart (Zeg-art)
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

- Professor of Political Science, by courtesy
- Senior Fellow at Stanford Hoover Institute
- Chair of Stanford's Artificial Intelligence and International Security Steering Committee
- Contributing writer to *The Atlantic*
- Former co-director of Stanford Center for International Security & Cooperation and Cyber Policy Program

Dr Robert "Rob" Reich
Professor of Political Science and Ethics, Stanford

- Also Professor of both Philosophy and Education
- Co-director of Stanford Center on Philanthropy & Civil Society and Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
- Board member at *Boston Review* magazine, Giving Tuesday and the Spencer Foundation
- Focuses on tech, philanthropy and democracy; author of multiple books
- Must not be confused for Dr Robert Reich, former US Secretary of Labor and a Professor at Berkeley.

Dr Michael W. McConnell
Professor of Law, Stanford

- Director of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center
- Senior Fellow at the Stanford Hoover Institute
- Co-chair of Meta's Oversight Review Board
- Former Circuit Judge on the US Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
- Focuses on constitutional law and history

Andrew J. Grotto
Director of Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance

- Fellow at the Stanford Cyber Policy Center
- Research Fellow at the Stanford Hoover Institute
- Formerly Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the White House in both the Obama and Trump Administrations
- Focuses on the national security and international economic dimensions of America's global leadership in information technology innovation

Professor Erik Brynjolfsson (Bryn-olf-son)
Director of Digital Economy Lab, Stanford

- Professor and Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
- Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
- Appointments at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Department of Economics, and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
- Highly cited academic focusing on the economics of information and has published multiple books

Russel Ward Director of Policy for the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence	
	• Visiting Fellow with the National Security Institute at George Mason University • Partner with the Truman National Security Project • Previously Head of Outreach for the Stanford Cyber Policy Program, which was later elevated to become the Stanford's Cyber Policy Center • Focuses on AI ethics
Renee DiResta (joining by Zoom) Research Manager, Stanford Internet Observatory	
	• Investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem. • Previously focused on disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of pseudoscience conspiracies, terrorism, and state-sponsored information warfare • Has advised Congress, the State Department, and other academic, civic, and business organizations • Contributor to WIRED and The Atlantic; featured in *The Social Dilemma* • Harvard BKC affiliate • Longstanding 'critical friend' of the Call.

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)

Meeting: Jack Clark, Co-Founder, Anthropic

Yet to be confirmed

Accompanied by s9(2)(a)   s9(2)(g)(ii)   s9(2)(g)(ii)

Objective

- Onboard Anthropic to the Christchurch Call, with a focus on new tech

Biography

Jack Clark is co-founder of Anthropic, an AI safety and research company. He is also co-chair of AI Index, an expert member of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, co-chair of the OECD's working group on AI and Compute, and a non-resident research fellow at the Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). He authors a popular AI newsletter, *Import AI.* Before Anthropic, he was Director of Policy at OpenAI, having started his career as a reporter for *The Register* and *Bloomberg*.

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	@DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]
Subject:	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 21 June 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 21 June 2023 3:00:00 pm
Attachments:	1. Engagements Tracker - Special Envoy.docx
	FW RedirectedDecentralised Rulebooks Internet Governance and Regional Content Moderation.msg
	3. Washington Post Op-ed Form.pdf
	4. Meeting with Call Unit 22 June.docx
	RE Debrief on meeting with Cyber Peace Institute.msg

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

This week's round-up from the Christchurch Call…

Engagements tracker

- Attached as *1. Engagements tracker*.

[Not in Scope]

Meeting in Wellington with Call team on 22 June

- We note the plan to keep this meeting short and light. We've therefore taken a light-touch approach to putting together an agenda. Please find this attached as *4. Meeting with Call Unit, 22 June*.
- To note, a location change for the 11am meeting with the team – we'll be in the Beehive in the function room on level 2.

[Not in Scope]

Read out of CyberPeace Institute

- The Special Envoy sent us an email debriefing on her meeting with the CyberPeace Institute, but something must've gone wrong as the email body was cut off and there was no debrief. I've attached this as *"Re: Debrief on meeting with Cyber Peace Institute"*.

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)

TrustCon pre-record

- The Special Envoy agreed to provide a pre-record for the Trust and Safety Professionals

Association (TSPA) annual conference TrustCon. This pre-record will play on 12 July Pacific Time, which is Day 2 of the conference – the highest attendance day. s9(2)(a)

we propose the Special Envoy pre-record her speech this coming Monday or Tuesday, 26 or 27 June. We are aiming to provide remarks this Thursday, 22 June.

s9(2)(g)(ii) and I met with TSPA's Executive Director, Charlotte Willner, while in Silicon Valley. Charlotte outlined the focus for TrustCon and the panel, which will follow the Special Envoy's remarks. The focus is on the personal experiences of trust and safety professionals, preparing for the rigours of the roles they undertake, and the journey they go on as they become experienced trust and safety professionals. Charlotte has asked that the Special Envoy's remarks centre on her experiences of being confronted by and responding to unexpected events and encouraging the trust and safety professionals who will be at the conference.

FYI reading
- Biden heading west to talk AI (axios.com)
- Finding Language Models in Influence Operations - Lawfare (lawfareblog.com)
- The Race to the Bottom on AI Safety Must Stop - Centre for International Governance Innovation (cigionline.org)

Ngā mihi,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

Summary of attachments:
1. Engagements tracker'

[Not in Scope]

4. Meeting with Call Unit, 22 June
5. "Re: Debrief on meeting with Cyber Peace Institute"

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

This document outlines the process for managing requests for external engagement with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and contains the tracker tool for managing these requests. This process and tool manage requests from external parties for meetings, event participation, and media engagement as well as the Christchurch Call Unit's (CCU's) proactive suggestions for engagement. This process and tool do not manage set international outreach trips, which will be managed as separate projects as they arise.

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2. Request centralised
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3. Request logged, assigned, and initially assessed
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4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Thursday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

7. Request decisions actioned
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements with s9(2)(a)
   Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

8. Request moved to 'Active engagement tracker' or 'Closed requests' tracker

Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

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Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:
s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests

Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 20 pages withheld under same grounds]

Meeting: Special Envoy / CCU, 22 June 2023
Location: Beehive, Level 2 Function Room
Time: 11am – 12:15pm

Agenda

1. US outreach visit
    a. Overview of the Special Envoy's meetings in San Francisco and Silicon Valley
    b. Quick overview of the Special Representative's meetings in Washington, DC

2. Next steps from visit
    a. Consolidating the Call
    b. New tech workstream
    c. Related initiatives workstream

3. Summit 2023
    a. Logistics and design
    b. Policy outcomes
    c. Internal structures and processes to support Summit preparations

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	Jacinda Ardern; s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	RE: Debrief on meeting with Cyber Peace Institute
Date:	Monday, 5 June 2023 12:25:00 pm

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Hi (from a rather tropical Costa Rica),

Unfortunately most of the email body and/or attachment dropped!

Would you mind resending if not too much trouble?

Thanks!
s9(2)(g)(ii)

-----Original Message-----
From: Jacinda Ardern <jacindaardern@googlemail.com>
Sent: Friday, 2 June 2023 7:47 pm
To: s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC] <s9(2)(a)
Cc: s9(2)(g)(II) [DPMC] <s9(2)(g)(ii) dpmc.govt.nz>; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
s9(2)(a)
Subject: Debrief on meeting with Cyber Peace Institute

[Some people who received this message don't often get email from s9(2)(g)(ii) Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification]

Hi team

Apologies for the delay. I thought it might be useful to provide a debrief on my meeting with the Cyber Peace Institute.

From:	s9(2)(a)
To:	s9(2)(g)(ii)　　[DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii)　　　[DPMC]
Cc:	@DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]
Subject:	Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 21 June 2023
Date:	Monday, 26 June 2023 3:21:10 pm
Attachments:	26062023150807-0001.pdf
	26062023151039-0001.pdf
	1. Engagements Tracker - Special Envoy.docx
	Mail Attachment.eml.msg
	3. Washington Post Op-ed Form.pdf
	4. Meeting with Call Unit 22 June.docx
	Mail Attachment.eml.msg

Hi there

Please find attached edits to the pre record script for TrustCon.
It is currently scheduled to be shot tomorrow.

[Not in Scope]

Thanks

s9(2)(a)

EA to the Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern

Special Envoy to the Christchurch Call
www.christchurchcall.com

s9(2)(a)

P O Box 90947, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142

Duplicate

TrustCon 2023:

Pre-recorded speech by Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern

Context:

The Trust and Safety Professionals Association (TSPA) represents the people who work to make online platforms safer for users. The idea of a T&S 'profession' is relatively new, having grown out of legal and customer service functions in the late 2000s.

T&S professionals deal with traumatising material, unhappy end-users, and executives and boards, who see them as a cost centre. While there has been big growth in T&S teams, there is now an increasing trend towards automating T&S functions.

This is the second 'TrustCon' meeting, at which tech-sector T&S professionals, from executive level down to those working at the coalface, will meet to talk about how they are staying ahead of evolving trends, pushing for excellence, and ensuring appropriate recognition of their important role in the industry.

The TSPA has suggested the following themes for your remarks

1. *Your personal journey:*
   Personal reflections on how you deal with unexpected, confronting situations. This could include your experience of dealing with the Christchurch attack, or other things that happened during your premiership.

2. *Recognizing and affirming the role of trust and safety*
   Trust and safety professionals play a vital role in countering extremism online and harmful behaviour generally. They apply cultural and human context to decisions about enforcing terms of service and community standards. Their role is often invisible in public discourse about trust & safety issues. An acknowledgement of their dedication would be well received.

3. *Importance of Collaboration:*
   Highlight that no one has to be alone in this work - and that this work cannot succeed without collaboration between different stakeholders, including governments, civil society organizations, real-world communities, tech companies, and this also applies at a human level for individuals in tech.

4. *Amplifying Success Stories:*
   Talk about some of the things that have changed for the better. Things aren't hopeless, and we have shown how things can change for the better.

5. *Continued commitment:*
   -Stress the need for sustained commitment and continuous adaptation of trust and safety in the face of evolving threats. This is especially important in this economic climate, when many companies are tempted to cut staff (and perhaps cut corners) in T&S.

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s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

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From: ███ s9(2)(a) ███
To: ███ s9(2)(g)(ii) ███ [DPMC]
Cc: @DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]
Subject: Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 21 June 2023
Date: Tuesday, 27 June 2023 2:55:24 pm
Attachments: 1. Engagements Tracker - commented on - Special Envoy.docx

Hi

Please find the tracker attached with comments.

Thanks

███ s9(2)(a) ███

███████████

EA to the Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern

Special Envoy to the Christchurch Call
www.christchurchcall.com

███ s9(2)(a) ███

P O Box 90947, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142

On 21/06/2023, at 3:00 PM, ███ s9(2)(g)(ii) ███ [DPMC]
███ s9(2)(a) ███ wrote:

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora ███ s9(2)(a) ███

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Ngā mihi,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

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   s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Thursday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

7. Request decisions actioned
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements with s9(2)(a)
   Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

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Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

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Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests

Propose d date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 20 pages withheld under same grounds]

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a) s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	RE: Possible collaboration with s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)
Date:	Monday, 3 July 2023 1:48:00 pm
Attachments:	image001.png
	image002.png
	image003.png
	image004.png
	image005.png
	image006.png

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Hi s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	9(2)(g)(ii): Special Envoy s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(a)
Subject:	Christchurch Call catch up - Special Envoy s9(2)(g)(ii)

To discuss:)(g)
                                                               (ii)

1. Summit

 a. Dates
 b. Concept note
 c. Hotels
 d. Invitations
 e. Securing s9(2)(ba)(i) as moderator

2. Second Gentleman meeting

 a. Run of the event, media, attendees
 b. Venue

3. Meeting with PM

 a. Time and date
 b. Preparation required

4. IGF

 a. Locking in some logistics

5. Working with IFPIM

 a. Possible collaboration points s9(2)(ba)(i)

6. Sam Altman meeting

7. OIA for info

[Not in Scope]

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	Jacinda Ardern [DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]
Subject:	For consideration: "Future of the Call" workstream
Date:	Wednesday, 12 July 2023 5:47:00 pm
Attachments:	image001.png
	FOTC.pdf

[SEEMAIL][SENSITIVE]

Kia ora Special Envoy,

This email is in addition to the regular weekly Call pack you get via s9(2)(a) and your other address.

Attached are some slides that s9(2)(g)(ii) has worked up in discussion with s9(2)(g)(ii) . The goal is to set out s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

If you are open to a conversation with s9(2)(g)(ii) about these issues, I can work with s9(2)(a) to schedule a call. Though s9(2)(g)(ii) is on leave from tomorrow for a week, he is happy for a call during this time should you wish to discuss prior to Thursday's meeting with the PM.

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Principal Advisor
Christchurch Call Unit, Policy Advisory Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Mobile s9(2)(a)
Email s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	@DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject:	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 12 July 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 12 July 2023 5:16:00 pm
Attachments:	1. Engagements tracker.docx
	2. Outline of Second Gentleman event.docx
	3. Stanford discussion read out.docx
	4. 2023 Summit Concept Note.docx
	s9(2)(j)
	6. CCAN - Current applicants for joining CCAN.docx
	7. EU regulations on illegal content online - CyberPeace Institute.pdf
	[Not in Scope]
	9. Rumman Chowdhury"s paper "International Insitutions for Advanced AI".pdf
	10. Letter to IFPIM (response).docx
	11. Letter from IFPIM (incoming).pdf

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Hi s9(2)(a)

Welcome back from your break – I hope you had a restful time!

Please find below and attached a return to the weekly Call update pack for the Special Envoy.

Attachment	CCU comment	SE comment
ENGAGEMENTS		
1. Engagements tracker	For **review and feedback**	
2. Outline of Second Gentleman event	For **review and feedback** if any	
FOLLOW UP ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS UPDATES		
3. Stanford discussion read out See here for how it will appear: Special Envoy Jacinda Ardern Assembles Stanford Scholars for Discussion on Technology Governance and Regulation | FSI	For **review and sign-off** CCU reviewed – looks excellent. CCU will provide edits regarding grammar, titles, capitalisation etc.	
Email re: OIA in the Special Envoy's DPMC inbox	For information	▌
SUMMIT PREPARATION		
4. 2023 Summit concept note	For **review and sign-off**	▌
BRIEFINGS / READING		
s9(2)(j)	For **review and discussion**	
7. CCAN – Current applicants for joining CCAN	For information ▌	
8. EU regulations on illegal	For information	

content online - CyberPeace Institute	Provided by CyberPeace Institute following your meeting in Geneva	
[Not in Scope]		
10. Rumman Chowdhury's paper 'International Institutions for Advanced AI' Blogpost here: Exploring institutions for global AI governance (deepmind.com)	For information	
CORRESPONDENCE		
11. Letter to IFPIM (response) 12. Letter from IFPIM (incoming)	For **review and signing**	
COMING UP		
Short note to support call with Sam Altman	Scheduled to come up on 13 July	
Event brief: Roundtable with US Second Gentleman, Mr Doug Emhoff, 21 July	Scheduled for next update pack on 19 July	
FYI: ACTIONS FOR CCU TO FOLLOW UP WITH s9(2)(a)		
Schedule meetings with: • Andrew Sullivan, Internet Society • He Whenua Taurikura co-directors	Not time sensitive	

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

This document outlines the process for managing requests for external engagement with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and contains the tracker tool for managing these requests. This process and tool manage requests from external parties for meetings, event participation, and media engagement as well as the Christchurch Call Unit's (CCU's) proactive suggestions for engagement. This process and tool do not manage set international outreach trips, which will be managed as separate projects as they arise.

Maintaining a record of all requests for engagement, either new, ongoing, or closed, is an essential information management practice. This document contains three tables:

- o <u>New requests</u>, which will go to the Special Envoy for decision
- o <u>Active engagements</u>, which are accepted or delegated engagements to be actioned and tracked
- o <u>Closed requests</u>, which are declined requests or engagements that have been completed

Process for requests for engagement with the Special Envoy

1. Request received
   Received through the Special Envoy's direct contacts, the Call inbox, or CCU members

2. Request centralised
   Forward all requests to s9(2)(g)(ii) copying s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)

3. Request logged, assigned, and initially assessed
   s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

4. Request reviewed by CCU leadership every Thursday morning
   s9(2)(g)(ii) to review the tracker every Thursday morning

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7. Request decisions actioned
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Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests

Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 22 pages withheld under same grounds]

Outline of event with US Second Gentleman, Mr. Doug Ermhoff

- Time: tbc but between 12 and 2pm on Friday 21 July
- Venue: tbc – US Embassy and White House liaising on hotel (Hyatt) venue; will look into and suggest option of Auckland Policy Office

Run of event

1:1 with Second Gentleman

- Meet with Second Gentleman one-on-one (accompanied by 1-2 CCU staff) for 15 – 20 minutes

Then roundtable with community representatives to discuss gender, youth, interfaith and social cohesion topics (of interest to Second Gentleman and his portfolio of work)

- Media will be present for first 5 – 10 minutes
- Special Envoy and Second Gentleman will provide short (2 min) opening remarks then media will depart
- Media to include NZ-based US/international outlets (AP, Bloomberg, The Guardian, NYT, Reuters, AFP, Benar News) with local outlets also invited (US Embassy holds relationships with e.g. Stuff, RNZ, TVNZ)
  - ➢ QUESTION: Are you comfortable with these arrangements?
- Special Envoy to kick off a free-flowing discussion with attendees based on following questions:
  - As well as a harm in its own right, **gender-based hate** is common across extremist ideologies. The Call Community is working to understand its role as a radicalising factor, and design interventions. How is gender-based hate presenting online? What actions could we – platforms, civil society, governments - take to disrupt this form of hate and the way it radicalises people?
  - In the Christchurch Call Community, we recognise the role of polarisation in driving radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism. How can we counter social divisions and promote **inclusive, cohesive societies**?
  - Young people are particularly vulnerable to becoming radicalised as a result of exclusion and isolation. What can we do to build tolerance and resilience among **younger generations**?
  - ➢ QUESTION: Are you comfortable with this substance?

Proposed invitees for roundtable

s9(2)(a)

DPMC (CCU and Christchurch-based engagement advisor, s9(2)(g)(ii) and US Embassy have worked together to develop this list. It is currently with White House for clearance. If you and the White House are happy, DPMC and US Embassy will aim to send invites on Thurs 13 July (DPMC to call invitees directly to socalise prior to formal invite.)

> QUESTION: Are you comfortable with this list?

Speaking at the roundtable held at the [Freeman Spogli Insitute for International Studies](#), s9(2)(g)(ii) the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Cyber and Digital in the New Zealand Government and Christchurch Call Coordinator, acknowledged the challenges inherent in building and maintaining this kind of broad, multi-nation, multi-stakeholder, public-private initiative.

"There's a new form of diplomacy required around this," he told the Stanford researchers. "It requires each of us to meet each other somewhere in the Venn diagram where our interests overlap. And that's not comfortable at all, but it's critically important."

Addressing the group, Ardern, who has been serving as a special envoy to the Christchurch Call after stepping down as New Zealand's prime minister in January 2023, outlined why the work of the Christchurch Call is still pressing four years since its founding.

"We always knew that the Call would not really have an end point so long as there are new, emerging technologies — be it AI or other immersive technologies — that contribute to radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism online," she explained.

With the release of new AI-based tools and products over the last year, the efforts of organizations like Christchurch Call are critical as governments, companies, and societies try to navigate rapidly evolving technology and the impacts it is having on the world.

As Erik Brynjolfsson, a senior fellow at Stanford HAI, told the delegation, "As we start to measure the economic and productivity effects this technology is going to have in the next decades, it's going to be staggering. But there's also a lot of room for this to go really wrong."

Special Envoy Ardern invited the scholars at the discussion to weigh in on two foundational questions: as experts, what worries you most in the space of technology governance and regulation, and what can be done by groups like Christchurch Call to help address those concerns? A selection of their answers is shared below.

Responses have been edited for length and clarity.

As researchers, what are some of the major challenges you see right now in technology development, safety, and regulation?

Losing Norms and Accelerating Disruption

Nathaniel Persily, Co-Director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center

We had been at a point of more-or-less equilibrium with content moderation, but that's really been blown apart by Twitter in the last year. And the effect of that is not limited to that platform; it's metastasizing across Silicon Valley to other platforms. Trust and Safety teams are also being hollowed out, often for economic reasons, and all of that has an impact on the kind of content that ends up online. We're at a point where the tectonic plates are shifting on established areas, and then new technology like AI, blockchain, VR, and AR is coming in and disrupting things even further. The cumulative effect of that is destabilizing.

Legal Fights Over Research

Alex Stamos, Director of the Stanford Internet Observatory

The transparency of platforms is key. We are now past peak Trust and Safety. The pinnacle of protecting things like elections in the United States and Europe was probably within the 2022 timeframe, and that is all now falling apart. Transparency is key to that. It's not just about the platforms providing technical access to us as researchers; we've historically had workarounds that have allowed us to still do research in an appropriate way. But we're getting to a point where we can't use our workarounds. Companies are starting to sue academics for doing research, and we're beginning to see the weaponization of the terms of service of social platforms and intellectual property law to prevent academics from doing their work. That's a big problem, and that's going to be the big story in this space through 2023 and 2024.

No Funding, No Results

Daphne Keller, Director of the Program on Platform Regulation

It's going to be very interesting to watch how the Digital Services Act (DSA) in Europe unfolds and what we learn about what works and what doesn't. I'm a little worried that other countries will rush to emulate it before seeing how it plays out. One of the interesting aspects of the DSA is that it deliberately set out to create a multi-stakeholder ecosystem. There are

built-in roles for researchers and auditors and other parties. That's great. But my big concern is that most of those so-called "essential roles" are not funded. There's an expectation that civil society will spring into action to do a bunch of things in terms of oversight, but it's very unclear if civil society will be able to afford to do that.

The Unknowns of AI

Rob Reich, Director of the Center for Ethics in Society

In the space of AI right now, one of the biggest debates is deciding whether open-source, open-access, generative AI models are a good way forward. To say the obvious, the concern is with what happens when you put powerful tools like this in the hands of adversarial actors. We all agree that open-sourcing access and information about uranium and plutonium is not a good idea. Now there's a growing tension about whether that same mentality needs to be brought to AI, and whether that is also an existential threat to humanity in some way.

The Optics of Regulations

Renée DiResta, Technical Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory

One of the challenges to regulating these technologies is that the optics of it look terrible for politicians. No one wants to be seen as a politician trying to curtail free speech or give the appearance of trying to sway elections in a certain way that benefits themselves. But by the same token, it needs to be done. And this is the question: how do you pass regulation that protects ordinary people who don't have the resources to fight against this — whether that's women suffering from revenge porn or children being exploited through the digital distribution of child sexual abuse materials — when you're a politician who has power but may be seen as having a direct self-interest in regulating technology that may appear unfavorable to you? It's not an easy needle to thread.

Who Has a Seat at the Table

Russell Wald, Director of Policy at the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI)

Who has a seat at the table right now when it comes to these discussions about technology and their place in society? Right now, it's just a handful of the same industry leaders who stand to benefit from their adoption. They're the ones with the policymakers. Academia and civil society have a lot to add to these conversations, but they are not at the table.

If you could have regulators do one thing today that would make a difference or impact in the space of tech governance, what would it be?

Put More Chefs in the Kitchen

Nathaniel Persily, Co-Director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center

One of the big places we need to start with is platform transparency and researcher access. And this is not just a ploy for ensuring employment for researchers and academics like myself. There is simply not enough expertise in any government anywhere in the world to effectively tackle this, and the only way we are going to be able to make a difference in the short time period we have in this inflection point moment we're at is to deploy the resources and knowledge of civil society and academia to help government.

Find Common Rules of Engagement

Alex Stamos, Director of the Stanford Internet Observatory

Democracies need to set a baseline framework for what they require and expect of tech companies and social platforms. There are a lot of groups who are starting to copy the moves Twitter is making to restrict transparency and keep outside eyes — whether they're regulators, academics, or researchers — from being able to see what's going on with the data inside these companies. There are equally plenty of people who don't care about rules and don't follow them and are violating people's privacy and selling their data and making money off of it.

For those of us who are part of legitimate institutions that follow compliance and have rules, we have to care. We're rapidly getting to a situation where the good guys are kept from looking and the bad guys get off with a free pass. Democracy can't work in that type of environment. So even if they don't all do it in the same way, countries need to try at some level to establish a status quo and standards and principles that apply across jurisdictions, especially as we are rapidly moving towards really difficult

legal scenarios involving things like AI-generated CSAM.

Transparency, Transparency, Transparency

Daphne Keller, Director of the Program on Platform Regulation

We have a mix of needing affirmative access rights that legislation like the Platform Accountability and Transparency Act (PATA) would give researchers in the U.S., but also action to get rid of barriers that researchers have to doing their work, such as being allowed to be sued for doing research. I think there's a lot of productive, low-hanging fruit work that can be done right now to kickstart broader transparency efforts.

Build Strength Through Interoperability

Mark Lemley, Director of the Stanford Program in Law, Science and Technology

There's lots of room to think about how researchers and companies can better interoperate across different digital platforms and how they can move their data and networks from one to the other should one platform, for example, be overrun by hostile actors. Right now, there are legal frameworks standing in the way. But by that same token, some of the questions surrounding regulation and protection will need to come through legal frameworks. The model I keep coming back to is that of cybersecurity, where you combine regulations with technological solutions to create defense and resiliency. So maybe we have AI disinformation that we create rules against, but we also have AI technology that is working to identify and flag the AI disinformation. That's going to take both a robust technology sector and a smart court system.

Center People in Policy

Renée DiResta, Technical Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory

I think interjecting the personal back into the policy can help with some of the traction needed to move the needle on these issues. There are lots of sympathetic cases that occasionally get covered in the media that have a lot of potential to make an impact. A lot of the golden era of content moderation in the United States happened through the work of activists,

civil society, and media arguing in favor of something being done. Those kinds of voices and stories can be powerful reminders about what's at stake and why we need norms and regulations.

Cultivate Consciousness of the Issues

Michael McFaul, Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Right now, these conversations about technology are mostly happening in very small, generally very elite circles. When I look at examples of successful political movements and successful sea changes in history, those all have a very broad, class-conscious band of support. I would wager that most people — at least most Americans — aren't thinking about these issues in the way, that say, researchers at Stanford, or in Paris, or New Zealand are. If we want to do something big about this issue, I think we need to make sure there is consciousness among people about what these tech companies are doing, how this technology is working, and what the effects of it are. That awareness doesn't come from nowhere, but we really need it if we're going to get somewhere on this.

CONCEPT NOTE: 2023 CHRISTCHURCH CALL SUMMIT

Context:

Planning for the September 2022 Summit began in November 2021 and involved a steering group, and input from the Call community on progress indicators, agenda topics, format and priorities.

The 2023 Summit will be planned on a more condensed time frame. As such, it will be important to build on the 2022 experience, taking into account feedback received, to streamline the process and ensure it is manageable for the Community.

This will require a rigorous focus on priority topics, multiple inputs over varied timeframes, and greater use of 'town hall' style virtual meetings as part of the preparatory phase.

Feedback on 2022

We received a great deal of feedback through the 2022 process.

Positives	Things to improve
- Meaningful substantive and focussed conversation between leaders - Action-oriented and frank dialogue - All sectors participated "A real conversation" - Inclusive process for preparation of- and input to- the Summit - Clear priorities set for the next period	- Would have benefited from more opportunities to meet among the community, not just at the Leaders' event. - Preparatory process was time intensive and required significant effort - Too many topics for Leaders to cover in sufficient depth - Not all Call topics could be covered - Three facilitators introduced complexity - The online interactive aspect of the hybrid model introduced complexity

We propose in addition to the Leaders meeting based on the 2022 format, that we test with the community hosting a separate hybrid meeting open to all Community members and, if there is widespread support for this, go ahead. This will allow Leaders to have a deep and strategic conversation on a selection of issues and to sign off priorities for the next phase, whilst ensuring we make best use of the opportunity to gather and discuss the full range of topics of interest to our community.

A successful 2023 Summit will

- Be a leading, innovative, example of Leader-level multistakeholder Summitry helping to evolve the model of how we discuss tech issues internationally
- Attract the right high level attendees from each sector
- Be a moment for the Call Community to 'come together' with a shared purpose
- Include significant announcements that indicate we have moved closer to our shared objectives
- Be a moment for Leaders to commit resources and funding to important projects
- Articulate a shared vision of the future way forward
- Involve a frank, focused and satisfying conversation between Leaders discussion
- Result in good media coverage and publicity for our work

Pre-Summit Process

Late July	**Town Hall Meeting**	• Save the date for September • Set out the proposed process based on 2022 with some adjustments • Invite feedback on the proposals (survey or google docs) • Invite working group inputs and individual/collective deliverables
Late July	**Formal Invitations**	• Confirmed date for Leaders' meeting • Confirmed date for Community meeting(s)
Early August	**Collation of community inputs**	• Secretariat starts to work with Community leads on gathering input for the Joint Statement and 'package' of deliverables.
1st Week of September	**Final agenda**	• Confirmed list of topics and outputs • Logistical details
2nd Week of September		• Final list of attendees confirmed • Accreditation issued • Summit 'pack' finalised
3rd Week of September	**Summit Day**	• Issuing of co-chairs Joint Statement and any additional announcements as part of a 'comms package' • Leaders' Meeting • Community Meeting (TBC 1 day either side)

Key Themes

- Delivering the Call Commitments: Community, Crisis, Algorithms, Transparency
- Impact of new technology, particularly the commercialisation of new AI products
- Evolution of international frameworks and discussions: how can society best address challenges and opportunities in tech whilst upholding human rights

Community Meeting

Date/Time	TBC 18, 19 or 21 September (propose 120 minutes duration)
Location	TBC (exploring options with Meta & French Consulate… Columbia Uni also an option?)
Host/Chair	s9(2)(g)(ii) and Henri Verdier
Invitees	Open to all in the Christchurch Community who confirm by the deadline

Format	• Fully hybrid (i.e. virtual attendees can intervene) • Pre-selected topics • Each sector / group has an opportunity to contribute to each topic • Rapporteurs for each topic • Invite sub-groups on relevant topics to run events around the same time that could feed into this meeting or derive from it (but aren't organised by the Summit team)

Leaders' Meeting

Date/Time	TBC 20 September at 11am (<120 minutes duration)
Location	Microsoft UN Headquarters, 1 Dag Hammarskjold
Host/Chair	Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern, and H.E. President Emmanuel Macron
Invitees	Selected Leaders from the Call Community • Head of State or Head of Government + 1 (a selection from among the 56 supporters based on regional diversity) • C-Suite Executives + 1 • Civil Society Leaders • Partner Organisation Executives
Format	• Facilitated discussion based on pre-selected topics • <u>Strictly no prepared statements in the room; these can be provided separately if needed</u> • Accredited community members can access a livestream (and possibly provide feedback via a virtual moderator)
Independent facilitator	s9(2)(ba)(i) , but just one facilitator)

Outputs

• Co-Chairs Joint Statement summarising key issues and decisions
• Individual announcements and updates added to 'comms package'
• Rapporteur statements for community topics

CCAN Current Applicants Summary
As of 7 July 2023

CCAN has approved the following for membership…

- s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a) is an expert in countering and preventing violent extremism and works as an independent expert with the UNDP, the UK Govt, and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (a Call partner). s9(2)(a) has worked with USAID in Cameroon in the Boko Haram-affected Lake Chad Basin Region and with the World Bank in Afghanistan. s9(2)(a) specialises in gender-based violence.

- **New Zealand International Student Association (NZISA)**

NZISA is a representative body of international students from NZ universities, focused on high-level advocacy and lobbying for issues international students face. NZISA's committee is interested in joining CCAN to create relationships and to build knowledge that will help international students. NZISA will broaden CCAN's membership to youth-oriented organisations to better understand youth issues.

- **The Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University**

CSET is a policy research organisation focused on security implications of emerging technologies. Members of CSET's new foundational research grants department have applied to join CCAN. They are interested in AI and TVEC; they have donated money to OpenMined and are interested in the CCIAO. CSET will boost CCAN's policy advice capabilities.

- **Red en Defensa de los Derechos Digitales (R3D)**

R3D are a Mexico-based NGO focused on public policy, human rights, freedom of expression and content moderation across Latin America. R3D is seeing an increase in violent extremist content in Mexico and wants to contribute their local expertise in global initiatives. Some CCAN members have a pre-existing good relationship with R3D.

CCAN is scheduled to meet with the following to explore membership…

- **Southeast Asian Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet)**

SAFEnet is an Indonesian-based advocate for freedom of expression and other human rights to be considered in digital policies. It provides resources to communities vulnerable to digital harm in Indonesia and SouthEast Asia and has launched an online gender-based violence helpline.

Center for Information Resilience (CIR)

CIR is a non-profit social enterprise with a global focus on human rights harms related to violent conflict offline and online. s9(2)(a) CIR's US Vice President, is the main contact s9(2)(a) s an expert in disinformation, Russia, and gendered digital harm.

CCAN is at an early stage of developing relationships with prospective members following RightsCon.

1. Regulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online – (EU) 2021/784

Having identified the shortcomings of the voluntary approach in online content moderation, the European Parliament and the European Council adopted, in June 2021, the **Regulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online (TCO Regulation).** The TCO Regulation became applicable in all EU Member States as of 7 June 2022. The aim of the Regulation is to ensure that terrorist content available to the public is removed swiftly, in a cooperative and coordinated manner among all EU Member States and hosting service providers. The Regulation applies to all **hosting service providers** offering services in the EU, whether or not they have their main establishment in the Member States.

The Regulation creates new rules and obligations for the competent authorities (CAs) of Member States and hosting service providers to address the misuse of hosting services for the dissemination of terrorist content online. One of the main provisions gives CAs the power to issue **removal orders**, requiring hosting service providers to remove or disable access to terrorist content in all Member States. Removal orders oblige hosting service providers to remove or disable access to that content **within one hour of receipt of the removal order**.

Voluntary cooperation through the **referral** process (i.e. flagging of content) between CAs and hosting service providers will continue, but the Regulation provides additional binding instruments for Member States to enforce the rapid removal of terrorist content where necessary.

Terrorist Content Online Regulation (EU) 2021/784

EU countries designate national authorities

Authorities issue orders to remove terrorist content

Internet platforms have 1 hour to remove the content

In the event of systematic breaches, internet platform have to pay penalties of up to 4% of their turnover

Overview of obligations for hosting service providers

According to the provisions of the TCO Regulation, hosting service providers are obliged to:

- Establish legal representation in Europe, along with a single point of contact that will receive removal orders.
- Remove terrorist content upon receiving a removal order from Member States' authorities within one hour;
- Take proactive measures when they are exposed to terrorist content:
- The measures they take will depend on the level of exposure and their size and capabilities as well as resources. The measures must be applied with effective safeguards to protect fundamental rights, in particular freedom of speech. There is no obligation to use automated tools to identify or remove content. Where platforms choose to use such tools, they need to ensure human oversight and publicly report on their functioning.
- Preserve removed or blocked content for six months;
- Promptly communicate content related to "imminent threat to life situations" to national competent authorities of concerned Member States and Europol;
- Publish annual transparency reports on the amount of content removed/blocked.

Safeguards to protect fundamental rights

At the same time, the TCO Regulation establishes strong safeguards to ensure that the fundamental rights of users and in particular, those guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are protected:

- Both the EU Member States and hosting service providers will issue annual transparency reports on the measures taken to remove terrorist content, and on any erroneous removals of legitimate speech online;
- Where content is removed, the user will be informed and provided with information to contest the removal;
- Content providers (users) and online platforms can request a review of the removal order before the relevant authorities or seek judicial redress in courts in the respective Member States.
- Hosting service providers exposed to terrorist content are required to take proactive measures in a proportionate and non-discriminatory manner, with a view to avoiding the removal of material which is not terrorist content.
- Content disseminated for educational, journalistic, artistic or research purposes is exempted. The exemption will also apply to content disseminated to raise awareness against terrorist activity.

Penalties

Financial penalties can be up to 4% of the platform's turnover. However, sanctions of non-compliance to hosting service providers will depend on the nature and size of the platforms to ensure penalties for small, medium and micro enterprises are proportionate.

2. The Digital Services Act - Regulation (EU) 2022/2065

The Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force on **16 November 2022**. It has been portrayed as Europe's new "**Digital Constitution**", which asserts the rules for tech companies that offer their services in the EU, in order to protect users and their rights, while countering the spread of illegal content and products online. The provisions introduced by the DSA will start to fully apply from **February 2024**. However, online platforms had the obligation to start implementing a number of actions from February 2023, while in the meantime, Member States are also making the necessary adjustments in order to be ready for the full implementation in 2024.

The DSA foresees horizontal provisions, setting common rules for all digital services, with the aim to better protect users and their fundamental rights online; improve and harmonize the mechanisms for the removal of illegal content; establish a robust transparency and accountability framework for online platforms and create a stronger public oversight, in particular for those platforms that reach more than 10% of the EU's population (i.e. 45 million citizens).

Overall, the DSA introduces a horizontal framework for all categories of content, products, services and activities online. It also includes a horizontal framework for regulatory oversight, accountability and transparency of the online space in response to emerging risks. Finally, it lays down rules to ensure greater accountability on how platforms moderate content, advertise, and use algorithmic processes

Scope

The DSA provisions are binding for all online intermediaries offering their services in the EU. In particular, the online services that fall within the scope of the draft DSA are the following1:

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[1] Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-online-environment_en#which-providers-are-covered

Intermediary services offering network infrastructure: Internet access providers, domain name registrars;

Hosting services such as cloud and webhosting services;

Online platforms such as online marketplaces, app stores collaborative economy platforms and social media platforms

Very large online platforms such as platforms reaching more tha 10% of 450 million population in Europe.

The responsibilities and obligations per online service category are proportionate to their role, size and impact in the online ecosystem. Specific rules are foreseen for the so-called Very Large Online Platforms and very large online search engines[2] which, according to the legislative proposal, carry particular risks in the dissemination of illegal content. In this regard, **VLOP are envisaged to have increased obligations for accountability, transparency and mitigation of risks**.

Overview of due diligence obligations

Currently, online users are exposed to illegal goods, content or services, with decisions about which content remains online or is taken down, being left mostly at the discretion of the online service providers. DSA aspires to codify the content moderation process through the establishment of clear notice and action procedures. The new obligations for the online service providers are of cumulative nature, which means that the biggest amount of obligations are shouldered by those platforms that have become quasi-public spaces for communication and trade (i.e. VLOP). Member States have the primary role, supported by a new "European Board for Digital Services" for the oversight and enforcement of the legislative proposal.

In addition, very large platforms (VLOP) and very large online search engines (VLOSE) are obliged to assess the risks their systems pose, regarding not only illegal content and products but also systematic risks to the protection of public interests, fundamental rights, public health and security. They need to develop appropriate risk management tools and measures to protect the integrity of their services against the use of manipulative

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[2] In April 2023, the EU Commission designated 17 Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and 2 Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) that reach at least 45 million monthly active users. These are: Alibaba AliExpress, Amazon Store, Apple AppStore, Booking.com, Facebook, Google Play, Google Maps, Google Shopping, Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube, Zalando, Bing, and Google Search.

techniques. For VLOP and VLOSE, enhanced supervision and enforcement includes the EU Commission.

The overview of the new obligations is displayed below3:

	Intermediary services	Hosting services	Online Platforms	Very Large Platforms
Transparency reporting	●	●	●	●
Requirements on terms of service due account of fundamental rights	●	●	●	●
Cooperation with national authorities following orders	●	●	●	●
Points of contact and, where necessary, legal representative	●	●	●	●
Notice and action and obligation to provide information to users		●	●	●
Complaint and redress mechanisms			●	●
Trusted Flaggers			●	●
Measures against abusive notices and counter-notices			●	●
Vetting credentials of third party suppliers ("KYBC")			●	●
User-facing transparency of online advertising			●	●
Reporting criminal offences to law enforcement			●	●
Obligations for risk management and establishment of compliance officer				●
External risk auditing and public accountability				●
Obligations for transparency of algorithms used for recommendations and user choice for access to information				●
Obligations for data sharing with authorities and researchers				●
Codes of conduct				●
Crisis response cooperation				●

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3 Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-online-environment/europe-fit-digital-age-new-online-rules-platforms_en

Safeguards to protect fundamental rights

- The Digital Services Act seeks to provide safeguards to ensure the effective protection of fundamental rights such as the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, non-discrimination and the right to access information:
- Users have the possibility to challenge the decisions of platforms to remove or label content, through established complaint mechanisms;
- The legislation provides the opportunity for independent scrutiny of these decisions through audit reports and through facilitating access to key platform's data to researchers;
- It creates transparency reporting obligations;
- It provides for the establishment of independent administrative authorities to oversee the implementation of the law.

Penalties

Failure to comply with the obligations laid down in the DSA could result in sanctions, including a fine of up to 6% of the annual worldwide turnover of the concerned intermediary service provider or a ban to operate in the EU single market in the event of repeated serious breaches.

2.1 Countering online disinformation

The DSA is considered to be an EU milestone in countering disinformation online, as its provisions, beyond content moderation, also require online platforms to be more transparent about the use of their recommender systems and algorithms and, more importantly, be held accountable for their role in disseminating disinformation. In other words, the DSA provides the framework to those MS that have legislated in their national law against the spread of disinformation, to send notice-and-action requests to online platforms, while tech companies are obliged to **monitor and make risk assessments of their platforms**, to **report on mitigation measures** and **prohibit the usage of manipulative algorithms and surveillance advertising**, which are prominent AI technologies employed for disinformation campaigns.

Moderating online disinformation as illegal content: Enforcement considerations

The EU policy initiatives consider disinformation to be **harmful content**, rather than illegal content. Both the "EU Communication in tackling online disinformation"[4] and the "EU Action Plan against disinformation"[5] recognise that the notion of disinformation is "without

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[4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/communication-tackling-online-disinformation-european-approach.
[5] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/54866_en.

prejudice to the laws of the Union or of any of the Member States that may be applicable, including rules on illegal content". At national level across the EU, the legislative approach towards the spread of disinformation is diverse. Several MS have made the spread of online disinformation **illegal**, while others have yet to take any legislative action in this field.

In many cases, disinformation is considered to be an accessory to specific illegal activity. In other words, manipulative content (i.e. disinformation) is a means to achieve an illegal end. For instance, beyond violent extremist propaganda, disinformation is an integral part of the promotion of illegal services online in migrant smuggling, instigation of climate-related crimes, gender-based online violence, war crimes etc. As such, any targeted action (i.e. removal orders, notice-and-action, referrals) against online criminal activity, in a number of crime areas covered in EU and national legislations, is expected to have an **impact on curbing the spread of disinformation**.

International Institutions for Advanced AI

Lewis Ho[1], Joslyn Barnhart[1], Robert Trager[2],
Yoshua Bengio[3], Miles Brundage[4], Allison Carnegie[5], Rumman Chowdhury[6],
Allan Dafoe[1], Gillian Hadfield[7], Margaret Levi[8], Duncan Snidal[9]

[1]Google DeepMind, [2]Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford and Centre for the Governance of AI, [3]Université de Montréal and Mila, CIFAR Fellow, [4]OpenAI, [5]Columbia University, [6]Harvard Berkman Klein, [7]University of Toronto, Vector Institute and OpenAI (independent contractor), [8]Stanford University, [9]Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract

International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems benefit humanity. International collaborations can unlock AI's ability to further sustainable development, and coordination of regulatory efforts can reduce obstacles to innovation and the spread of benefits. Conversely, the potential dangerous capabilities of powerful and general-purpose AI systems create global externalities in their development and deployment, and international efforts to further responsible AI practices could help manage the risks they pose. This paper identifies a set of governance functions that could be performed at an international level to address these challenges, ranging from supporting access to frontier AI systems to setting international safety standards. It groups these functions into four institutional models that exhibit internal synergies and have precedents in existing organizations: 1) a Commission on Frontier AI that facilitates expert consensus on opportunities and risks from advanced AI, 2) an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards to manage global threats from advanced models, supports their implementation, and possibly monitors compliance with a future governance regime, 3) a Frontier AI Collaborative that promotes access to cutting-edge AI, and 4) an AI Safety Project that brings together leading researchers and engineers to further AI safety research. We explore the utility of these models and identify open questions about their viability.

Executive Summary

Recent advances in AI have highlighted the potentially transformative impacts of advanced systems.[1] International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring these are globally beneficial.

International collaborations could be important for unlocking AI's abilities to further sustainable development and benefit humanity. Many societies that could most benefit may not have the resources, infrastructure or training to take advantage of current cutting-edge AI systems. Frontier AI development may not focus on global needs, and the economic benefits of commercial AI technologies could primarily benefit developed countries. A failure to coordinate or harmonize regulation may also slow innovation.

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[1]By "advanced AI systems" we mean systems that are highly capable and general purpose.

Moreover, international efforts may also be necessary to manage the direct risks posed by powerful AI capabilities. Without adequate safeguards, some of these capabilities—automated software development, chemistry and synthetic biology research, text and video generation—may be misused by malicious actors around the world with transnational consequences. Furthermore, the significant geopolitical benefits of rapid AI development decreases the likelihood of adequate AI governance without international cooperation.

This paper describes a set of international governance functions, ranging from the distribution of frontier AI systems to the setting of safety standards, that may be needed to harness the opportunities and mitigate the risks of advanced AI. Early efforts to perform some of these functions have been undertaken by inter-governmental organizations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), the Group of 7 (G7) Hiroshima Process, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as well as by private sector initiatives like the Partnership on AI, the ML Commons, and International Standards Organization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard-setting initiatives. But the rapid rate of AI progress suggests further institutional efforts in AI global governance could be needed.

The functions we identify could be divided in multiple ways across organizations and could involve stakeholders from the public sector, the private sector, and civil society. We group these functions into four institutional models that exhibit synergies and have precedents in existing organizations, and discuss their strengths and limitations:

- An intergovernmental **Commission on Frontier AI**[2] could establish a scientific position on opportunities and risks from advanced AI and how they may be managed. In doing so, it would increase public awareness and understanding of AI prospects and issues, contribute to a scientifically informed account of AI use and risk mitigation, and be a source of expertise for policymakers.

- An intergovernmental or multi-stakeholder **Advanced AI Governance Organization**[3] could help internationalize and align efforts to address global risks from advanced AI systems by setting governance norms and standards, and assisting in their implementation. It may also perform compliance monitoring functions (either independently or in association with industry groups) for an international governance regime.

- A **Frontier AI Collaborative**[4] could promote access to advanced AI as an international public-private partnership. In doing so, it could help underserved societies benefit from cutting-edge AI technology and promote international access to AI technology for safety and governance objectives.

- An **AI Safety Project**[5] could bring together leading researchers and engineers, and provide them with access to computing resources and advanced AI models for work on technical mitigations of AI risks, potentially working with parallel industry efforts. It would promote AI safety R&D by increasing its scale, resourcing and coordination.

There are important open questions around the viability of such models. A Commission on Frontier AI will face significant scientific challenges given the limited scientific research on advanced AI

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[2]Similar institutions include the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), and the Scientific Assessment Panel of the United Nations Environment Programme.

[3]Cf. the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

[4]Cf. international public-private partnerships like Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; as well as organizations that hold dangerous technologies, like the IAEA's nuclear fuel bank and the Atomic Development Authority proposed following WWII.

[5]Cf. scientific collaborations like the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and ITER.

issues, and will have to combat the politicization of its activities. The rapid rate of AI progress will make it difficult for an Advanced AI Governance Organization to set standards that keep up with and are appropriately scoped for the risk landscape, and the many difficulties of international coordination raise questions about how participation in an Organization regime can be incentivized. The potentially dual-use nature of general purpose AI technologies might hamper a Frontier AI Collaborative's ability to distribute beneficial systems widely, and the significant obstacles to underserved societies making use of AI systems raises questions about its effectiveness as a means of promoting sustainable development. Finally, an AI Safety Project could struggle to secure adequate model access to conduct safety research, and it may not be worthwhile to divert safety researchers away from frontier labs.

Table 1 below summarizes our mapping of institutional functions, the challenges they address, and the existing and possible institutions that perform those functions.

There are details about these institutional models that we leave out of scope or that remain uncertain—whether these institutions should be new or evolutions of existing organizations, whether the conditions under which these institutions are likely to be most impactful will obtain, whether other groupings of institutional functions would be more effective—but rapid progress on these topics will help prepare for the development of advanced AI.

Table 1: A mapping of international institutional functions, governance objectives and models.

Function → Objective / institutions ↓	Science and Technology Research, Development and Diffusion				International Rulemaking and Enforcement			
	Conduct or Support AI Safety Research	Build Consensus on Opportunities and Risks	Develop Frontier AI	Distribute and Enable Access to AI	Set Safety Norms and Standards	Support Implementation of Standards	Monitor Compliance	Control Inputs
Spreading Beneficial Technology	No	Yes	Maybe	Yes	No	No	No	No
Harmonizing Regulation	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Ensuring Safe Development and Use	Maybe	Yes	Maybe	Maybe	Yes	Yes	Maybe	Maybe
Managing Geopolitical Risk Factors	No	No	Maybe	Maybe	No	No	Yes	Yes

Existing Int'l Institutional Efforts		OECD, GPAI, G7, ITU			ISO/IEC			Semi-conductor Export Controls
Possible Institution	*AI Safety Project*	*Commission on Frontier AI*	*Frontier AI Collaborative*		*Advanced AI Governance Agency*			
Key challenges	Model access; diverting talent	Politicization; scientific challenges	Managing dual-use technology; education, infrastructure and ecosystem obstacles		Incentivizing participation; quickly changing risk landscape; maintaining appropriate scope			

3

1 Introduction

The capabilities of AI systems have grown quickly over the last decade. Employing a growing wealth of algorithmic insights, data sources and computation power, AI researchers have created systems that can comprehend language, recognize and generate images and video, write computer programs and engage in scientific reasoning. If current trends in AI capabilities continue, AI systems could have transformative impacts on society.

Powerful AI systems will bring significant benefits and risks. These systems have the capacity to significantly improve the productivity of workers and economies as a whole, and to help us address some of our most important social and technological challenges. But these systems also present challenges including workforce dislocation, lack of transparency, biased outcomes, inequitably shared benefits and threats to national security.

Promoting AI benefits and managing AI risks both have domestic and international components. On the domestic front, governments and the private sector will need to establish rules and norms around how advanced AI systems are developed, distributed, deployed and accessed, addressing issues like security, distributive impacts, privacy, bias, and more. A number of challenges have the potential to transcend national borders and impact societies and economies worldwide. Accordingly, policymakers, technologists, and AI governance experts have recently begun to call for specific global AI governance initiatives centered on international institutions.[6]

This paper contributes to these early conversations by discussing why AI governance may be needed on an international scale and then offering a non-exhaustive taxonomy of the institutional functions that international efforts might require. It explores four possible international institutions to perform these functions: 1) a Commission on Frontier AI that facilitates expert consensus on opportunities and risks from advanced AI; 2) an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards, supports their implementation, and could monitor compliance to future governance regimes; 3) a Frontier AI Collaborative that develops and distributes cutting-edge AI; and 4) an AI Safety Project that brings together exceptional researchers, engineers and compute to further AI safety research. Each of these approaches seeks to mitigate the societal challenges of advanced AI in different ways and each confronts significant challenges to its viability and success.

2 The Need for International Governance

Powerful AI systems have the potential to transform society, economics and politics in fundamental ways. Because of characteristics like its high barriers to development/utilization and the possibility of cross-border use, it is possible that harnessing AI's potential for global benefit and managing its risks could require governance functions at the international level.

Promoting Global Benefits

Access to appropriate AI technology might greatly promote prosperity and stability [50], but the benefits might not be evenly distributed or focused on the greatest needs of underrepresented communities or the developing world. Inadequate access to internet services, computing power, or availability of machine learning training/expertise will also hinder certain groups' ability to benefit fully from AI advances.

International institutions have long sought to support sustainable global development. International efforts to **build consensus on AI opportunities**—especially addressing barriers to their effective use globally—could support efforts to **distribute and enable access to AI.** On top of facilitating access, this could also include building capacity to benefit from AI through education, infrastructure, and local commercial ecosystems. In some cases, international collaborations (including public-private

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[6]See, e.g., [10; 11; 13; 22; 25; 33; 46]

partnerships) to ***develop frontier AI systems*** that are suited to the needs to underserved communities may also be appropriate.

Inconsistent national regulations could also slow the development and deployment of AI, as developers of powerful AI technology may be unwilling to export to countries with inconsistent or unsuitable technology governance.[7] International efforts to ***set safety norms and standards*** could help coordinate governance in a way that supports innovation and serves a broad set of interests.

Managing Shared Risks

Advanced AI capabilities may also create negative global externalities. AI systems today are already capable of not just progressing drug discovery and development, but also of (re)inventing dangerous chemicals [48] and solving foundational problems in synthetic biology [24]. Scientific capabilities like these could be weaponized by malicious actors for use worldwide. AI may also be used to create potent cyberweapons that can generate code, scan codebases for vulnerabilities, and engineer polymorphic malware in ways that threaten critical infrastructure [38; 41]. Existing AI systems already pose mis- and dis-information issues, and the introduction of more advanced systems is leading malicious actors to explore more sophisticated methods of information warfare.[8] Furthermore, building systems that act as intended in novel circumstances is a challenging problem that may only grow more difficult [3; 20]. As systems get increasingly capable, there will be greater incentives to deploy them in higher stakes domains where accidents could have serious global consequences [5; 9].

Implementing protocols for responsible development and deployment will help address these risks of accident and misuse,[9] on top of measures targeted at specific downstream issues.[10] However, cross-border access to AI products and the cross-border effects of misuse and accidents suggests that national regulation may be ineffective for managing the risks of AI even within states. States will inevitably be impacted by the development of such capabilities in other jurisdictions.

To further the international adoption of safety protocols for advanced models, it would be useful to ***build consensus on risks*** and how they can be mitigated, and ***set safety norms and standards*** and ***support their implementation*** to help developers and regulators with responsible development and use. International efforts to ***conduct or support AI safety research*** may be beneficial, if it can increase the rate of safety progress or the reach of its outputs.

In the longer term, continued algorithmic and hardware progress could make systems capable of causing significant harm accessible to a large number of actors, greatly increasing the governance challenges.[11] In this case, the international community might explore measures like ***controlling AI inputs*** (although the dual-use/general purpose nature of the technology creates significant tradeoffs to doing so) and ***developing and/or enabling safe forms of access to AI***.

The significant geopolitical benefits of AI development may disincline states to adequately regulate AI: arguments about national competitiveness are already raised against AI regulation,[12] and such pressures may strengthen alongside AI progress. We may eventually need international agreements

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[7]In addition to compliance costs, they may be concerned about enabling misuse, or the theft of proprietary information [6].

[8]See, e.g, [7; 17]

[9]Potential protocols include: training methods that restrict the dangerous capabilities and increase the reliability of systems, subjecting AI systems to risk assessments that ascertain their propensity to cause harm before training or deployment, deployment protocols that secure systems against misuse or the exfiltration of its parameters, post-deployment monitoring to identify and respond to unforeseen risks. See [4].

[10]Such as the Digital Services Act for disinformation, and treaties targeting chemical and biological weapons.

[11]According to [14] and [21], the compute costs of training a model of a fixed performance level decreases approximately tenfold every 2 years.

[12]See, e.g., the arguments discussed in [44]

that address these geopolitical risks, with institutions that can ***monitor compliance*** where feasible.[13] Efforts to control AI inputs may be useful to enable non-proliferation of potentially dangerous capabilities and increase the technical feasibility of monitoring. More speculatively, efforts to develop frontier AI collectively or distribute and enable access and its benefits could incentivize participation in a governance regime.

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The institutional functions identified above can be summarized and grouped into the following two broad categories.

I. *Science and technology research, development and diffusion*

- **Conduct or support AI safety research:** Research and develop of measures to reduce the risks of AI misuse and accidents stemming from system characteristics like dangerous capabilities and unreliability/misalignment. This includes work on understanding and evaluating these characteristics and the threats they pose, training methods to reduce and manage risky behaviors, and examining safe deployment protocols appropriate to different system [3; 20].

- **Build consensus on opportunities and risks:** Further international understanding of the opportunities and challenges created by advanced AI and possible strategies for mitigating the risks.

- **Develop frontier AI:** Build cutting-edge AI systems.

- **Distribute and enable access to cutting edge AI:** Facilitate access to cutting-edge systems and increase absorptive capacity through education, infrastructure, and support of the local commercial ecosystem.

II. *International rulemaking and enforcement*

- **Set safety norms and standards:** Establish guidelines and standards around how AI can be developed, deployed and regulated to maximize benefit and minimize risks.

- **Support implementation of standards:** Provide assistance for the implementation of established guidelines and standards.

- **Monitor compliance:** Conduct audits /evaluations and issue certifications / licenses to ensure adherence to international standards and agreements.

- **Control AI inputs:** Manage or monitor models, compute, data and other ingredients of potentially dangerous technologies.

International bodies already perform some of these functions.[14] The OECD's AI Principles and AI Policy Observatory work, the ITU's AI for Good initiative, and expert reports from the Global Partnership on AI's Working Group on Responsible AI are early efforts at building consensus on AI opportunities and risks. Relatedly, the UK's proposed Foundation Model Taskforce [18] and the US's proposed Multilateral AI Research Institute could emerge as multilateral efforts to conduct AI safety research, or potentially even develop frontier AI systems, though both are in exploratory phases.[15]

Alongside lawmaking efforts like the EU's AI Act and the Council of Europe's Convention on AI, Human Rights and Democracy, we have seen early norm and standard setting efforts from

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[13]Monitoring can vary significantly in intrusiveness and effectiveness: while it will be highly difficult to implement adequate monitoring across major geopolitical divides, the safety of advanced systems could be a shared interest of major powers and a regime to address risk factors from smaller-scale geopolitical competition may be feasible.

[14]See [49] for a more thorough overview.

[15]The amount of funding required to stay on the cutting-edge of AI capabilities is significant. See, e.g., [39].

ISO/IEC, but little in the way of implementation support, oversight or certification. In terms of controlling dangerous inputs: computing resources have been targeted by US, Japanese and Dutch export controls that prevent the sale of certain AI chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China [1].

3 International Institutions for Advanced AI

We have outlined several AI governance functions that might be needed at an international level, and shown that only a limited number of these are currently being performed by existing institutions. In this section, we discuss how functional gaps may be filled.

The functions could be split in multiple ways across institutions: drawing on existing international organizations and proposals, we describe four idealized models. We note that the models described in this section describe roles that could be filled by existing or new institutions. Participants in these institutions could include governments, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and academia. Table 1 summarizes the previous analysis and the functions of the institutions we discuss.

Table 1 (repeated): A mapping of international institutional functions, governance objectives and models.

Function → Objective / institutions ↓	Science and Technology Research, Development and Diffusion				International Rulemaking and Enforcement			
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Harmonizing Regulation	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Ensuring Safe Development and Use	Maybe	Yes	Maybe	Maybe	Yes	Yes	Maybe	Maybe
Managing Geopolitical Risk Factors	No	No	Maybe	Maybe	No	No	Yes	Yes

Existing Int'l Institutional Efforts		OECD, GPAI, G7, ITU			ISO/IEC			Semi-conductor Export Controls
Possible Institution	*AI Safety Project*	*Commission on Frontier AI*	*Frontier AI Collaborative*		*Advanced AI Governance Agency*			
Key challenges	Model access; diverting talent	Politicization; scientific challenges	Managing dual-use technology; education, infrastructure and ecosystem obstacles		Incentivizing participation; quickly changing risk landscape; maintaining appropriate scope			

7

3.1 Commission on Frontier AI: Fostering Scientific Consensus

There have been several recent proposals of an intergovernmental body to develop expert consensus on the challenges and opportunities presented by advanced AI.[16] Existing institutions like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) and the Scientific Assessment Panel (SAS), which studies ozone depletion under the Montreal Protocol, provide possible models for an AI-focused scientific institution. Like these organizations, the Commission on Frontier AI could facilitate scientific consensus by convening experts to conduct rigorous and comprehensive assessments of key AI topics, such as interventions to unlock AI's potential for sustainable development, the effects of AI regulation on innovation, the distribution of benefits, and possible dual-use capabilities from advanced systems and how they ought to be managed.

Functions and Motivation

International consensus on the opportunities and risks from advanced AI has the potential to facilitate effective action addressing them, for example, by engendering a shared desire for the development and adoption of effective risk mitigation strategies.

Currently, there is significant disagreement even among experts about the different opportunities and challenges created by advanced AI,[17] and this lack of consensus may worsen over time as the effects of AI systems increase in scale and number, hindering collective action on the scale necessary to ensure that AI is developed for the benefit of all. Furthermore, there are several challenges from advanced AI that may require international action *before* risks materialize, and the lack of a widely accepted account or even mapping of AI development trajectories makes it difficult to take such preparatory actions. Facilitating consensus among an internationally representative group of experts could be a promising first step to expanding our levels of confidence in predicting and responding to technological trends.

Challenges and Risks

Scientific challenges of understanding risks on the horizon: Understanding frontier AI risks and their mitigation is technically challenging. The nature of future AI capabilities and their impact is difficult to predict, especially given the fast rate of progress. To increase chances of success, a Commission should foreground scientific rigor and the selection of highly competent AI experts who work at the cutting edge of technological development and who can continually interpret the ever-changing technological and risk landscape.

Unfortunately, there is a relative lack of existing scientific research on the risks of advanced AI.[18] To address the lack of existing scientific research, a Commission might undertake activities that draw and facilitate greater scientific attention, such as organizing conferences and workshops and publishing research agendas. It may be helpful to write a foundational "Conceptual Framework"— following the example of the IPBES—to create a common language and framework that allows the integration of disparate strands of existing work and paves the way for future efforts [12].

Politicization: A Commission on Frontier AI would benefit from, if not require, a clear buffer between experts charged with developing consensus narratives around the risks and opportunities of AI and policymakers acting on the political and economic interests of their states, which might push policies in different directions. The scientific understanding of the impacts of AI should ideally be seen as a universal good and not be politicized.

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[16]See, e.g., [27; 33].

[17]See, for example, the disagreement around whether advanced AI could pose an extinction risk: [9; 31].

[18]The recent IPCC assessment, for reference, was written by 234 scientists from 66 states and drew on 14,000 scientific papers.

Membership structure can affect a Commission's impartiality and legitimacy: ideally, there would be broad geographic representation in the main decisionmaking bodies, and a predominance of scientific experts in working groups.[19] Unfortunately, given the uncertain and controversial nature of advanced AI risks and opportunities, representation may trade off against a Commission's ability to overcome scientific challenges and generate meaningful consensus.[20] In addition to striking the correct balance in membership, a Commission should carefully scope the subject matter of their research—it may, for example, adopt the IPCC's objective of being "policy-relevant" without being "policy-prescriptive."

Initial Assessment

The objective of a Commission on Frontier AI is worthwhile in most circumstances, but the scientific challenges and potential of politicization imply that a Commission—especially one that aims at broad political representation—may not be able to build scientific consensus effectively. The extraordinary pace of technological change may require more nimble policy responses, such as less institutionalized and politically authoritative scientific advisory panels on advanced AI.

3.2 Advanced AI Governance Organization: Promoting Norms and Standards, Providing Implementation Support, Monitoring Compliance

As discussed above, certain misuse and accident risks of advanced AI systems may pose significant global threats, and international efforts aimed at managing these risks could be worthwhile. An intergovernmental or multi-stakeholder organization could perform a variety of governance functions furthering the regulation of such systems, in particular norm and standard setting, implementation assistance, and perhaps monitoring compliance with governance frameworks.[21]

Functions and motivation

We identify two main objectives for an Advanced AI Governance Organization. How much emphasis it should place on each depends on the challenges it aims to address.

Objective 1: Internationalizing and Harmonizing AI Regulation. Regulatory regimes that set standards and provide implementation support may help ensure that powerful AI capabilities do not pose misuse or accident risks. Standard setting would facilitate widespread international adoption by: 1) reducing the burden on domestic regulators to identify necessary safety regulations and protocols, 2) generating normative pressure for safety protocol adoption, and 3) reducing frictions around the development of international frameworks. Implementation support would assist the establishment and maintenance of regulatory regimes meeting these frameworks. Examples of organizations that perform similar functions include the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

The same functions are useful for harmonizing regulation: international standard setting would reduce cross-border frictions due to differing domestic regulatory regimes. (It is possible that future regulations will limit access to powerful AI technologies in jurisdictions with inadequate AI governance.) Implementation support would help reduce obstacles to countries meeting international standards and therefore enable greater access to advanced AI.

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[19]If legitimacy is the primary concern, the Commission might adopt the IPCC's innovation of writing key documents by consensus, balancing inclusion (states' representatives and scientists review, discuss and approve the report line by line) and scientific rigor (all suggested amendments must be consisted with working group's scientific report that is being summarized) [36].

[20]If it follows the IPCC model, experts will be nominated by member states, but there will not be a robust climate science discipline to buffer against political interests.

[21]See, e.g., [2; 10; 13; 28; 46] for discussions and proposals of an institution of this type.

Objective 2: Monitoring Compliance.   Where states have incentives to undercut each other's regulatory commitments, international institutions may be needed to support and incentivize best practices. That may require monitoring standards compliance. At the least intrusive end of the spectrum is self-reporting of compliance with international standards (as in the Paris Agreement—see proposals for self-reporting/registration of training runs [4]). Organizations like the FATF, ICAO, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) take a somewhat more intrusive approach, monitoring jurisdictions to ensure they adopt best practice regulations, and in some cases checking on the enforcement of domestic regulations embodying international standard. In the case of advanced AI, some observers have asked whether more intrusive forms of international oversight might be necessary, including detection and inspections of large data centers (partly analogous to IAEA safeguards). The more intense and intrusive any monitoring, the more challenging it may be to get to consensus [35; 43].

Challenges and risks

Speed and comprehensiveness in standard setting: One challenge for a Governance Organization is that standard setting (especially in an international and multistakeholder context) tends to be a slow process, while the rapid and unpredictable nature of frontier AI progress may require more rapid international action. A Governance Organization may need to partner with faster-moving expert bodies and expedited standard-setting approaches. The breadth of membership may also represent a trade-off between speed and diversity of perspectives. Broader membership may be important where long-term consensus is important, while urgent risks may need to be addressed at first by smaller groups of frontier AI states, or aligned states with relevant expertise.

Incentivizing participation: The impact of a Governance Organization depends on states adopting its standards and/or agreeing to monitoring. Broad agreement (or agreement among frontier AI states at least) about the risks that standards and monitoring address and financial and technical support for standards' implementation may help induce states' participation. Many states—even those that are not full members of the organization—adopt FATF standards because they view them as in their own interests [45]. Other AI-specific incentives for participation include conditioning on participation access to AI technology (possibly from a Frontier AI Collaborative) or computing resources.[22] States might also adopt import restrictions on AI from countries that are not certified by a Governance Organization—similar, for instance, to the way states prohibit flights from jurisdictions without ICAO-certification from entering their airspace.

In the more distant case of high stakes agreements governing AI development by states (such as arms control treaties), some states may be especially reluctant to join due to fear of clandestine non-compliance by other states. They may also worry that international inspections could compromise state secrets to the benefit of adversaries (which information security protocols could address in part). Again, the current reliance of advanced AI development on significant computing resources may make it easier to track significant AI efforts.[23] Automated (even AI-enabled) monitoring may allow closer inspection of large training runs without compromising secrets. Such measures would likely hinge on negotiated verification regimes rather than national technical means—and negotiating verification is always fraught (e.g., in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention) and often unsuccessful (e.g., in the case of the Biological Weapons Convention)[15; 23].

Scoping challenges: Unlike many other technologies—from nuclear resources to aviation—AI is already broadly deployed and used by billions of people every day. To operate efficiently and at appropriate scale, a Governance Organization should focus primarily on advanced AI systems that pose significant global risks, but it will be difficult in practice to decide on the nature and sophistication of AI tools that should be broadly available and uncontrolled versus the set of systems that

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[22]The cloud compute industry and the underlying semiconductor supply chain are concentrated in a small number of countries.

[23]Oversight of data centers may allow the detection of large training runs that are subject to international controls. See [8; 35].

should be subject to national or international governance. The rapid evolution of these technologies compounds the problem, as the technological frontier is advancing quickly, and models that were "frontier" a year ago are now both outdated and widely available.

Assessment

If advanced AI poses misuse and accident risks of a global scope, and unilateral technical defenses are not sufficient to protect against them, an international Governance Organization may be valuable. However, its effectiveness will depend on its membership, governance and standard-setting processes.

It may be important for governance to apply to all countries, and particularly to those whose firms are on the frontier of AI development. Yet, aligned countries may seek to form governance clubs, as they have in other domains. This facilitates decision-making, but may make it harder to enlist other countries later in the process. It is unclear what institutional processes would satisfy the demands of legitimacy and effectiveness, and incentivize the participation of important groups of stakeholders.

3.3   Frontier AI Collaborative: Enabling International Access to AI

Policymakers and pundits have also proposed collaborations to develop and distribute cutting-edge AI systems, or to ensure such technologies are accessible to a broad international coalition [22; 25; 34; 40]. Given the significant cost of developing advanced AI systems, a Frontier AI Collaborative could take the form of an international private-public partnership that leverages existing technology and capacity in industry, for example by contracting access to or funding innovation in appropriate AI technology from frontier AI developers. Such an organization could draw inspiration from international public-private partnerships like Gavi - the Vaccine Alliance or The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; as well as international organizations that hold and control powerful technologies, like the IAEA's nuclear fuel bank [32] or the Atomic Development Authority that was proposed following WWII [51].

Functions and motivation

A Frontier AI Collaborative could be designed to spread beneficial technology or serve as a channel for legitimate international access to advanced AI.

Spreading beneficial technology: A Collaborative could be established to ensure the benefits of cutting-edge AI reach groups that are otherwise underserved by AI development. One motivation for this objective is that the resources required to develop advanced systems make their development unavailable to many societies. This may result in technologies being inadequately designed for and supplied to groups that may benefit most from them for a variety of reasons:

1. Systems developed by private actors may not adequately cater to all societies or demographics: they may not reflect the right values, have the right language capabilities, or work efficiently in diverse geographies[30].

2. Private firms may not price their products in ways that allow for equitable or broad distribution of benefits.

3. In order to protect proprietary information, private AI firms may not grant deep access to their models (e.g. they may restrict API access to prevent model imitation [42]), which could preclude the development of use cases with significant social benefit.

A Collaborative could acquire or develop and then distribute AI systems to address these gaps, pooling resources from member states and international development programs, working with frontier

AI labs to provide appropriate technology, and partnering with local businesses, NGOs, and beneficiary governments to better understand technological needs and overcome barriers to use.[24] It could enable the development of technology that better caters to the underserved, [30] price access to AI models in a way that is equitable, provide education and build infrastructure to allow the effective utilization of AI technology, and set a paradigm for responsible and inclusive AI development. By pooling the resources of multiple parties towards these ends (including safety talent, which is currently very scarce in the AI community), one or more of the aims could potentially be pursued more quickly and effectively than under the status quo.

Facilitating legitimate international access to powerful AI: More speculatively, a sufficiently ambitious, responsible and legitimately governed AI Collaborative could further AI governance objectives and reduce geopolitical instability amidst fierce AI competition among states. For example, membership in a Collaborative and access to its safe technology could be offered as an incentive for countries to participate in a governance regime that enforces responsibility (such as agreements to enact stricter regulation, or restrict military AI development). The existence of a technologically empowered neutral coalition may also mitigate the destabilizing effects of an AI race between states, by reducing the strategic consequences of one party falling behind or moderating the power concentrated among competing powers.

In addition, the Collaborative's technology could be used to increase global resilience to misused or misaligned AI systems by giving experts a head start in studying the kinds of threats likely to be posed by other AI systems, and by being deployed for "protective" purposes such as fixing security vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, detecting and counteracting disinformation campaigns, identifying misuse or failures of deployed systems, or monitoring compliance with AI regulations. This would be especially useful in scenarios where sharply falling training costs (due to algorithmic progress and Moore's law) means the ability to train dangerous models is widely spread.

Challenges and risks

Obstacles to benefiting from AI access: It is likely to be difficult to meaningfully empower underserved populations with AI technology, as the obstacles to their benefiting from AI run much deeper than access alone. Any Collaborative whose primary objective is global benefit needs to be adequately integrated into the global development ecosystem and set up with significant capacity or partnerships for activities beyond AI development such as: understanding the needs of member countries, building absorptive capacity through education and infrastructure, and supporting the development of a local commercial ecosystem to make use of the technology [29; 47]. The resources required to overcome these obstacles is likely to be substantial, and it is unclear whether such a Collaborative would be an effective means of promoting development.

Diffusion of dual-use technologies: Another challenge for the Collaborative would be managing the risk of diffusing dangerous technologies. On the one hand, in order to fulfill its objectives, the Collaborative would need to significantly promote access to the benefits of advanced AI (objective 1), or put control of cutting-edge AI technology in the hands of a broad coalition (objective 2). On the other hand, it may be difficult to do this without diffusing dangerous AI technologies around the world, if the most powerful AI systems are general purpose, dual-use, and proliferate easily.[25] This is especially the case if the Collaborative aims to deploy cutting-edge general purpose systems to manage AI risks: the kinds of systems (and their underlying source code and algorithms) capable of meaningfully protecting against dangerous AI or furthering governance objectives may pose an exceptional misuse risk, as they will likely be engineered from highly capable, general purpose models.

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[24]For example, Gavi promotes immunization e.g. by funding innovation, and negotiating bulk contracts with pharmaceutical companies (especially advanced market commitments) for vaccination programs in low-income countries [16].

[25]For example: it may be difficult to protect broadly-deployed models from imitation, and it may be difficult to secure the deployment pipeline from attempts to copy model weights.

To address such a challenge, it would be important for the Collaborative to have a clear mandate and purpose. Members of a Collaborative would need to have a strong understanding of the risks of the models being developed now and in the future, and their implications for model distribution, organization security (especially restrictions on the movement of Collaborative model weights), and other activities that may impact their ability to benefit from the Collaborative. Only by doing this would the Collaborative be able to consistently implement the necessary controls to manage frontier systems. It may also be necessary to exclude from participation states who are likely to want to use AI technology in non-peaceful ways, or make participation in a governance regime the precondition for membership.

Assessment

A Frontier AI Collaborative may indeed be a viable way of spreading AI benefits. However, the significant obstacles to societies benefiting from AI access raise questions about its competitiveness (relative to other development initiatives) as a means of promoting the welfare of underserved communities.

The viability of a Collaborative as a site of legitimately controlled technology also unclear: it depends on whether a balance can be struck between legitimately pursuing technologies powerful enough to positively affect international stability, and managing the proliferation of dangerous systems.

3.4 AI Safety Project: Conducting Technical Safety Research

The final model we discuss is an international collaboration to conduct technical AI safety research[26] at an ambitious scale.[27]

Tthe Safety Project would be modeled after large-scale scientific collaborations like ITER and CERN. Concretely, it would be an institution with significant compute, engineering capacity and access to models (obtained via agreements with leading AI developers), and would recruit the world's leading experts in AI, AI safety and other relevant fields to work collaboratively on how to engineer and deploy advanced AI systems such that they are reliable and less able to be misused. CERN and ITER are intergovernmental collaborations; we note that an AI Safety Project need not be, and should be organized to benefit from the AI Safety expertise in civil society and the private sector.

Functions and Motivation

The motivation behind an international Safety Project would be to accelerate AI safety research by increasing its scale, resourcing and coordination, thereby expanding the ways in which AI can be safely deployed, and mitigating risks stemming from powerful general purpose capabilities.[28] Researchers—including those who would not otherwise be working on AI safety—could be drawn by its international stature and enabled by the project's exceptional compute, engineers and model access. The Project would become a vibrant research community that benefits from tighter information flows and a collective focus on AI safety. The Project should also have exceptional leaders and governance structures that ensure its efforts are most effectively targeted at critical questions on the path to safer AI systems.

Because perceptions of AI risk vary around the world, such an effort would likely be spearheaded by frontier risk-conscious actors like the US and UK governments, AGI labs and civil society groups.

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[26]This could include work on understanding and evaluating characteristics of systems such as alignment/reliability and dangerous capabilities, training methods to reduce and manage these characteristics, and deployment protocols (such as system security, monitoring, accident-response) that are appropriate to different system characteristics.

[27]See, e.g., [11; 19]

[28]Being a public good, AI safety may be underfunded by default, which the Safety Project would address as a site of collective contribution.

In the long run, it would be important for membership to be broad to ensure its research is recognized and informs AI development and deployment around the world.[29]

Risks and Challenges

Pulling safety research away from frontier developers: One potential effect of this model is that it diverts safety research away from the sites of frontier AI development. It is possible that safety research is best conducted in close proximity to AI development to deepen safety researchers' understanding of the processes and systems they are trying to make safe and to ensure there is adequate safety expertise in-house. This risk could be addressed by offering safety researchers within AI labs dual appointments or advisory roles in the Project, and may become less of an issue if the *practice* of AI safety becomes institutionalized and separated from research and development.

Security concerns and model access: In order to be effective, participants in the Project need to have access to advanced AI models, which may allow them to illegally copy the model's weights, clone the model via access to its outputs [42], or understand how it could be replicated (by determining its architecture or training process). Given the importance of these assets to the business interests of frontier labs, it may be difficult to negotiate agreements where adequate model access is granted. It may also lead to the diffusion of dangerous technologies.

This issue may be addressed by restricting membership in the Safety Project and by information security measures. In particular, it may be possible to silo information, structure model access, and design internal review processes in such a way that meaningfully reduces this risk while ensuring research results are subject to adequate scientific scrutiny. Certain types of research, such as the development of model evaluations and red-teaming protocols, can proceed effectively with API access to the models, while others such as mechanistic interpretability will require access to the model weights and architectures, but may not need to work with the latest (and therefore most sensitive) models [37].

Assessment

Technical progress on how to increase the reliability of advanced AI systems and protect them from misuse will likely be a priority in AI governance. It remains to be seen whether—due to issues of model access and the allocation of experts between a Safety Project and sites of frontier AI development—an AI Safety Project will be the most effective way of pursuing this goal.

3.5   Combining Institutional Functions

We can imagine institutions taking on the role of several of the models above. For example, the Commission on Frontier AI and the AI Safety Project make an obvious pairing: a Commission could scale up research functions to supplement the synthesis and consensus-building efforts, or a Project could conduct synthesis work in the course of its activities and gradually take on a consensus-establishing role. A Frontier AI Collaborative would also likely conduct safety research, and could easily absorb additional resourcing to become a world-leading Safety Project.

4   Conclusion

This paper has outlined several reasons why the world may want to expand existing initiatives in AI governance and safety and discussed the strengths and limitations of four possible institutional models to address these needs.

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[29]While safety-relevant insights should be publicized for international use, other innovations with commercial value can be collectively owned by or affordably licensed to member states to incentivize broad participation. See, e.g., CERN's approach to this [26].

To better harness advanced AI for global benefit, international efforts to help underserved societies access and use advanced AI systems will be important. A Frontier AI Collaborative that acquires and distributes AI systems could be helpful, if it can effectively enable underserved groups to take full advantage of such systems. A Commission on Frontier AI could help identify the areas where international efforts can most effectively achieve these goals, if it can prevent the politicization of its work. Relatedly, it will be important for governance approaches around the world to be coordinated, so as to reduce frictions to innovation and access: an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards for governance of the most advanced models could facilitate this.

To manage global risks from powerful AI systems, effective AI governance regimes may be needed around the world. An Advanced AI Governance Organization that establishes governance frameworks for managing global threats from advanced systems and helps with their implementation may help internationalize effective regulatory measures, but it may be difficult to establish reliable standards if AI progress continues at the present rate, and also difficult to incentivize adoption of an Organization's standards if there is a lack of global consensus on AI risks. A Commission on Frontier AI could also support governance efforts by building scientific consensus around AI risks and their mitigation, although its task of providing a scientifically credible and internationally recognized account of a quickly changing risk landscape will be challenging, especially given the relative lack of existing scientific research on the topic. An AI Safety Project could accelerate the rate at which technical methods of mitigating AI risks are developed—provided it can overcome its efficiency and model access hurdles, and a Frontier AI Collaborative's technology might be used to increase global resilience to misused or misaligned AI systems. More speculatively, the functions of a Governance Organization and Collaborative could in some cases counteract the geopolitical factors exacerbating AI risks.

The taxonomy of functions we have presented is not exhaustive, nor do we argue that our institutional grouping is the most promising. Given the immense global opportunities and challenges presented by AI systems that may be on the horizon, the topic of international institutions for AI governance demands much greater analytical and practical attention.

Acknowledgements

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From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	RE: Christchurch Call: Briefing paper - Altman call 18 July
Date:	Monday, 17 July 2023 8:08:00 am
Attachments:	image001.png
	Meeting brief - call with Sam Altman - 18 July (updated).docx
Importance:	High

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

We have added one very important point that I overlooked in drafting this paper – an informal invitation to Sam Altman to the Call Leaders' Summit later in the year should OpenAI join the Call. This point has now been added, so please find attached an updated copy of this briefing for the Special Envoy's 8.30am call with Sam tomorrow.

s9(2)(g)(ii)

From: s9(2)(g)(ii)   [DPMC]
Sent: Thursday, 13 July 2023 6:06 pm
To: s9(2)(a)   < s9(2)(a): ADL
Cc: s9(2)(g)(ii)   [DPMC] < s9(2)(a)   ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii)   [DPMC] < s9(2)(g)(ii)
[DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)   [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Christchurch Call: Briefing paper - Altman call 18 July

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora s9(2)(a)

Please find attached a note to support the Special Envoy's call with Sam Altman next Tuesday 18 July at 8.30am.

Mānawatia a Matariki,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

Principal Advisor
Christchurch Call Unit, Policy Advisory Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Mobile s9(2)(a)
Email s9(2)(g)(ii)   dpmc.govt.nz

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	Jacinda Ardern [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	Final briefing to support PM / SE meeting - 20 July
Date:	Tuesday, 18 July 2023 4:19:00 pm
Attachments:	image001.png
	Aide Memoire_Meeting with Special Envoy 20 July.docx

[SEEMAIL][RESTRICTED]

Kia ora Special Envoy,

Please find attached the final version of the briefing that went in the PM's bag this afternoon.

s9(2)(g)(ii)

From: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Sent: Tuesday, 18 July 2023 1:01 pm
To: Jacinda Ardern [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)   s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
< s9(2)(a)
Cc: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(a)   s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
s9(2)(a)
Subject: For review: briefing to support PM / SE meeting

Hi Special Envoy and s9(2)(g)(ii)

Please find attached the briefing, with MFAT input, to support the Special Envoy's meeting with the Prime Minister on Thursday. We are aiming to get this into today's bag, which closes at 4pm, so I apologise for the tight turnaround for your review.

s9(2)(g)(ii)   and I are on standby to discuss as needed.

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Principal Advisor
Christchurch Call Unit, Policy Advisory Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Mobile s9(2)(a)
Email s9(2)(g)(ii)   dpmc.govt.nz

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

Aide-Mémoire

CHRISTCHURCH CALL: MEETING WITH SPECIAL ENVOY, 20 JULY

To:	Rt Hon Chris Hipkins, Prime Minister		
From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) Christchurch Call Coordinator	**Date:**	18/07/2023
Briefing Number:	DPMC-4769516	**Security Level:**	IN-CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. This aide-mémoire provides an annotated agenda and background information for your meeting with the Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call on Thursday 20 July at 4pm. DPMC (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet) and MFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade) officials will also attend.

2. The Special Envoy and officials propose discussing the Christchurch Call Leaders' Summit in September, the future direction and scope of the Christchurch Call, and the Special Envoy's work programme whilst based in the US from August to November.

3. Attachments:

    A: Annotated Agenda

    B: Call Leaders' Summit 2023 outline

Background

A Christchurch Call Leaders' Summit is fast approaching

4. The Special Envoy and officials propose to hold a Call Leaders' Summit during the United Nations High Level Week, likely on Wednesday 20 September, convened by President Macron and Special Envoy Ardern (though, the President's attendance at High Level Week and Summit involvement is not confirmed). An outline of the Summit is at <u>Attachment B.</u> Subject to your feedback and approval, the Special Envoy and officials will work with France to deliver a Summit in accordance with this outline.

5. We propose a Summit focused on delivering the Call Commitments, through the agreed work streams and the priority actions Leaders set at last year's Summit. As such, a 2023 Summit will include priorities for:

    - the next phase of the Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes (CCIAO);

    - a crisis response mechanism for small firms;

Aide Mémoire: Christchurch Call: Meeting with Special Envoy	DPMC-4769516

- announcing an expanded Call Community (including artificial intelligence companies);

- showcasing research into gender-based hate and terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC);

- determining how we can support the adoption of new technologies (including generative artificial intelligence (gen AI)) whilst managing their impacts on TVEC; and

- reporting on how the Call's multistakeholder model can be drawn upon by other initiatives.

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

Aide Mémoire: Christchurch Call: Meeting with Special Envoy	DPMC-4769516

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

The Special Envoy could take this Call work forward during her time at Harvard

10. The Special Envoy will be US-based while at Harvard from August to November. During this time, the Special Envoy will continue Christchurch Call work, including on CCIAO governance and new tech (e.g. gen AI) and TVEC, through her Tech Governance Leadership Fellowship with Harvard's Berkman Klein Center. As the Special Envoy will also undertake work at Harvard separate to the Call, Thursday's meeting is an opportunity to discuss the Special Envoy's Call work in relation to her Harvard Fellowships work.

11. Given the significant interest in the Call during her recent visit, s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

12. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

    this may include in her capacity as your Special Envoy or in her Harvard Fellow capacity.

13. Further to Thursday's discussion, we suggest scheduling another call with the Special Envoy in five to six weeks to reassess s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

[Not in Scope]

Recommendations

15. It is recommended that you:

- **Note** the contents of this aide-memoire ahead of your discussion with the Special Envoy.

- **Note** s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

    and the Special Envoy's Call work in relation to her Harvard fellowships.

Aide Mémoire: Christchurch Call: Meeting with Special Envoy	DPMC-4769516

- **Note** officials are available to discuss these issues, should you wish.

s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii) **Christchurch Call Coordinator**	**Rt Hon Chris Hipkins** **Prime Minister**
18 / 07 / 2023	/ 07 / 2023

Attachments:	
Attachment A:	Annotated Agenda
Attachment B:	Call Leaders' Summit 2023 – concept note

Contact for telephone discussion			
Name	*Position*	*Telephone*	*1st contact*
s9(2)(g) (ii)	Christchurch Call and Cyber Coordinator	s9(2)(a)	✓

Aide Mémoire: Christchurch Call: Meeting with Special Envoy	**DPMC-4769516**

Attachment A: Annotated agenda

Agenda item	Decision or action point
1. Christchurch Call Leaders' Summit 2023	Feedback on Summit concept note A clear mandate on Summit scope, policy deliverables, invitations to Call Leaders, and expected reporting throughout Summit preparations
s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)	
3. Special Envoy's US-based work programme	s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j) discuss the Special Envoy's Call work in relation to her Harvard Fellowships Determine the need for a follow-up call for item #2 and #3 once the Special Envoy is established in the US

Attachment B: Summit 2023 outline

- The 2022 Summit was a success in that it combined a comprehensive, inclusive process for multistakeholder input with opportunities to communicate individually and together about objectives and achievement. The format allowed for free-flowing conversation among Leaders representing all parts of the Community.

- In 2023 we will be looking to continue with that free-flowing format, with Special Envoy Ardern and President Macron inviting Leaders from the Call Community and co-hosting a Summit during United Nations High Level Week in September.

- The feedback on the 2022 Summit has been very positive. One key area of improvement would be around having a more manageable agenda, and therefore carefully considering the issues we put in front of Leaders for conversation, as distinct from those officials can pre-bake for noting as part of the Summit communications package.

- In our consultations thus far, Leaders have been focussed on the question of how new powerful Artificial Intelligence models will affect our work. There are great opportunities and risks, in which all sectors have an interest. This will no doubt be a focal point.

- Key outputs to be announced at the Summit could include:
  - Next steps under the Christchurch Call Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes, s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)
  - Measures to assist small firms with eliminating TVEC and responding to crisis incidents
  - Improved evidence base on gender-based hatred and radicalisation to violence
  - Progress on the Community including a new platform, and additional online service providers, partner organisations and civil society advisory network members. This could also include e.g. work on assembling a survivor network, and mechanism for engagement with, and input from young people.
  - Progress on government transparency, incident response, positive intervention, and advice on how the Call should respond to technological developments in the sector.

- The Call Summit remains a Leader-level event and will engage top-tier (C-level) executives from industry and civil society, and Heads of State and Government. We are looking to United Nations High Level Week in New York as the best opportunity to assemble a quorum of such Leaders.

- For Leaders thinking to participate this is a nearly unique opportunity on the international agenda to sit down and have a proper conversation with Leaders from tech and civil society, as well as other Heads of State and Government.

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	Jacinda Ardern [DPMC]
Cc:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]
Subject:	Briefing note - US Second Gentleman - 21 July
Date:	Wednesday, 19 July 2023 10:33:00 am
Attachments:	image001.png
	Event brief - roundtable with Second Gentleman - 21 July 2023.docx

~~[IN CONFIDENCE]~~

Kia ora Special Envoy,

Please find attached a briefing note for the meeting and roundtable with the US Second Gentleman on Friday.

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Principal Advisor
Christchurch Call Unit, Policy Advisory Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Mobile s9(2)(a)
Email s9(2)(g)(ii)   dpmc.govt.nz

DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND **CABINET**
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

EVENT BRIEF

ROUNDTABLE WITH THE US SECOND GENTLEMAN, DOUGLAS EMHOFF, 21 JULY

To	Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call	**Prepared by**	s9(2)(g)(ii) s9(2)(g)(ii) s9(2)(g)(ii) s9(2)(g)(ii)
From	s9(2)(g)(ii)	**Date**	17/07/2023

Overview

- You are meeting and then hosting a community roundtable with Mr. Douglas Emhoff, the Second Gentleman of the United States (US), on Friday 21 July 2023 from 12.45pm to 2.00pm at the Auckland Policy Office. The Prime Minister is scheduled to meet with Mr. Emhoff on Thursday evening.

- The Second Gentleman works on the Biden-Harris Administration's inclusion and social cohesion priorities with a focus on empowering Jewish, interfaith, women's and LGBTQIA+ communities. The roundtable will cover these priorities, in relation to the Call and TVEC, with representatives from these communities. Media will be present for short opening statements.

- This note provides background on the US's and Second Gentleman's work; a roundtable runsheet, including opening remarks and discussion questions; and biographies.

- s6(a)

Event runsheet and remarks

Meeting with the Second Gentleman at 12.45pm

- You will have 15 – 20 minutes to meet one-on-one with the Second Gentleman prior to the roundtable.

- We suggest using this time to:
  - Thank the Second Gentleman for his personal work on social inclusion, tolerance and anti-hate
  - Thank the Second Gentleman for US work in the Call, including on the CCIAO, and US leadership on gender issues

  s9(2)(j)

  - This is a unique opportunity for a substantive and action-oriented discussion between a small group of Leaders in tech and civil society and heads of state and

government from advanced liberal democracies on how we collectively uphold our values in the context of advanced digital technologies.

- o Note the Summit will be an opportunity to announce next steps on the Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes, improving evidence on gender-based hate online and TVEC, increasing our Call Community, developing a crisis response tool for small platforms, and how the Call should respond to new tech, including gen AI.
- o Note the roundtable discussion today will feed directly into our policy preparation for the Summit and we hope it will also feed into the Second Gentleman's work in the US

Roundtable with community representatives at about 1.00pm

1.00pm – Join at roundtable, brief chance to meet attendees, photo opportunity for media

1.03pm – Opening remarks – Special Envoy remarks; media present

Opening remarks

Second Gentleman, tēnā koe

Community leaders from across Aotearoa New Zealand, tēnā koutou tēnā tatou katoa

Nau mai, haere mai ki a koutou katoa

Second Gentleman, it is a pleasure to welcome you to Aotearoa New Zealand and this roundtable today with leaders from across the New Zealand community.

Surrounded by brilliant, thoughtful, and kind New Zealanders, we have a very rich discussion ahead of us on ways we can build resilient, inclusive, cohesive democracies.

These are dearly held values for our two nations, and they are also priorities for practical, concerted action for both our Governments.

Second Gentleman, I know you champion efforts in the United States and internationally to ensure generation, gender and faith do not divide us; that instead, our diverse communities are celebrated and become a source of strengthen and unity for our democracies.

Inevitably this means confronting hate in all its forms, including online, to ensure it does not give way to further violence.

Of course, the United States and New Zealand work closely together through the Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online, where we as Governments have committed to counter the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism by strengthening the resilience and inclusiveness of our societies. We have prioritised addressing issues of violent extremism that affect youth, women and LGBTQIA+ communities. We are particularly pleased to collaborate with the US through the Summit for Democracy and the Global Partnership for Action on Gender Based Online Harassment and Abuse.

Given how closely we already work together, it is wonderful to host you in person, Second Gentleman, and it is a particular delight to be joined by leaders, some of whom are longstanding friends, from across the New Zealand community; I am looking forward to our discussion today.

1.05pm – Opening remarks – Second Gentleman remarks; media present

1.07pm – Media to leave

1.08pm – Informal welcome to attendees and short round of introductions

1.09pm – Segue to discussion questions, focusing on free-flowing conversation and hearing from attendees

Discussion questions to pitch to the attendees for their views…

- Gender-based online harm and radicalisation: As well as a harm in its own right, gender-based hate is common across extremist ideologies. The Call Community is working to understand its role as a radicalising factor, and design interventions. How is gender-based hate presenting online? What actions could we – platforms, civil society, governments - take to disrupt this form of hate and the way it radicalises people?

- Promoting social cohesion: In the Christchurch Call Community, we recognise the role of polarisation in driving radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism. How can we counter social divisions and promote inclusive, cohesive societies?

- Building tolerance for future generations: Young people are particularly vulnerable to becoming radicalised as a result of exclusion and isolation. What can we do to build tolerance and resilience among younger generations?

1.55pm – Conclude discussion

Background

s9(2)(g)(i)

The US has released a series of national strategies on social inclusion issues…

6. The Biden-Harris Administration focus on social inclusion prioritises equity and protections for minorities. The Administration has released a series of strategies that take a whole-of-society approach to social inclusion for vulnerable groups, including addressing online harm and hate-based extremism.

7. The **National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality** (Oct 2021) is part of the Administration's post-COVID 'build-back better' efforts following the exacerbation of gender and intersectional inequity during COVID-19. It prioritises marginalised groups of women, girls and LGBTQIA+ people, and links their status with the health of economies, democracies and societies. This strategy covers all sectors and core rights, including economic security. reproductive healthcare, education access ,, , immigration justice, gender equality in security and humanitarian relief, and gender considerations in climate change mitigation. Gender equality in security focuses on the absence of gender consideration in TVEC: "Strategies to prevent terrorism overlook the role of women as perpetrators, mitigators, and victims, even as extremist groups recruit women and benefit from their subjugation across the globe, and despite the link between misogyny and domestic extremism." The US was a driver of including the link between misogyny and LGTBQIA+ hate and violent extremism in last year's Leaders' Summit.

8. The national strategy required the update of a **Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally** (Dec 2022), which makes global gender-based human rights a US national security, diplomatic, and foreign assistance priority; gender-based polarisation and violence are threats to democracy including by shrinking space for women's and LGBTQIA+ people's civic participation. The update focuses on newer gender-based violence challenges, such as the shadow-pandemic of gender-based violence during COVID-19, the role of technology in gender-based violence, and gender-based violence faced by LGBTQIA+ communities. The Strategy requires US foreign engagement to be driven on the understanding of a connection between online misogyny, gendered disinformation, and violent extremism and that violent extremist organisations use gender-based violence.

9. The **Strategy to Counter Antisemitism** (May 2023), a response to the rise of antisemitic hate in the US, outlines the links with antisemitism with other forms of hate directed towards minorities, particularly driven by white supremacy (as the greatest current domestic terrorist threat to the US). The strategy focuses on awareness raising and education campaigns, including online, of antisemitism and discrimination, improving the safety of Jewish communities, and building interfaith solidarity. The strategy includes Executive branch actions delegated to specific agencies (e.g. a cyber agency will offer risk and planning tools for Jewish communities with regard to possible attacks); calls to Congress; and whole-of-society calls to action, including a call on online service providers to explicitly cover antisemitism in their community standards and adopt a zero tolerance for hate speech, improve de-ranking capabilities, and increase transparency of their algorithmic recommendation systems and data.

10. The Administration's **New Actions to Protect LGBTQI+ Communities** (June 2023) protect LGBTQI+ communities' rights and safety, strengthen mental health support for LGBTQI+ youth, and counter the incursion on LGBTQI+ communities' rights due to book bans. Government agencies will provide training and support to help LGBTQI+ organisations stay across the threat landscape, including online violence indicators, and respond. Agencies will also work with communities on hate crime reporting, though this action does not explicitly account for reporting of online harms.

11. In addition to these strategies, the US leads, with Denmark, the **Global Partnership for Action on Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse**, which New Zealand joined during your visit as Prime Minister to the US in May 2022. s6(a)

increasing targeted programming and resources to prevent online

gender-based violence in partner countries (Australia is mapping and assessing effective intervention programmes); and expand reliable, comparable data on online gender-based violence (the UK delivered an evidence landscape analysis). 2023 thematic priorities include closing the gender digital divide; and countering gendered disinformation, and elevating youth voices.

The Christchurch Call Commitments and priorities align closely with the Second Gentleman's work

- The Second Gentleman's interest in social cohesion aligns with the Christchurch Call Community's focus on addressing the social drivers of terrorism and violent extremism; the first Christchurch Call Commitment recognises the role of social division and inequality in driving terrorism and violent extremism. This commits Government Supporters to counter the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism by strengthening resilience and inclusiveness in our societies, including through education and media literacy to counter terrorist and violent extremist narratives. Much of the Second Gentleman's work includes building awareness and literacy across the US about gender equality and Jewish culture especially, to break down misinformed views and resulting animosity.

- The Christchurch Call is squarely focused on countering terrorist and violent extremist content rather than other forms of online harm. However, given the Call's interest in preventing radicalisation through social inclusion, we do have an interest in addressing the harms of radicalising content, including that which seeks to drive social division. The importance of understanding and preventing radicalisation was noted at the 2022 Leaders' Summit, with a direction to prioritise understanding the role of gender-based hate in radicalisation to TVEC and the unique vulnerabilities of youth to radicalisation including by safely engaging with youth on their online experiences.

Biographies

| **Douglas (Doug) Emhoff**	
	- Experienced lawyer, most recently a partner at the firm DLA Piper, stepping down in 2020 - Distinguished visitor and fellow at Georgetown University Law Center and Georgetown Institute for Technology Law & Policy, respectively - Particularly active on gender issues, including internationally. He has met with ministers responding for gender equality in both Japan and France and has hosted roundtable discussions with women and young girls around the world to discuss the importance of equity in the workplace, equal pay, protecting reproductive rights and health care, and access to justice. - He is also Jewish and regularly engages with Jewish and interfaith communities

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i)

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i)

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i)

IN CONFIDENCE

From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Subject:	RE: Invitation for Prime Minister Ardern [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date:	Wednesday, 19 July 2023 10:49:00 am

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)

|	
From:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(a)
Cc:	@DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject:	Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 19 July 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 19 July 2023 2:56:00 pm
Attachments:	1. Engagements tracker.docx
	2. Stanford discussion read out.docx
	3. Presentation - William Baldet MBE - SITs^J Permissive Environments and Siege Psychology.pptx
	4. Will Baldet presentation - additional notes and bio.docx

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Hi s9(2)(a)

Please find below (and with some attachments) this week's Christchurch Call round-up.

There are a couple of items there for you and I to liaise on – arranging a meeting with the He Whenua Taurikura co-directors and arranging a meeting with Andrew Sullivan. Andrew is working with his team to prepare for the meeting and has asked that we schedule the meeting once he's confidently prepared, so it's really the He Whenua Taurikura co-directors meeting to scheduled. Do you have a few available time options I can provide them? It's not hugely time sensitive, so entirely up to you and the Special Envoy's diary.

Attachment / item	CCU comment	SE comment
ENGAGEMENTS		
1. Engagements tracker	For **review and feedback** Please note a follow up question from s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i) in the 'active / upcoming engagements' section. Please also note, update included on previous request from s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i) in the 'active / upcoming engagements' section.	
Event brief for meeting and roundtable with US Second Gentleman, Fri 21 July	Sent to Special Envoy's DPMC address	
FOLLOW UP ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS UPDATES / CATCH-UP CONVERSATIONS		
2. Stanford discussion read out See here for how it will appear: Special Envoy Jacinda Ardern Assembles Stanford Scholars for Discussion on Technology Governance and Regulation	For **review and sign-off** CCU reviewed – looks excellent. CCU will provide edits regarding grammar, titles, capitalisation etc.	

[Not in Scope]

SUMMIT PREPARATION		
Briefing for meeting with PM, Thurs 20 July	Sent to Special Envoy's DPMC address	
BRIEFINGS / READING		
3. Presentation by Will Baldet MBE (Fellow at ISD and advisor to UK Govt): "Self-Initiated Terrorism: Permissive Environments and Siege Psychology" 4. Baldet presentation – additional notes	Presentation to NZ Govt, coordinated by DIA, last week.	

FYI: ACTIONS FOR CCU TO FOLLOW UP WITH s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(ba)(i)

Special Envoy: managing external engagements

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2. Request centralised
    Forward all requests to s9(2)(g)(ii) copying s9(2)(g)(ii) and s9(2)(g)(ii)

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    s9(2)(g)(ii) will log request in tracker and assign to suitable CCU member; both to undertake preliminary assessment, including s9(2)(a) for an availability assessment

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    s9(2)(g)(ii) o review the tracker every Wednesday midday

5. New requests provided to the Special Envoy by close of business every Wednesday

6. Tracker with Special Envoy decisions and comments returned

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    s9(2)(g)(ii) to respond to requestors, commission required briefing/speeches from CCU, make logistical arrangements th s9(2)(a)
    Separate internal commissioning process and timeline for confirmed engagements

8. Request moved to 'Active engagement tracker' or 'Closed requests' tracker

Tracker: Engagement requests - Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call

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Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests

Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 24 pages withheld under same grounds]

Self-Initiated Terrorists & the Role of Permissive Environments

Understanding Non-Violent 'Extremisms': Online Research and Responses in Post-Pandemic Times

28th June 2023

William Baldet MBE

Self-Initiated Terrorism (S-IT)

A Self-Initiated Terrorist is defined as "Person(s) who threaten or mobilise to violence (as defined in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000) without material support or personal direction from a terrorist organisation; but who may still be influenced or encouraged by the rhetoric or ideology of a group". Self-Initiated Terrorists have previously been referred to as 'lone actors'.

Self-Initiated Terrorism currently constitutes the most significant terrorist threat to the United Kingdom.

A Self-Initiated Terrorism attack in the UK is most likely to be of low-complexity and low-sophistication methodology; this could include using bladed weapons or a vehicle

Publicly accessible locations and religious institutions are the most likely targets for a Self-Initiated Terrorism attack.

Some Self-Initiated Terrorists are also likely to view authority figures as legitimate targets, such as the Police or representatives of government.

Access to extremist material online is one of the key drivers for Self-Initiated Terrorist self-radicalisation. It is easily accessed by individuals, irrelevant of their ideology.

"Today's threat is dominated by increasingly fragmented ideologies, self-initiated terrorism, and the reach of hateful online ideologies into the lives of the young people."

Matt Jukes, Head of Counter UK Terrorism Policing
October 2022

Self-Initiated Terrorists (S-ITs)

Khalid Masood – Westminster Bridge, 2017
Islamist Terrorism

Criminal background, links to ALM affiliates

Religious zealotry – told his children he
believed he was going to die fighting for God

Thomas Mair – Birstall, 2016
Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism

Books on improvised munitions and
explosives after David Copeland's attacks

Fixation with Nazism for 30+ years.

Darren Osborne – Finsbury Park, 2017
Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism

History of alcoholism, fixation on grievances
and injustice, them and us mindset

Explored cultural nationalist ideology

Sudesh Amman – Streatham, 2020
Islamist Terrorism

Previous TACT convictions, possession +
dissemination

Pledge of allegiance to ISIS in prison cell

Permissive Environments

Ideologies do not exist in a vacuum. There are 'ecosystems' – offline and online - which sustain ideologies and grievances and create environments conducive for them to incubate and flourish.

Noemie Bouhana:

- To acquire a propensity for terrorism, people have to become **exposed to terrorist-supportive moral contexts**.
- For them to be exposed, settings with terrorism-supportive moral contexts have to be **present in their environment**,
- and they have to come into **regular contact** with these settings.
- For radicalisation to result from exposure, individuals have to be **sensitive to the influence** of the terrorism-supportive features of the settings they come into regular contact with (vulnerability to moral change).

- Other individuals who may not display the same acute susceptibility characteristics may still 'drop' once toxicity reaches higher levels; in other words, **even individuals who are not highly susceptible to moral change can radicalise if they experience sustained, persistent and effective** (in terms of socialisation) **exposure**

"ISIS didn't radicalise, they recruited."

Criminologist Simon Cottee found that the vast majority of Trinidadian ISIS recruits were not 'targeted' for radicalisation so much as 'socialised' by the permissive environment that was present there. There was no radicalisation process as we would conventionally define it, but a socialisation – sometimes from childhood – by an environment that not only perpetuated, but <u>failed to challenge</u>, the Salafi-Jihadi worldview.

(Black Flags of the Caribbean, 2021)

Siege Psychology

Radicalisation is both a social and emotional process

One role of 'non-violent extremist groups' is to socialise their target audience to the extremist worldview, establishing a sense of belonging within this in-group and a collective sense of victimhood from an unjust society.

This 'siege mentality' implies not just that an in-group has opponents, but that society as a whole is irredeemably hostile to the group. It instils a sense of apocalyptic fear that not only requires a way of life to be defended but implicitly justifies or equivocates over the use of violence.

Research by Cambridge University (*IC Thinking*) noted that even the *perception* of being under siege will engage the same emotional responses in the human brain as immediate physical danger; it shifts our thinking from the cognitive complexity of the problem-solving, frontal cortex to the highly emotive and reactionary limbic system. **A good argument will always lose out to a strong emotion.**

Siege narratives and conspiracies promulgated by non-violent extremist groups encourage this **cognitive simplicity** and therefore a **receptiveness to radicalisation**.

They fuel conspiratorial thinking and sustain the heightened sense of 'siege' amongst their target audiences. They present an existential threat to the in-group and a distrust in statutory institutions, then offer their extremist narrative as the solution to the problems and grievances they have instilled, and a way for people to make sense of the unjust world they now inhabit

Social media is the perfect incubator for these narratives – a system that encourages and rewards conflict, and keeps its consumers locked in an emotive, adversarial mindset. Perpetually under siege and exposed to the worst excesses of your 'enemies'.

Will Baldet presentation - Self-Initiated Terrorism: Permissive Environments and Siege Psychology additional notes + bio

Long-term resilience
- Young people are being drawn into tribalism, supercharged by social media. They need the skills to resist that tribalism and the abilities to enter discussions / disputes from multiple perspectives is a core skill they can gain in early life. It's obviously not a quick fix but starts the journey now for results in the future.
- Jonathan Haidt does some ambitious thinking in this space, with an acute focus on young people and social media.
- The IC Thinking programme has yielded significant results – definitely worth exploring for more tailored, small group interventions.

Localised Challenges
- Regardless of the online footprint, non-violent extremist actors still have geographic hotspots; law enforcement and intelligence agencies can map these.
- Small, local panels in each city made up of vetted municipality officers, CT police, local police and – if feasible – intelligence agency representation can hold honest discussions on local actors, areas of concern and problematic venues / institutions and collaborate on their respective 'toolkits' for disrupting them. Imagination is key – if you can't target extremist activity explicitly, then deploy any and all tools (think Al Capone) at the disposal of the assembled partners.
    - I can perhaps arrange a talk in the future from a local municipality who have perfected this – but it takes local willingness and collaboration, something we haven't been able to replicate on a large scale because of institutional tensions in some areas of the country.
- Having all these stakeholders represented allows for deconfliction (to avoid interference in investigations) but also to act collaboratively, deploying different tactics to disrupt.
- Influential civil society actors can be encouraged to work within communities to help undermine the core extremist narratives (not with 'counter' narratives, but with compelling, positive alternative narratives) and to work on interventions with susceptible individuals.
- But this requires seeking out trusted, influential community leaders – and they're usually not the ones who are first in the funding queue with 'community leader' emblazoned on a t-shirt!
- Civil society is the softer end of the options, but they can be adept over time through a persistent undermining of the core extremist narratives of legitimising violence, dehumanising of groups and the conspiratorial, binary thinking.

Will Baldet bio
- Fellow at Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), a CCAN member. Also serves as a Regional CVE Coordinator in the UK and a Senior Advisor to the UK Government's 'Prevent' strategy.
- Countering Violent Extremism practitioner since 2008, working in both policing and policy. In 2020 he received an MBE for his counter terrorism work as a Prevent Coordinator protecting communities in the UK. In this role, developed and managed projects to empower civil society responses to radicalisation with a particular focus on youth, women and education.
- Consulted for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and is a member of the EU-funded Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Europe.
- Has supported Governments with the development of their national CVE programmes, including the Netherlands, Malta and Kazakhstan.

From:	s9(2)(a)
To:	s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	Re: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 19 July 2023
Date:	Wednesday, 19 July 2023 4:04:44 pm
Attachments:	1. Engagements tracker.docx

Here you go.

The first week of August looks reasonably good at this point so if you want to look at scheduling those two meeting that week - that could work.

To date no comments re Japan.

s9(2)(a)

EA to the Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern

Special Envoy to the Christchurch Call
www.christchurchcall.com

s9(2)(a)

P O Box 90947, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142

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Considerations for CCU comment and priority evaluation:

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests								
Propose d date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 24 pages withheld under same grounds]

From:	Jacinda Ardern [DPMC]
To:	s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:	RE: FORMAL MESSAGE: US TO ANNOUNCE NEW AI COMMITMENTS ON 21 JULY RESTRICTED
Date:	Friday, 21 July 2023 11:03:20 am

Thanks ^{s9(2)(g)(ii)} A really interesting read out.

In your follow up conversations, I would be interested to hear s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

I see they have an expectation that companies establish these mechanisms – it would be a lost opportunity if we couldn't impart some of what we have learned in this space.

From: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] < s9(2)(a)
Sent: Friday, 21 July 2023 8:58 am
To: Jacinda Ardern [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: FW: FORMAL MESSAGE: US TO ANNOUNCE NEW AI COMMITMENTS ON 21 JULY RESTRICTED
Importance: High

To see, ahead of today's meeting.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

s6(a)

From: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
To: s9(2)(a)
Cc: @DPMC Chch Call Unit [DPMC]; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ; ^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii) ;
^MFAT: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Christchurch Call: Weekly round-up - 26 July 2023
Date: Wednesday, 26 July 2023 5:47:00 pm
Attachments: 6. Note on IGF logistics.docx
FW Confidential Preview Frontier Model Forum.msg
FW Request for Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern.msg
1. Engagements tracker.docx
3. Schmidt Futures - follow-up note.docx
4. CCU work plan.pdf

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Hi s9(2)(a)

Please find below and with attachments this week's Christchurch Call round-up.

Attachment	CCU comment	SE comment
ENGAGEMENTS		
1. Engagements tracker	For **review and feedback**	
2. FW_ Request for Rt Hon Dame Jacinda Ardern s9(2)(ba)(i)	Request referenced in tracker, but included in full as attachment to this email for your **consideration and feedback**	
FOLLOW UP ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS UPDATES		
3. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j) follow-up note drafted by s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j) for our consideration and discussion with you.	For **review and discussion**	
BRIEFINGS / READING		
4. CCU work plan	For **information and feedback if any** • CCU's work plan, which is updated monthly. • Please note: this is the current draft. We have had a number of workstream lead changes recently s9(2)(a) so some parts are not updated this month. Slides 25 - 27 are the main change from previous work plans, giving a first view of what post-Summit plans might look like.	

5. [Confidential Preview] Frontier Model Forum	For **information** Email from Anthropic on announcement this week of an industry body for safe and responsible AI systems. s9(2)(g)(ii) has reached back to s9(2)(a) and the Anthropic team for further information.	
IGF PREPARATION		
6. Note on IGF logistics	For **review and feedback**	
CORRESPONDENCE		
None		
FYI: COMING UP		
Zoom call with He Whenua Taurikura co-directors, Mon 31 July 10am	Co-directors will provide a short note ahead of the meeting	
Call with s9(2)(a) and CCU on BKC work programme	s9(2)(a) scheduling for week of 31 July CCU to draft Harvard 'to do' ideas for consideration and discussion	
Briefing note on Summit comms plan and options	CCU currently drafting	
FYI: ACTIONS FOR CCU TO FOLLOW UP WITH s9(2)(a)		
Schedule meetings with: s9(2)(a)	CCU liaising with s9(2)(a) to find suitable times	

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s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

New requests

Proposed date	Requestor / organiser	Type	Request	CCU: comment	Priority	Special Envoy: decision	Special Envoy: comment	CCU assignee
Christchurch Call Unit requests/suggestions – proactive outreach programme								

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [Remainder of table in the following 26 pages withheld under same grounds]

From:	s9(2) [DPMC]
To:	(g)(ii) h Call JV
Subject:	FW: [Confidential Preview] Frontier Model Forum
Date:	Monday, 24 July 2023 8:26:59 am
Attachments:	image001.png

[UNCLASSIFIED]

s9(2)(g)(i)

s9(2)(g)(ii)

Prime Minister's Special Representative on Cyber and Digital
Christchurch Call and Cyber Coordinator

Policy Advisory Group/National Security Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Phone: s9(2)(a)
Email: s9(2)(a)
Web: www.christchurchcall.com

From: Michael Sellitto <michael@anthropic.com>
Sent: Monday, 24 July 2023 5:44 am
To: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] <s9(2)(a)
Cc: s9(2)(a), s9(2)(ba)(i)
Subject: [Confidential Preview] Frontier Model Forum

Dear s9(2)(g)(ii)

Governments and industry agree that AI offers tremendous promise to improve the world, while
appropriate guardrails are required to mitigate harms. The US and UK governments, the
European Union, the OECD, the G7 (through the Hiroshima AI Process), and others are making
important contributions to this work. To build on these efforts, we need further work on safety
standards and evaluations to ensure advanced AI systems are developed and deployed
responsibly.

We are confidentially sharing with you, a trusted stakeholder, that this week Anthropic, Google,
Microsoft, and OpenAI will announce the formation of the Frontier Model Forum, an industry
body focused on ensuring safe and responsible development of advanced AI systems. The Forum
defines AI frontier models as large-scale machine-learning models that exceed the capabilities
currently present in the most advanced existing models, and aims to help (i) promote

responsible development of frontier models and minimize potential misuse cases, (ii) identify safety best practices for frontier models, and (iii) share knowledge with policymakers, academics, civil society and others to advance responsible AI development. Over the coming months, the FMF will establish an Advisory Board to help guide its strategy and priorities. The FMF will have opportunities for governments, civil society, academia, international organizations - and of course additional labs that meet the criteria - to join this effort and collaborate on ensuring safe and responsible development of frontier AI systems.

We would be happy to discuss live in the next few days if you have any questions or feedback. We look forward to continuing our engagement with you, with governments, and with civil society as our work progresses.

Best,

Michael

Michael Sellitto
Interim Head of Policy and Societal Impacts
Anthropic

<u>Follow Up Items</u>

In early June, [s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)] met with Jacinda Ardern, former Prime Minister of New Zealand. She currently serves as the Prime Minister of New Zealand's Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call and remains a global thought leader on social media regulation, AI governance, and online harms issues.

1. **[Christchurch Call](#)** – The Christchurch Call is a community of over 120 governments, online service providers, and civil society organizations acting together to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. [s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)]

   [s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)]

2. **AI Governance** – Both Special Envoy Ardern and [s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)] have written and spoken publicly about the importance of AI governance and the best approaches to it. [s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)]

   [s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)]

3. **Tools and prosocial interventions for Platforms/companies** – There are opportunities to develop more/better quality tools for small and mid-sized platforms.

Building off GIFCT and Tech Against Terrorism's work is a good starting place. The NZ government is supporting various promising efforts and there is potential interest from leading corporate players ranging from Microsoft to Cinder to CSET, etc. Likewise, there are opportunities to focus on a new generation of prosocial interventions leveraging CCIAO insights. These positive "nudges" will contribute to the health of online discourse and strengthen democracy, if successful.

    a. Landscape existing tooling and identify high priority gaps.
    b. Align with the Tooling Hub concept called for in [Scaling Trust on the Web](#) report (as being further developed by Schmidt Futures).
    c. Assess CCIAO data and articulate specific priorities for prosocial interventions.

s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)

Christchurch Call Unit workplan tracker

July 2023

VERSION ONE

IN CONFIDENCE

What are these slides

- A view of the main deliverables and milestones for the Christchurch Call Unit
- An aide to delivery, management and communications intended to cover all major priorities and at least 80 per cent of total team effort
- Updated with a check in on progress towards the end of most months

- There are three versions each month:
  — v1 has the same content as the month before – used for your updates
  — v2 is the version created for the review meeting – built from your updates
  — v3 is the final version – adjusted after the discussion at the meeting

- Contact:
  s9(2)(g)(ii)

  Policy Advisory Group
  Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
  s9(2)(a)

The asks for you this month

1.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

2.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

3.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

Output	By March 2023	June	September	De
Develop Call into self-sustaining community. Resources: L / M / H Main Call Commitment: [α]				
Develop tools to help test algorithmic Outcomes Resources: L / M / H Main Call Commitment: 14				
[words about transparency] Resources: L / M / H Main Call Commitment: [λi]				
Strengthen incident response:				

## Workstreams against leader expectations

External workstreams (1-3)	Leader expectations (2021 + 2022 Summit) (CCU SG#5 summary)	Are we on track
1. Develop Call into self-sustaining community (Hisham)	Build a self-sustaining community with a shared sense of purpose, aligned expectations, responsibility, and ownership. Strengthen the Civil Society Advisory Network, help them to diversify their expertise, diversity, and make better use of their advisory function + specific outreach to, and consideration of issues for LGBTQIA+ and youth Help GIFCT to become an effective delivery vehicle. Grow industry support for the Call incl. gaming, and those with a young, and/or regionally diverse user base + outreach to small platforms Structured conversations with supporters on delivery of Call Commitments. Deliver a community platform [repeat priority for Leaders]	[Yes / In part,/ No what more do you comment]
	Review and update the shared Crisis Protocol (+ continued effort with particular focus on purpose, activation criteria, extending participation across Call Community, including CCAN) Establish human rights and due process protections (+ continued effort in Call Community, GIFCT Incident Response Working Group) Support and engage with GIFCT to improve their incident response	

Background

The tracker just covers Call Unit work

Call Community work

Governments' Call work

Call commitments

Companies' Call work

Call Unit work covered by this Tracker
(not to scale)

There are four Call priorities plus a group for cross-cutting priority work

Building the Call Community

We seek to deepen engagement among the Call Community, increase the diversity of representation, and strengthen our infrastructure.

Objectives:
- Increase the number of online service provider supporters
- Increase engagement with existing supporters, including through the development of a community platform
- Continue regular dialogue on policy issues and sharing of best practice
- Support the Christchurch Call Advisory Network to build its advisory function and grow its expertise and diversity
- Continue to strengthen ties with the GIFCT and Tech Against Terrorism

Algorithms and Positive Interventions

We are focused on improving our understanding of user journeys and the role of algorithms in driving online radicalisation, and developing positive interventions to keep users safe.

Objectives:
- Improve understanding of online user journeys and the role they may play in radicalisation, how online and offline factors interact, how content recommendation processes might be exploited, and ways to mitigate this.
- Work across the tech sector and government to understand data and information needs for effective research.
- Progress the Initiative on Algorithmic Outcomes, to help enable independent research on these important questions.

Crisis and Incident Response

We continue to test and refine our approach to crisis response to prevent the spread of terrorist and violent extremist content in real time.

Objectives:
- Bring diverse companies – both large and small - into crisis response.
- Extend participation in the Christchurch Call Crisis Response Protocol, including active roles for civil society, researchers, and communities.
- Continue to strengthen the crisis response system, human rights protections and transparency.

Transparency

We are focused on building greater transparency from Government and Online Services Provider supporters, including by encouraging supporters to report on content flagging and removal

Objectives:
- Develop and make readily accessible for the Call's tech company and government supporters' advice on how to provide meaningful transparency for key stakeholders.
- Continue encouraging and supporting Call supporters to make demonstrable improvements in their transparency practices and reporting.

Cross-Cutting Work

We are progressing several areas of work that contribute to all or several of the priorities.

Objectives:
- Launch a workstream on new technologies (including Generative AI)
- Deepen the evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism and terrorism
- Contribute to tech governance initiatives on related issues
- Deliver options and advice on the awareness, capacity and willingness of smaller platforms (including unmoderated and 'alt-tech' services) to counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation
- Bring together a working group focused on upholding the commitment to a free, open and secure internet in Call-related work

The are nine external Call Unit workstreams to deliver on the five Call priorities

Building the Call Community

Algorithms and Positive Interventions

Crisis and Incident Response

Transparency

Cross-cutting work

Priority	Call Unit external workstreams
Building the Call Community	1. Community: Develop the Call into self-sustaining community (includes specific outreach to and consideration of issues for LGBTQIA+ and youth) (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Algorithms and Positive Interventions	2. Algorithms: Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Crisis and Incident Response	3. Crisis Response: Strengthen incident response and expand participation (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Transparency	4. Transparency: Enhance government and company transparency (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)
Cross-cutting work	5. New Tech: Launch a workstream on new technologies including Generative AI (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) 6. Gender: Deepen the evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) 7. Parallel initiatives: Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives on related issues (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) 8. Smaller platforms: Deliver options and advice on the awareness, capacity and willingness of smaller platforms to counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) 9. Free, Open and Secure Internet (FOSIC): Establish a working group to ensure understanding and upholding of commitments in Call-related work (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)

Quarterly Deliverables Tracker

External workstream (1 to 4)	By March 2023	June	September	December
1. Community: Develop Call into self-sustaining community Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: 13, 15, 22		s9(2)(g)(i) Engagement plan for Posts Deliver on the Call's anniversary plan Christchurch visit	RightsCon reports Christchurch visit report Implemented NZ Post engagement plan Complete testing phase of Community workstream Increase the number of partners and supporters	CCAN has had a number of advisory sessions with call supporters
2. Algorithms: Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitments: 11, 14, 15	Proof of function for CCIAO with two online platform datasets in parallel	Convene Algorithmic Oversight Group Researchers complete CCIAO proof of concept	Agree in principle long term setup of CCIAO and new pilot projects Expand CCIAO to other partners	CCIAO structure up and running Agree a way forward for work on how to assess interventions
3. Crisis response: Strengthen incident response and expand participation Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: 20		Plan for Crisis Response Protocol (CRP) work	Crisis response for smaller platforms s9(2)(f)(iv) GIFCT Incident Response working group delivers view of success measures (TBC)	s9(2)(f)(iv) Begin to design/organise TTX for international IR system, including new small firms mechanism, for 5th anniversary?
4. Transparency: Enhance government and company transparency Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitments: 2, 6, 7, 10, 22	Government: Community work designed and scheduled. Read literature.	Government: Community sessions completed.	Company: ACT Portal delivered Government: Community guidance consulted and published, with recs for Leaders. *GIFCT Transparency Working Group delivers toolkit*	Benchmarks and monitoring for improvements in government and company transparency. Agreed programme of work to further elaborate government guidance.

Christchurch Call Unit deliverables

| External workstream (5 to 8)	By March 2023	June	September	December
5. New tech: Launch a workstream on new technologies, including Generative AI Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitment: 5, 6, 20		Convene working group Discuss intersectional approaches at RightsCon Drafting issue report	Report on key issues, risks, opportunities and next steps for Call Community	s9(2)(f)(iv)
6. Gender: Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Medium Main Call Commitments: 16, 23, 24, 25	Agree goals for gender work Global Partnership evidence base paper from UK	Community gender research agendas aligned, some research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#1 and RightsCon sessions Global Partnership intervention programmes catalogue	Community gender research agendas aligned, ongoing research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#2 with policy brief delivered; RightsCon recs ; bilaterals with OSPs Engagement with CCIAO	Ongoing research delivered s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
7. Parallel initiatives: Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitments: 25		s6(b)(ii)	Detailed advice for PM and Special Envoy on parallel approaches to disinformation and related issues.	
8. Smaller platforms: Deliver options to strengthen the awareness, capacity and willingness of smaller platforms to counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation Lead s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: High Main Call Commitment: TBC		Begin consultation with Call Community and select smaller platforms	Finalise report on strengthening smaller platform awareness, capacity and willingness Co-launch mechanism / tools for smaller platforms (TBC)	Workstream merges into BAU

Christchurch Call Unit deliverables

External workstream (9)	By March 2023	June	September	December
9. FOSIC: Establish a cross-cutting working group to ensure understanding and upholding of the commitment to a free, open and secure internet in Call-related work Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitment: TBC		s9(2)(f)(iv)		

Internal outputs	By March 2023	June	September	December
Ensure visibility of Call-relevant domestic projects across agencies Lead: [TBC] Resources: Medium Main Call Commitment: TBC		Regular checkin with DIA and other Internet Governance officials		Annual stocktake before Steering Group meeting
Future of the Call Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii) Resources: Low Main Call Commitment: None		Develop and distribute a view of the options for internal discussion and agreement	Discuss with France as a prelude to wider community conversations (TBC)	

Supporting workstreams	By March 2023	June	September	December
Milestones and events s9(2)(g)(ii)	Briefing for incoming PM Announce Envoy role	Budget (May) GIFCT summit (June) RightsCon (June)	TrustCon (July) UNGA (Sep) UK AI Summit (Spring)	IGF (Oct) Paris Peace Forum (Nov)
Planning and reporting s9(2)(g)(ii)		Steering Group (Jun) Progress update to Cabinet (Jul)	Steering Group (Oct)	Steering Group (Dec) s9(2)(f)(iv)
Special Envoy s9(2)(g)(ii)		Deliver Anniversary webinar speech (pre-record) Deliver RightsCon opening speech (pre-record) SF: tech company and NGO outreach (Jun 8 and 9) First set of media engagements (TBC)	Deliver TrustCon speech (pre-record) Harvard fellowships formally begin UNGA events s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)	IGF attendance (session with Maria Ressa) (8/9 Oct) Paris Peace Forum (TBC)
Unit travel s9(2)(g)(ii)		Ottawa: Countering Radicalisation (early May) SF: Tech ambassadors (mid May) Costa Rica: RightsCon (early June) SF: meetings incl GIFCT summit (mid-June) Singapore: GIFCT, TAT, Meta workshops (mid-May)	SF: IETF 117, TrustCon (July) Montreal: AI Ethics and Society conference (Aug) NY: UNGA events (Sep) Stanford: Trust & Safety Research Conference (Late Sep) Pittsburgh: Eradicate Hate (September)	

Monthly plans

1. Community: Develop Call into self-sustaining community (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s9(2)(g)(i) Engagement plan for Posts Deliver on the Call's anniversary plan Christchurch visit	RightsCon report Christchurch visit report Implemented NZ Post engagement plan Complete testing phase of Community workstream Increase the number of partners and supporters	CCAN has had a number of advisory sessions with call supporters
	April: Complete the government community workstream concept note CCU workstream updates now standing part of CCAN monthly update Develop concept note on youth and contact the main relevant stakeholders	**July:** Test ideas with a pilot group of young people Ongoing engagement with country supporters, including calls with Netherlands and Ireland Engagement with Posts: FM on Call Summit during UNGA Start CCAN engagement plan implementation Pipeline of new partners onboarded, plus key OSPs in new tech	**October:**
	May: Held Te Rourou session and call with Costa Rica; briefed PM for Coronation engagements Deliver Call Anniversary Plan (16 May) Engagement with stakeholders with interest and expertise in the youth workstream	**August:** Additional, key OSPs onboarded (OpenAI, Anthropic, Discord?)	**November:**
	June: Engagement with Posts in NL, IR, Kenya, Ghana, Japan and SK Bilateral with Costa Rican government	**September:**	**December:** OSPs onboard s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)

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2. Algorithms: Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Proof of function for CCIAO with two online platform datasets in parallel	Convene Algorithmic Oversight Group Researchers complete CCIAO proof of concept	Agree in principle long term setup of CCIAO and new pilot projects Expand CCIAO to other partners	CCIAO structure up and running Agree a way forward for work on how to assess interventions Long term funding arrangements settled
	April: Completed phase 1 and setting up of data nodes at DailyMotion, LinkedIn and Twitter	July: Outreach with Call Community	October: Launch of next phase – researcher access tool and project funding
	May: Confirming US and French funding for the project Start of phase 2 testing on real data Final New Zealand payment to OpenMined	August: Finalisation of announcements for UNGA meeting and decisions on funding and institutional design for next phase of project Formal onboarding of France and DailyMotion s9(2)(ba)(i), s9(2)(j)	November:
	June: Engagement with researcher community on roll out of the PET tool	September: Announcement of outcomes on CCIAO s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)	December:

3. Crisis response: Strengthen incident response and expand participation (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s9(2)(f)(iv)	Crisis response for smaller platforms s9(2)(f)(iv) GIFCT Incident Response working group delivers view of success measures (TBC)	s9(2)(f)(iv)
	April: Small firms project proposal. Facilitate CCAN discussion on Nashville/bystander footage Notify Community of Louisville CIP activation; media points for PM GIFCT IRWG: Identification of quantitative metrics.	**July:** Commenting on draft IRWG output on success measures for incident response. s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)	**October:** s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j) Begin work on TTX for early 2024 or in conjunction with 5th anniversary.
	May: Compile target list and questions for CRP consultation, schedule meetings. Commission work on small firms Initial FOSI meeting GIFCT IRWG: Participate in GIFCT Louisville debrief. Human rights metrics.	**August:** s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)	**November:** s6(a), s9(2)(j)
	June: Conclude initial consultation with key stakeholders on changes to CRP GIFCT IRWG: Bystander footage deep dive.	**September:** s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j) GIFCT WG publishes success measures.	**December:**

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4. Transparency: Enhance government and company transparency (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Government: Community work designed and scheduled. Read literature.	Government: Community sessions completed. Final draft of Community advice out for feedback/input.	Company: ACT Portal delivered Government: Community guidance and best practice examples published GIFCT Transparency Working Group delivers toolkit	
	April: First Community Session on Government Transparency (13 April) First draft of Community advice circulated for feedback/input GIFCT TWG: Overview of toolkit proposal	July: Complete full draft of Community guidance and best practice examples. GIFCT TWG: Feedback on toolkit.	October: Schedule work on benchmarking and next steps to elaborate guidance for Governments.
	May: Second Community Session (17 May). Iterate draft advice for feedback/input Identify with ACT areas for collaboration on government transparency	August: WG and Community engagement on draft Guidance, and recommendations for Leaders	November:
	June: Third Community Session. Iterate draft advice for feedback/input Support awareness raising of ACT portal at RightsCon GIFCT TWG: Feedback on toolkit	September: Publish Guidance in conjunction with Summit. Set out next steps.	December:

5. New tech: Launch a new technologies workstream, including Generative AI (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	Convene working group Discuss intersectional approaches at RightsCon Drafting issue report	Working Group includes sub-groups Report on key issues, risks, opportunities and next steps for Call Community	Working group agrees key recommendations
	April: WG Meeting #1	July:	October:
	May: WG Meeting #2	August: Sub-groups formally established and meeting regularly Whole of WG convenes to discuss initial recommendations / opportunities	November:
	June: Draft issue report RightsCon Session	September: Early Sept – WG shares initial advice on opportunities with community Mid-late Sept – initial advice on opportunities, next steps shared with leaders.	December:

6. Gender: Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
Agree goals for gender work Global Partnership evidence base paper from UK	Community gender research agendas aligned, some research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#1 and RightsCon sessions Global Partnership intervention programmes catalogue	Community gender research agendas aligned, ongoing research delivered Advising OSPs: ISD WG#2 with policy brief delivered; RightsCon recs; bilaterals with OSPs Engagement with CCIAO	Ongoing research delivered s6(a)
	April:	July: RightsCon session findings paper and Community consultation (25 July) s9(2)(f)(iv) Community gender group meeting with research members (GNET, ISD) presenting research agendas (TBC) Intro meetings with interested gender researchers following outreach efforts	October:
	May: ISD WG#1 on OSP TVEC/gender policies Community design and consultation of RightsCon session	August: Meetings with OSPs to understand current efforts + recs for Summit (+ drafting gender Summit outputs) (by w/e 04/08) Co-draft (co-consult) ISD policy brief + resource base GNET's gender/TVEC list reviews complete, 25 August	November: GNET's GBV week (TBC)
	June: RightsCon session on advice to OSPs on TVEC/gender, 6 June ISD WG#2 on OSP TVEC/gender policies	September: ISD policy brief due (first week)	December:

7. Parallel initiatives: Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	s6(b)(ii)	Detailed advice for PM and Special Envoy on parallel approaches to disinformation and related issues	
	April:	July:	October:
	May:	August: Advice to PM and Special Envoy on approaches to Disinformation and related issues	November:
	s6(b)(ii)	September: Decisions regarding ongoing engagement	December:

8. Smaller platforms: Deliver options to strengthen the awareness, capacity and willingness of smaller platforms to counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

| March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	Begin consultation with Call Community and select smaller platforms	Finalise report on strengthening smaller platform awareness, capacity and willingness Co-launch mechanism / tools for smaller platforms (TBC)	Workstream merges into BAU
	April:	**July:** • Discussions on smaller platforms held in Crisis Response, New Tech and FOSIC working groups • Discussions held with select smaller platforms about joining the Call	**October:** • Outstanding potential Call supporter companies processed or referred to Tech Against Terrorism
	May:	**August:** • All consultation finalised by end of month • Smaller platforms report draft completed and reviewed • Support announceable for smaller platforms finalised • Finalise discussions on new Call supporter smaller platforms	**November:** • Smaller platforms workstream concludes and all remaining actions merged into BAU Call work
	June: • Meetings with select Call supporters and smaller platforms • Initial research and drafting of smaller platforms report • Begin coordination with Tech Against Terrorism, France and Canada on TCAP support announceable	**September:** • Smaller platforms report released • Support announceable launched at Leaders Summit • New Call supporters announced	**December:**

9. FOSI: Establish a cross-cutting working group to ensure understanding and upholding of the commitment to a free, open and secure internet in Call-related work (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)

March quarter	June quarter	September quarter	December quarter
[blank]	Convene working group Discuss intersectional approaches at RightsCon Drafting issue report	Report on key issues, risks, opportunities and next steps for Call Community	Working group agrees key recommendations
	April:	July: • Meeting With Smaller Platforms Work Lead—discussion-based work on understanding and taking actions around the role of smaller platforms in TVEC, including the intersection with internet infrastructure	October: • Working group pivots to a focus on guidelines for internet infrastructure service providers or another focus as guided by Leaders/Working Group
	May: • Convene expert group • Agree approach for Working Group establishment	August: • Finalise input for inclusion in the Smaller Platforms Report in the Smaller Platforms Workstream	November:
	June: • Hold introductory meeting to evaluate work to date and upcoming agenda	September: • Leaders' Summit • Capacity to continue FOSIC workstream reassessed	December:

Christchurch Call Unit high-level comms calendar (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii))

Channel	By March 2023	June	September	December
Website		Special Envoy – news story (April) Call Anniversary – news story, speech notes (May)		
Social media		Special Envoy – PR tweet (April) Call anniversary content (May)		
Communications to Posts		FM on Special Envoy (April) Staff forum for MFAT Posts, plus intranet news story and video (April)		
Call community (Monthly newsletter)		Call Anniversary Webinar (15 May) SF: tech company and NGO outreach (Jun 8 and 9)	s9(2)(f)(iv)	
CCAN (Zoom, last Friday of the month)				
Press		SE: Op-ed delivered s9(2)(g)(ii) NATO DEEP podcast (recorded April, aired May)		
Events and major partner engagements	Announce Envoy role	Budget (May) GIFCT summit (June) RightsCon (June)	TrustCon (July) UNGA (Sep)	IGF (Oct) Paris Peace Forum (Nov)

What comes next

Ideas for post-Summit work programme by workstream

External workstreams (1)	Potential post Summit work programme
1. Community: Develop Call into self-sustaining community s9(2)(g)(ii) 2021 Work Plan, reaffirmed in 2022 Summit: Leader expectations from last time: • Build a self-sustaining community with a shared sense of purpose, aligned expectations, responsibility, and ownership. • Strengthen the Civil Society Advisory Network, help them to diversify their expertise, diversity, and make better use of their advisory function + specific outreach to, and consideration of issues for LGBTQIA+ and youth • Help GIFCT to become an effective delivery vehicle. • Grow Industry support for the Call incl. gaming, and those with a young and/or regionally diverse user base + outreach to small platforms • Structured conversations with supporters on delivery of Call Commitments. • Deliver a community platform (repeat priority for Leaders)	s9(2)(g)(i) - decisions on work programme are set out in the 2023 Leaders' Summit Joint Statement which is publicly available on the Christchurch Call website.

Ideas for post-Summit work programme by workstream

| External workstreams (2-3)	Potential post Summit work programme
	s9(2)(g)(i) - decisions on work programme are set out in the 2023 Leaders' Summit Joint Statement which is publicly available on the Christchurch Call website.

2. Algorithms: Understand and address the impacts of algorithms on the distribution of TVEC s9(2)(g)(ii)

Leader expectations:
- Better understanding of user journeys and platforms' role in radicalisation
- Identify more effective design tweaks and intervention points to make the online environment safer
- Empower a new generation of community-led online interventions
- Develop shared approaches, push towards research pilots and studies, and build the collective evidence base
- Establish more transparency and redress mechanisms for algorithms that remove TVEC
- Prioritise new tools
- Develop a new suite of shared technical tools to eliminate TVEC

3. Crisis response: Strengthen incident response, and expand participation s9(2)(g)(ii)

Leader expectations:
- Review and update the shared Crisis Protocol and extend participation
- Establish human rights and due process protections
- Engage with GIFCT to improve its incident response framework
- Continue to build, test, and refine tools for collective response
- Ensure shared industry tools remain effective
- Specific work on small and alt-tech platforms
- Respond to incidents and deliver debriefs
- Build a global community of practice on incident response

Ideas for post-Summit work programme by workstream

External workstreams (4-6)	Leader expectations	Potential post Summit work programme
4. Transparency: Enhance government and company transparency s9(2)(g)(ii)	• Establish more interactive multi stakeholder policy dialogue on topical policy issues, improve input on policy and increase trust & understanding • Raise awareness about the Call – what it does and how it operates • Gather existing resources and make them accessible to governments and companies • Identify trust gaps and transparency needs of different stakeholders • Enhance information sharing and establish communities of practice for government and tech company transparency • Find ways to scale up support for new/small/different companies to do transparency & reporting	s9(2)(g)(i) - decisions on work programme are set out in the 2023 Leaders' Summit Joint Statement which is publicly available on the Christchurch Call website.
5. New tech: Launch a workstream on new technologies (including Generative AI)	• Launch a workstream on new technologies (including on ways Call commitments can be effected in new online environments)	
6. Gender: Deepen evidence base on linkages between online gender-based extremism and violent extremism s9(2)(g)(ii)	• Deepen evidence base on linkages between online misogyny and gender-based hatred and extremism as vectors for violent extremism and terrorism online	

Ideas for post-Summit work programme by workstream

External workstreams (7-9)	Leader expectations	Potential post Summit work programme
7. Parallel Initiatives: Contribute to parallel tech governance initiatives (Lead s9(2)(g)(ii)	• Contribute to parallel initiatives on related issues and ensure that the Call work complements and contributes to broader tech governance effort	s9(2)(g)(i) - decisions on work programme are set out in the 2023 Leaders' Summit Joint Statement which is publicly available on the Christchurch Call website.
8. Smaller Platforms: Deliver options to strengthen the awareness, capacity and willingness of smaller platforms (including unmoderated and 'alt-tech' services) to counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation. (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)	• Start Community work on options and advice for Call Supporters to address the role of unmoderated and 'alt-tech' services in disseminating terrorist and violent extremist content, day-to-day and in crises, while protecting and respecting human rights and maintaining a free, open, and secure internet.	
9. FOSIC: Establish a cross-cutting working group to ensure understanding and upholding of the commitment to a free, open and secure internet in Call-related work. (Lead: s9(2)(g)(ii)	• All action on this issue must be consistent with principles of a free, open and secure internet.	

What is next

Items to discuss in monthly review (July 24)

s9(2)(g)(ii)

- Welcome, new people
- What has changed since last month
- Periodic reminder of the weighty responsibilities of the workstream lead role

Workstream leads

- Talk to your thoughts on potential post-Summit workplans for your workstream (slides 25 to 28)

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- New lead for the community workstream, the gender workstream and domestic coordination
- Check in on communications planning
- Next steps:
  - o No review next month
  - o Future of the Call update
  - o First workplan publication to the Call Community